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AT THE END  of the last millennium, in Good Looking: Essays on the Virtue 
of Images, visual studies scholar Barbara Maria Stafford called into question 
the long-standing supremacy of the “identification of writing with intellectual 
potency” (5). She argued that the dominant literate and linguistic perspectives 
in culture had led to a bias in which printed words were intrinsically (though 
by no means naturally) coupled with reason and “introspective depth,” while 
visual aesthetics and image-based representations (i.e., the practice of imag-
ing) were viewed as a kind of “dumbing down” (4). For Stafford this was prob-
lematic because it ignored the complex ways in which visual media functioned 
(from epistemic to aesthetic impulses) and actively reduced the visual register 
(among others) to a linguistic or literate order. She argued that “verbalizing 
binaries,” like signifier/signified, “turned noumenal and phenomenal experi-
ence into the product of language” (5), which not only reinscribed a Carte-
sian separation of the mind and body but also routinely “collaps[ed] diverse 
phenomenological performances . . . into interpretable texts without sensory 
diversity” (6). What gets elided in these orientations, according to Stafford, is 
“the developmental link between perception and thought” (6), which is pre-
cisely what good imaging work attempts to foreground.
In challenging this bias, Stafford was not attempting to delegitimize writ-
ing (or the study of linguistics); rather, she was trying to grasp the “genuine 
nature” of a different set of representational and communicational values: cre-
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ating a space for reimagining the power of imaging and, in so doing, free-
ing “graphicacy” and the realm of the visual aesthetic from its “subordinate 
[position] to literacy” (5). Moreover, Stafford was interested in reclaiming a 
certain value (and validity) to imaging itself—a rich and “fascinating modal-
ity for configuring and conveying ideas” (4)—as well as attempting to foster 
a better position from which to approach twenty-first-century thinking and 
engagement. If the age of computerism, as Stafford referred to the turn of the 
millennium, was to be dominated by image-based mediascapes, then a new 
order was required.
But while Stafford was so eloquently arguing for the epistemic value 
of imaging—embracing the aesthetic dimension as a way of knowing and 
accounting for the various impacts of critical and creative media on human 
consciousness (70)—twenty-first-century academia continued to proliferate 
literacies (and literacy-ensconced orientations) with great fervor. Even a cur-
sory glance around higher education today, now twenty-plus years removed 
from Stafford’s efforts, reveals a world littered with literacies: digital literacies, 
computational literacies, multimodal literacies, gaming literacies, techno-liter-
acies, screen literacies, and so on. (There seems a literacy for everything!) But 
for all their administrative appeal and cache, what resides at the core of these 
varied “literacies,” as rhetoric and composition scholar Kathleen Blake Yancey 
intimated in “Made Not Only in Words: Composition in a New Key,”1 is the 
attempt (among scholars) to bring “inside” the academy what is otherwise a 
series of techniques and techné developing and circulating among a digital 
public “outside” academic walls (see also Benkler2). There is, then, something 
else wanting (and something else at work) in today’s rich mediascapes—which 
have only exponentially increased the visual saturations of media to which 
Stafford was responding.
Now, in making even a general appeal to something outside the literacy 
framework, I do not mean to discredit literacy, nor to dispense altogether with 
literacy-orientations—for the literacy frameworks should remain among the 
 1. This essay, which Yancey delivered as the 2004 CCCC Chair’s address, takes stock of 
the vast types of writing (and writing practices) proliferated by writing technologies—inviting 
writing studies to reconsider its role and pedagogies in relation to “writing publics”: those writ-
ing groups and practices that take shape and get distributed via participatory communities that 
form outside scholarly institutions.
 2. In The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom, 
Yochai Benkler argues that the means of production are now held in common (no longer 
restricted to commercial owners), which means that what gets produced is no longer limited to 
the professional class and/or to the constraints of institutional platforms but rather reflects the 
coming together of “otherwise unconnected individuals” via network technologies to pursue 
common goals, engage in the sharing and distribution of knowledge, and facilitate new “con-
densation point[s] for human connection” and creation (375).
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set of perspectives that individuals might draw from for thinking about, work-
ing with, and explaining various medial elements (particularly those actually 
grounded in literacy practices). But to adopt a literacy-orientation as the pri-
mary (and sometimes only) response to new mediating technologies and the 
human–technology relationships they introduce is, at best, short-sighted, and, 
at worst, egregious in how it limits thinking and practice. Let me offer the 
following analogy: In a 2008 Anheuser Busch Superbowl commercial, titled 
“Wheel Sucks,” a group of cavemen attempt to push a large stone cooler full 
of Bud Light to a party. One caveman stops pushing the cooler, and, with 
exasperation, says, “We never make it to party.” The cavemen all look despon-
dent. Then another caveman (accompanied by heroic intro music) appears on 
the path in front of them. He boasts, “I invent Wheel!” and shoves the mas-
sive wheel over onto its side. As the stone wheel slams onto the dirt path, he 
says, with confidence and a sense of revelation, “Help get Bud Light to party.” 
The cavemen all get very excited. But in the next scene, the three men who 
were pushing the cooler through the dirt are now standing, carrying the large, 
heavy stone wheel at shoulder height, using it as platform to transport the 
even heavier cooler full of beer. One caveman, struggling under the weight of 
the stone-wheel-cooler apparatus, says to the others, “Wheel suck!”
Aside from its humor, the commercial points to a particular way the cave-
men relate to the technology of the wheel. To put it another way, despite the 
fuller range of affordances of the wheel, the cavemen failed to listen to the 
ways in which the wheel was calling to them to interact. Or rather, what they 
heard from the wheel and the manner in which they “listened” were condi-
tioned by the ways in which they knew how to make sense of things in the 
world—how they made sense of the new technology (wheel) was framed in 
terms of older technologies (e.g., platform). This does make some sense given 
that “new technologies,” as multimedia composition scholar Anne Wysocki 
has argued, always emerge “out of existing technologies and out of existing 
material economies, patterns, and habits” (8). Therefore, in its initial moment, 
the cavemen had little recourse but to think of the wheel in terms of a previ-
ous technology with which they were familiar: the platform. Of course, the 
wheel-as-platform does, in fact, “suck.” But is being a platform part of its affor-
dances? Yes. Can it work as a platform? Technically. Does it make sense that 
the cavemen made sense of the wheel as a platform? Absolutely. But does this 
make it any less absurd? No.
In a very correlative way, the current “caveman’s wheel” is the advent of 
new mediating technologies. And much like the cavemen, when rhetoricians 
approach new mediating technologies from the perspective of literacy, they 
too end up trying to carry the wheel—inevitably leading to the realization 
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that “Wheel suck!” What is needed instead, as rhetoric scholars Jenny Bay and 
Thomas Rickert argued in “Dwelling with New Media,” is an engagement that 
affords new mediating technologies their own ontological weight and/or rhe-
torical agency3—approaches that allow one to attune to technologies on their 
own terms. Not only does this help avoid reinscribing a literacy imperative in 
a literal sense, but it better positions new mediating technologies as partners 
in a symbiotic engagement, not as neutral servants to a human will.
This work, then, does not (re)turn to any literacy impulse, nor does it 
merely embrace Stafford’s new imagist figurations, but rather it attempts to 
afford a contemporary phenomenon its own ontological weight—attuning 
to the intuitions, implications, and insinuations of the techno-phenomenon 
known as the New Aesthetic as a way to expose new practices and proclivities 
for twenty-first-century rhetoricians. In turning to the New Aesthetic as focal 
entity, this work takes stock of contemporary mediascapes by immersing the 
inquiry in what media studies scholar and critical theorist David M. Berry 
refers to as the “inconspicuous surface-level expressions” and media artifacts 
of the everyday—which, he argues in “The Postdigital Constellation,” allows 
one to better grasp the ontological, ideological, and epistemological dimen-
sions of a given epoch (50).
NEW AESTHETIC: A FRAMING
The New Aesthetic will, of course, be more fully introduced in chapter 1, but 
something of a quick overview may help orient readers to the larger arc of this 
work. In 2011, after months of noticing a different kind of aesthetic sensibil-
ity and creative practice manifesting in art, culture, commerce, media, and 
the like, London-based artist James Bridle began capturing examples of what 
he saw as a “new aesthetic”—moments and manifestations that situated com-
putationality and related elements of the network apparatus as increasingly 
aestheticized values. Bridle gathered these examples into a Tumblr4 account, 
which he labeled the New Aesthetic. But as artist and designer Curt Cloninger 
argued in “A Manifesto for a Theory of the New Aesthetic,” what Bridle ended 
up creating was an archive documenting the residue of the digital in people’s 
 3. Bay and Rickert take up with philosopher Martin Heidegger’s concept of dwelling as 
a way of thinking about fuller orientations to human–technology dynamics. Specifically, they 
argue that humans adopt the very perspectives of their mediating technologies, which, in turn, 
reshape the ways that humans see (and understand) themselves in the world.
 4. Tumblr is a free social-media microblogging platform that allows users to post content, 
share media, and follow other Tumblr users.
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everyday lives (n.  pag.).5 Although this “documentation” (and subsequent 
mediations) may not have resulted in an aesthetic movement in proper, what it 
demonstrated was the rich complexities in contemporary human–technology 
assemblages—adding depth to how one might understand the techno-human 
capacities that individuals possess for experiencing and making sense of the 
(mediated) world. To this end, my intent in this book is to explore, explicate, 
and expand the critical and creative impulses of the New Aesthetic (as archive 
and rhetorical ecology), doing so not simply as an extended examination of 
the New Aesthetic but rather to delineate and leverage its operative contours 
and position them as loose guides for the doing of rhetoric in a post-digital 
age.
Given this turning to the New Aesthetic and the attempt to offer it its 
own ontological weight, there may be value in contextualizing the consider-
ations in relation to non-literacy medial orientations. One such frame is the 
pseudo-continuum that exists from new media studies to post-digital aesthet-
ics to the New Aesthetic. To better situate this tripartite, I offer the follow-
ing parallel with Web 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 considerations. The web (or Web 1.0) 
was fairly static (primarily a client-based internet), while Web 2.0 moved the 
world toward a dynamic social web. Web 3.0 is yet something else, involving, 
as media arts scholar Virginia Kuhn has argued in “Web Three Point Oh: The 
Virtual Is the Real,” at least three common approaches: a shift from indexical 
to semantic web, an attunement to an increasingly visually saturated culture 
(i.e., “imageworlds”; see also Stafford), and an orientation toward ubiquitous 
computing and the ways in which it breaks down any digital/real distinc-
tion (1).6 Digital media scholar Lukasz Mirocha contends, in “Communica-
tion Models, Aesthetics, and Ontology of the Computational Age,” that the 
New Aesthetic is “a movement rooted in Web 2.0 culture,” owing to how it 
operationalizes the “logic[s] of the hyperlinked interface and freely shareable 
information” (63). But Mirocha’s considerations are primarily grounded in the 
New Aesthetic’s Tumblr home (more about where it is than about rhetorical 
considerations of how it is or ontological considerations of what it is). Instead, 
as I think one will more readily see in this work, there is greater correla-
tion between Web 3.0 and the tenets of the New Aesthetic, particularly with 
 5. Cloninger situates the New Aesthetic as a process or orientation rather than as a sin-
gular aesthetic intentionality. For him it is fundamentally a matter of traces and residues being 
apperceived more readily in relation to affect than to any fixed line (or even fixing impulse) of 
critical theory.
 6. Kuhn explicitly looks at how Web 3.0 technologies call into question the very distinc-
tions between the virtual and the real. While she does not address the New Aesthetic in any 
capacity, many of the core gestures she makes of Web 3.0 have touchstones with the New Aes-
theticism explored in this work.
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considerations of “imageworlds” and their composing elements as well as the 
blurring of boundaries associated with ubiquitous computing. But the point at 
this juncture is not to squabble over Web 2.0 or Web 3.0 orientations; rather, 
it is to set up the following (loose) comparative: new media (and new media 
principles) took shape on the front edge of Web 1.0 technologies and solidi-
fied, more or less, in the Web 2.0 era; post-digital (and post-digital aesthetics) 
took shape somewhere between the coming of Web 2.0 technologies and the 
Web 3.0 turn; and the New Aesthetic was of a different moment yet, taking 
shape in a culture operating in (if not beyond) the Web 3.0 mobile, techno-
cultural scene.
What this parallel highlights is not only a kind of change in the opera-
tive tenets of networked (and mediating) technologies associated with each 
moment but also an additional tentativeness with how to proceed, especially 
from a rhetorical perspective. If this work does not move cautiously and criti-
cally with regard to certain assumptions (or even incongruities) across this 
medial spectrum, it could end up reproducing, at both theoretical and prag-
matic levels, the technocommercial practices that regularly lead to massive 
computational glitches and vulnerabilities—offering something of a caution-
ary tale.
For example, on July 8, 2015, a technical glitch grounded, for the entire 
day, all United Airlines flights in the US. That same day, the New York Stock 
Exchange and the Wall Street Journal websites went down as well—also glitch-
related. In addition to demonstrating how digital disasters have the potential 
to operate with the magnitude of a natural disaster, these events also revealed 
the scary reality that many major corporate glitches and computational mis-
haps are, as informatics scholar Zeynep Tufekci explained in “Why the Great 
Glitch of July 8th Should Scare You,” the result of what happens when years of 
low-bid, adjunct, software laborers “make things work” with emerging systems 
(n. pag.). Meaning, as Tufekci explains, that companies regularly pay (often 
entry-level) programmers to patch their existing systems into newer protocols. 
This makes sense, as entire system changes can be extremely expensive (in 
cost, in time, and especially in training) and technologies evolve so quickly 
that new systems are essentially outdated the moment they go live. But the 
result of multigenerational patchwork, which is methodologically similar to 
much in the scholarly world (e.g., digital literacy), is that more than occasion-
ally one is dealing with a major corporate computational structure operat-
ing on a piece of programming code written twenty to thirty years ago. That 
would be like hitching a Boeing 747 to a team of horses in order to get it up 
in the air—and what the New Aesthetic seems to be doing is highlighting the 
horseshit on the runway.
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Therefore, while it is important to consider things like new media perspec-
tives and even the nuances among post-digital orientations, this work will be 
attentive to the rhetorical limits of any patchwork concepts and structures 
that other medial orientations might provide. These other frameworks may 
help contextualize and even operationalize the rhetorical dimensions of the 
New Aesthetic, but the goal will be to explore the New Aesthetic as a rhetori-
cal ecology and to articulate its circulating intensities as operative guides for 
post-digital rhetoric.
THE ARCHITECTURE
This book unfolds across six chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 introduce New Aes-
theticism, situate the methodological orientations of the work, and rhetori-
cally maneuver through the New Aesthetic ecology to identify its contours. 
Chapters 3 through 6 each pick up with one of the four contours identified 
and positions their value for contemporary rhetorical considerations.
Working with a bit more granularity, chapter 1, “The New Aesthetic and 
(Post-)Digital Rhetoric,” provides a fuller outline of the New Aesthetic, situat-
ing its value for rhetorical studies and locating it within the formative tenets of 
digital rhetoric. It traces specific technological or medial implications through 
conversations in rhetoric, argues for the necessity of (if not recovery of) the 
aesthetic perspective (and a level of screen essentialism), and points to the 
underexplored rhetorical areas into which New Aestheticism pushes post-
digital practices.
Chapter 2, “Rhetorical Ecologies and the New Aesthetic,” introduces the 
methodology of this inquiry, which involves situating the New Aesthetic as a 
rhetorical ecology. To this perspective, the chapter adds the term contour as 
a way of capturing (and/or articulating) the circulating intensities among a 
given rhetorical ecology. Then, via rhetorical analysis, it explores the New Aes-
thetic ecology—specifically through the challenges lobbied at New Aestheti-
cism—to give shape to its contours, which become the focus of the remaining 
chapters.
Chapter 3 picks up with the contour of eversion as/of design, explicitly 
showing how the dueling orientations of “making digital things real” and 
“making real things digital” opens greater capacities for post-digital rhetori-
cians. But more than that, this contour blurs the digital/real divide, moving 
post-digital considerations away from the rhetoric of couplings and binaries 
toward matters of ecology—showing why systems that operate through a com-
plexity of relations (not either/or logics) are valuable. Specifically, it picks up 
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with the manners by which digital and nondigital materialities (and their cir-
culatory capacities) come to bear on post-digital rhetorical practices.
Chapter 4 picks up with the pixel orientation of the New Aesthetic to dem-
onstrate the ways in which mediating practices, through the human–tech-
nology assemblage, have the capacity to transform the very root of human 
sensibilities. But beyond accounting for how pixel aesthetics have become 
intertwined with human sensibilities, this chapter also brings Jay David Bolter 
and Richard Grusin’s considerations of remediation to bear on (a) the very 
experience of the pixel, and (b) how something like the New Aesthetic helps 
situate the rhetorical value (and significance) of the pixel itself.
Chapter 5 takes up with the contour of human–technology making, which 
resides at the very heart of New Aestheticism’s contribution to rhetorical 
studies. It attempts to demonstrate a more collaborative relationship between 
humans and technologies, and it reconfigures the rhetorical practices of post-
digital making in terms of a willingness to play rather than the long-standing 
orientation toward a will to mastery. This shift to play, in turn, invites new 
considerations as well as altogether new kinds of representative figures (e.g., 
post-digital practitioners) for the making of rhetoric.
Finally, chapter 6 treats the hyperawareness of mediation that runs through-
out most of the New Aesthetic. It returns the conversation to Bolter and 
Grusin and the experiences of mediation to illuminate the rhetorical value of 
hypermediation (in the artifacts themselves and in audience expectations), to 
call attention to the potential of crafting hyperrhetorical mediations, and to 
introduce the very necessity of moving away from practices rooted in ekphra-
sis toward those more firmly grounded in experience design.
Collectively, through these chapters, this work introduces the New Aes-
thetic, locates its value for rhetoric, situates it as its own rhetorical ecology, 
and uses its rhetorical dimensions to help call to attention its operative con-
tours. Then, working with each contour one by one, it introduces their com-
plexities, unpacks their value for understanding the rhetorical capacities of 
human–technology assemblages, and positions them as a guide for the prac-
tices of post-digital rhetoric. The first contour deals with the blurring of the 
digital/real divide and the very need for an ecological orientation. The second 
shows how technological values become human sensibilities and, in so doing, 
reshape rhetorical practices. The third highlights an altogether different ori-
entation to making—pointing to the collaborative (rather than controlling) 
partnerships among human–technology productions as well as to the genera-
tive value of the novice and the need to focus on human–technology relations. 
The fourth foregrounds the mediation itself and how contemporary media-
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tions play within the hypermediacy of their own medial practices, fostering 
awareness, working rhetorically, and inviting specific kinds of relationships 
and expectations from specific kinds of audiences. Together, the contours offer 
something akin to “a rhetoric” for post-digital knowing, doing, and making, 
and unpacking those considerations is the focus of this work.
10
C H A P T E R  1
The New Aesthetic and 
(Post-)Digital Rhetoric
IN O R A L I T Y  A N D  L I T E R AC Y:  The Technologizing of the Word, media and cul-
ture theorist Walter J. Ong offered the following statement: “Technology, prop-
erly interiorized, does not degrade human life but on the contrary enhances 
it” (83). This statement echoes the core of this work, which seeks not to raise 
further alarm about the mechanization of human bodies, nor to reinscribe 
any particular tool/user paradigm, but rather to sincerely inquire after the 
human–technology relationships at the center of so many cultural and com-
mercial activities today. As such, the intent of this inquiry is twofold: first, to 
understand the impact of emergent ordering principles, representational prac-
tices, privileged perspectives, and technological values (aesthetic or algorith-
mic, material or mathematical) on human ways of being in (and representing) 
the world; and second, to capture something of an “enhanced” posthumanism 
taking shape in today’s digitally saturated moment. But to illuminate these 
considerations with any granularity requires more than just general gestures 
toward technology—as mediating condition or material apparatus. There-
fore, this work will explicitly take up with the techno-aesthetic phenomenon 
known as the New Aesthetic, with the goal of situating its contours as heuretics 
for twenty-first-century critical and creative practices. I use the term heuret-
ics here in the way it has been introduced by cybermedia scholar and criti-
cal theorist Gregory L. Ulmer: as the inventive counterpart to the process of 
interpretation (hermeneutics). Meaning that heuretics are intended to move 
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rhetors (and their rhetorical inclinations) out of categorical imperatives tied 
to judgment and to instead situate them on a generative plane, one linked 
to intuition and affect as much as to any governing logics. Thus, while the 
focus of this work is on the intersections and interpenetrations of humans 
and technologies and the object is the New Aesthetic, the output (the contri-
butions and scholarly interests) leans necessarily toward rhetoric, particularly 
the inventive practices central to rhetoric in a post-digital age.
The New Aesthetic was first introduced in May 2011 via a blog post1 on the 
Really Interesting Group website. There, designer and digital futurist James 
Bridle wrote about a new aesthetic sensibility and creative practice manifest-
ing in art, culture, commerce, media, and the like. The main thrust of this 
aesthetic involved everyday working creatives leveraging—as model, meta-
phor, and meme—the forms, functions, and infrastructures of computers and 
network culture. Bridle, in an attempt to demonstrate the nuances of this new 
aesthetic sensibility, embarked on a yearlong curatorial endeavor in which 
he gathered artifacts on a Tumblr account2 (the New Aesthetic archive), with 
each artifact serving, in some capacity, as witness to one or more aspects of 
New Aestheticism. The problem, however, was that Bridle’s artifacts varied 
so extensively in style, purpose, and delivery that there was little consistency 
among their critical features and aesthetic dimensions, making it difficult, if 
not impossible, to define. But as popular science fiction writer Bruce Sterling 
argued in “An Essay on the New Aesthetic,” even without clear definition or 
categorical distinction, the archive itself (particularly when coupled with the 
many commentaries on the New Aesthetic) did gesture toward something of 
significance (n.  pag.). That significance, as I will argue here, is a new kind 
of art practice and cultural critique—if not a twenty-first-century rhetori-
cal orientation—calling attention to human relationships with technologies, 
human acts of mediation, the systems and protocols that produce particular 
computational representations, and the human viewpoints that frame those 
considerations.
Note, however, that my perspective (rhetorically infused as it is) stands 
notably in counterdistinction to mainstream treatments of New Aestheti-
cism, which have primarily reduced the phenomenon to not much more than 
the novelty of pixelated representation—the use of 8-bit graphics (and their 
overtly pixelated qualities) in nondigital cultural spaces, as well as in things 
like screen glitches, downsampled satellite imagery, and the blurry squared 
 1. http://www.riglondon.com/2011/05/06/the-new-aesthetic/
 2. http://new-aesthetic.tumblr.com
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edges of render ghosts.3 But for Bridle, the would-be André Breton of this 
movement, the pixelated imagery was and is merely a kind of visual short-
hand—serving as a relay toward larger concerns: like the blurring bound-
aries between the digital and the real, and the underlying systems that (a) 
produce those boundaries and (b) produce culture-specific understandings 
of such (Bridle, “#sxaesthetic,” n. pag.). Or, said another way: while the New 
Aesthetic is attentive to the very media in which pixelated and glitched rep-
resentations are being undertaken (and of which they are reflective), it is just 
as concerned with the human–technology assemblages that allow critics and 
working creatives alike to make sense of those attunements on multiple lev-
els and scales. New Aestheticism may employ, in some cases, aesthetic sen-
sibilities linked to 8-bit graphics, but what it is about (if one can make such 
a statement) are the overt and subtle impacts of computational mediation on 
representation, expression, and existence (three considerations important to 
rhetorical studies).
Bridle’s curatorial Tumblr exercise was, then, more than just suggestive of 
a kind of network aesthetic (disruptive or otherwise). It was (and is), in many 
respects, a point of contact between what new media scholar Lev Manovich 
called Duchamp-land and Turing-land—a distinction offered in his 1996 arti-
cle, “The Death of Computer Art,” as a way of thinking through the contradic-
tory orientations for art and computational technology present at the end of 
the last millennium. Duchamp-land, which Manovich named after the twen-
tieth-century avant-garde artist Marcel Duchamp, pursued artistic practices 
and art objects that were oriented toward content, reveled in self-referentiality, 
and harbored a playful (if not destructive) impulse toward their own technic-
ity and materiality (n. pag.). Turing-land, named after Alan Turing, a founding 
figure in theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence, was oriented 
toward technology rather than content, preferred simplicity of design (and 
often seamlessness as a governing quality), and deployed technology toward 
serious ends (n. pag.). For Manovich, these two “lands” were never to converge, 
because “Duchamp-land want[ed] art, not research into new aesthetic possi-
bilities of new media” (n. pag.). Over a decade later, art scholar Claire Bishop 
reiterated some of these same tensions in her essay “Digital Divide,” indicating 
that despite contemporary artists in the first decade of the new millennium 
using new technologies in their work, they had not “really confront[ed] the 
question of what it means to think, see, and filter affect through the digital” 
 3. Render ghost is the name given to the deployment of images of people in digital visual-
izations—composite creations that use likenesses of individual people in decontextualized ways. 
This is particularly common in 2D and 3D architectural representations, where the designed 
spaces include human bodies as part of their visual representations (people in space, in action).
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(436).4 But the New Aesthetic, as art and design scholar Daniel Pinkas has 
suggested, points toward “confront[ing] these crucially important questions” 
precisely because it is situated in the convergences of these two “lands” (88).5 
The New Aesthetic does this by (a) highlighting specific instances in which the 
technological systems of Turing-land have come to produce the very aesthetic 
mediascapes of contemporary Duchamp-land, and (b) demonstrating how the 
aesthetic values of contemporary Duchamp-land have influenced the design, 
practice, and experience of everyday (computational) objects in Turing-land. 
To spin a line from journalist and art critic Josephine Bosma, the New Aes-
thetic may be art’s very response to the merging of these two lands—offering 
a screen-based way to perceive the art (and artistic tendencies and irruptions) 
of the coding core of computational culture (n. pag.).6
What is important, then, is not any specific categorical order—nor, as 
techno-culture scholar David M. Berry and his many collaborators7 express 
in New Aesthetic, New Anxieties, how the New Aesthetic might be funneled 
into the “established divides of creative industries, art practice and theory” 
(4)—but rather the larger complexity of relations among New Aestheticism 
that proffer different avenues for critique, creativity, commentary, and concep-
tualization. Of course, if these “avenues” could be marshaled toward providing 
structures, explanatory models, or representational techniques for designing 
mediated experiences, then New Aestheticism would have much to offer a 
range of critical and creative inquiry practices (for those in digital rhetoric 
and digital humanities alike). But New Aestheticism seems to actively resist 
the very codification needed for it to be “marshaled” anywhere. This is in 
keeping, of course, with most aesthetic turns, which traditionally resist being 
reduced to a set of tropes; but for Bridle the “resistance” is less tropological 
hesitation and more that New Aestheticism is an ongoing process of critical 
 4. In this piece, Bishop argues that while artists may use computational technologies in 
their processes, and while there is an entire subfield of new media art, turn-of-the-century 
prognostications of the impact of “the digital” on mainstream art never fully manifested.
 5. Pinkas’s “A Hyperbolic and Catchy New Aesthetic” situates the New Aesthetic as 
bringing together mediating technologies with human aesthetics and offering resolution to the 
fourth great discontinuity in human history: the separation of humans and machines.
 6. In “Post-Digital Is Post-Screen—Towards a New Visual Art,” Bosma argues that as digi-
tal mediation is pervasive and persists, to speak of any “post” requires an altogether different 
orientation, which she offers by extending visual thinking and critical art theory beyond the 
screen (and/or the screenic-spectacle).
 7. New Aesthetic, New Anxieties is a multiday, collaboratively written book sprint com-
pleted by Berry, Michel van Dartel, Michael Dieter, Michelle Kasprzack, Nat Muller, Rachel 
O’Reilly, and José Luis de Vicente. This was the first extended treatment of the New Aesthetic, 
which gave shape to its early lines of consideration and situated it as a mood (and/or collective 
feeling) designed to mobilize network mediations.
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and creative engagement (always in flux), born of a networked culture, taking 
place in/on/of networked worlds, and mirroring certain conditionalities of 
the network, which itself seems resistant to codification (“The New Aesthetic 
and Its Politics”). Take Sterling’s attempt to give shape to New Aestheticism 
as one demonstration of this resistance. Sterling offered readers over thirty 
definitional statements, ranging from “The New Aesthetic is a native prod-
uct of a modern network culture” to “it is rhizomic” to “the New Aesthetic 
is really a design fiction” (n.  pag.). But aside from helping mainstream the 
New Aesthetic by lending his celebrity to the issue, Sterling came up short in 
providing any conceptual whole as to what the New Aesthetic is, what it may 
become, or how it may be deployed. And he most certainly did not provide 
a set of tropes (hermeneutic or heuristic) that might allow for the New Aes-
thetic’s “marshaling.”
Part of the central tension to something like Sterling’s engagement is that 
his impulse was one of definition, an orientation not well equipped to respond 
to something as in flux as the New Aesthetic. But another part of this ten-
sion, in many ways connected to the larger concerns of New Aestheticism in 
general, is whether the New Aesthetic is (or wants to be) an aesthetic move-
ment. As Sterling pointed out, and others, like games scholar Ian Bogost, have 
echoed: a year’s worth of “eye-catching curiosities” curated by Bridle on a 
tumblr, though suggestive and significant, do not necessarily “constitute a 
compelling worldview” (Sterling n. pag.). The New Aesthetic collection may 
direct attention to things escalating in cultural and rhetorical significance—
such as the increasingly computational worlds in which humans act, and the 
proliferation of hybrid “ways of seeing” manifesting with human–technology 
assemblages—but as a movement it simply does not have a handle on the 
particular types of perception, beauty, judgment, and value that it privileges. 
Or, to put it in Sterling’s terms, the definitional frictions (if not anxieties) of 
the New Aesthetic result from its lacking a strong metaphysics. Instead of 
doing the work to establish itself on its own terms, the New Aesthetic has 
been getting by, as Sterling suggests, by hacking a modern (and postmodern) 
aesthetic—or, as artist Kyle McDonald critiques in “Personifying Machines, 
Machining Persons,” by mining and employing aesthetics from the function-
ally designed devices of everyday lives.
To be fair, Bridle never intended to launch an aesthetic movement. His 
project was merely a yearlong creative exercise, having little to do with mani-
festos and revolution—(rhetorical) staples of aesthetic movements. Instead, 
his was an emergent “thing,” tapping into the dynamics of networked cul-
ture to gather together “images and things that seem[ed] to approach a new 
aesthetic” of the network itself (Bridle, “The New Aesthetic” n. pag.). Bridle 
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adopted a “hey, look at this cool thing” methodology and pulled together arti-
facts that reveled in pixelated representation in nondigital/nonscreen spaces 
(Plate A), that included “born digital” architecture and its impossible mate-
rial structures (from the parametric school of architecture to more common 
3D-printing practices; Plate B), that featured render ghosts (pixelated and 
not) that populate the “virtual spaces of computer rendering software” (Bri-
dle, “The Render”), that highlighted computational glitches and the displaced/
disrupted images and sounds they produce, and that capitalized on represen-
tational practices designed to circumvent “machine vision,” like Adam Har-
vey’s CV Dazzle,8 one of the first entries on the New Aesthetic tumblr. [For all 
images, see the image gallery.]
Although each artifact gathered offered its own visual cues, with many 
possessing a notable degree of pixelation, what they all carried were markers 
of their underlying systems, which are, as Bridle argues, “inseparable from 
[the artifacts] and without which they would not exist” (“The New Aesthetic 
and Its Politics” n. pag.). Given this relation, there is a rhetorical tension at 
the core of New Aestheticism between (a) the visual elements that mark what 
many see as nothing more than pixel aesthetics and (b) the computational, 
social, and political systems that underlie those representations. Thus, while 
Bridle’s diverse collection of artifacts may resist being marshaled toward any 
particular sociopolitical agenda, and while the New Aesthetic may not be or 
may not represent a movement in proper—lacking a manifesto or revolution-
ary agenda—what it does offer is a set of gestures (and a collection of artifacts) 
that quite overtly mark a place for thinking about how individuals situate 
themselves in relation to particular technologies—a matter of critical signifi-
cance for contemporary rhetorical arts.
To this end, part of what makes the New Aesthetic of value (and even 
workable to a rhetorical context) is that despite the Tumblr archive being 
continued by Bridle beyond his initial yearlong vision, the broader conversa-
tions around the New Aesthetic have tapered off: its moment has more or less 
passed. But this distance is actually helpful because it allows one to approach 
the emergence of the New Aesthetic as a marked rhetorical ecology—an entity 
composed as much by its artifacts as by its surrounding arguments, with the 
flows that manifest across its visual and verbal registers putting into relief its 
varied shapes and shades. The New Aesthetic may not have coalesced into a 
complete, compelling worldview, but it did generate an ecology whose granu-
 8. Bridle was specifically working in relation to “Look #1” from Harvey’s CV Dazzle, but 
for a complete look at the project, visit https://cvdazzle.com.
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larities illuminate significant qualities for rhetorical practices in a post-digital 
culture.
RHETORICAL MOTIVATIONS
That rhetorical studies should have interest in the practices and purposes (if 
not emerging paradigm) of the New Aesthetic should come as no surprise 
because rhetoric, as an art, as techné, has always been concerned with mak-
ing—with how one produces discourse and/or artifacts for particular audi-
ences, in and of specific moments in time, space, and culture, and through 
various materialities and mediations. In this regard, the New Aesthetic offers 
much for consideration, as it reflects a set of practices and aesthetic values of 
a contemporary moment. But there is more at stake here in the rhetorical fla-
vor of this work, for what unfolds in the coming pages is a critical reciprocity: 
bringing rhetoric (and rhetorical perspectives) to bear on the New Aesthetic 
as a way of developing insights into New Aestheticism, and then extending 
those insights back into the practices of rhetoric as a way of guiding twenty-
first-century knowing, doing, and making.
To more fully situate the rhetorical inflection of this work, let me offer 
something of a quadrangle of motivations. First, the major claims in this argu-
ment take shape by adopting a rhetorical approach to the New Aesthetic (a 
matter rooted not in the definitional impulse of Sterling but in the conceptual 
orientations offered by Jenny Edbauer’s work on rhetorical ecologies, which are 
more fully explored in chapter 2). Second, rhetoric (as a mode of inquiry) has 
been quite absent from New Aesthetic conversations—with the overwhelm-
ing majority of its critical engagements coming out of new media studies, art 
criticism, and techno-culture perspectives. Third, as a kind of inversion of the 
previous point, the New Aesthetic has yet to be directly taken up in the field 
of rhetoric. This is especially interesting given how it so readily aligns with 
considerations of glitch, pixel art, dirty new media, computational subversion, 
digital representation, augmented installations, and the like, all of which have 
been touched on by rhetoric and composition scholars in recent years. As an 
orienting sample, in 2012 Alex Reid’s “Composing Objects: Prospects for a 
Digital Rhetoric” focused on glitch ontology as a way of thinking/rethinking 
writing and rhetoric practices. In 2013, in “Reclaiming Experience: The Aes-
thetic and Multimodal Composition,” Aimée Knight argued for a recovery of 
functional aesthetics as a critical orientation to techno-production—specifi-
cally grounded in multimodal composition practices. In 2015 Casey Boyle’s 
“The Rhetorical Question Concerning Glitch” extended Reid’s ontological 
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orientation and situated glitch as rhetorical invention. Later that year, Steven 
Hammer argued, in “Writing (Dirty) New Media / Glitch Composition,” that 
glitch and related dirty new media practices had a critical value for cultivat-
ing technical, rhetorical, and medial awareness among writers/rhetors. And in 
2017 Sean Morey and John Tinnell published Augmented Reality: Innovative 
Perspectives across Art, Industry, and Academia, an edited collection on aug-
mented reality that included a variety of rhetorical perspectives on how (and 
to what degree) digital technologies and physical/material spaces were con-
verging. Collectively, this brief sample helps set up the fact that over the past 
half-decade or so, rhetoric and composition scholars have demonstrated (a) 
that rhetoric can critically inform how one thinks about techno-phenomena 
related to the New Aesthetic, and (b) that those insights can, in turn, be 
brought back into rhetoric, illuminating different conditionalities and prac-
tices relevant to today’s emerging mediascapes.
The fourth and perhaps most significant motivation for the rhetorical con-
sideration here is pragmatic—for mediating technologies, whether emergent 
or established, influence the very means, modes, and metaphors by which one 
does rhetoric in the everyday (in the how of making rhetorical artifacts). And 
this has impact beyond just the making of mediated representations, as new 
mediating technologies (and their related aesthetics) also introduce new mod-
els and conceptual structures for thinking about and accounting for things in 
the world—for example, from viewing the brain as computer (a perspective 
increasingly problematized) to seeing pixels in nonpixel representations and 
artifacts (a dynamic this work examines in chapter 4). More to the point, 
computational, screen-based, networked media have fundamentally altered, 
augmented, and expanded the materialities and modalities, figures and forms 
available to rhetoric, and the New Aesthetic offers a finer granularity by which 
to take stock of these changes. In looking at the artifacts and objects of the 
New Aesthetic, and situating those in relation to a larger rhetorical orienta-
tion, one can more readily grasp the privileged patterns, perspectives, and 
practices for knowing, doing, and making in and of post-digital culture; and, 
in turn, one can more easily put into relief current and emergent human and 
nonhuman conditions of being.
The latter (conditions of being) signals something of an essential concern 
for why any of this should matter to rhetorical studies. For as Boyle sets it 
up in “Writing and Rhetoric and/as Posthuman Practice,” the current human 
condition is one increasingly “practiced in” and “more sensitive to being in 
relation” with various technological systems (540). This indicates something 
far more invasive than just an increased frequency, familiarity, and function-
ality for rhetors to do things with technology. Instead, it gestures toward and 
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reflects a set of cultural circumstances in which the vast majority of day-to-
day experiences are mediated experiences: where Western culture is so satu-
rated by computational, screen-mediating technologies that to be is, in many 
ways, to be mediated—to relate to the world in mediated ways. Consequently, 
while mediating technologies undoubtedly augment technical capacities for 
expression (the classical “available means” line in rhetoric), what is more 
important is recognizing how new human–technology assemblages alter both 
the rhetorical practices by which people inhabit and interact with the world 
(and with things in the world) and the relationships that come to bear on how 
people make sense of those dynamics.9 The issue is not just that technologies 
extend human capacities for action but rather that they also introduce entirely 
different ways for people to think about, describe, qualify, and explain those 
actions, those capacities, and their place within that rhetorical potentiality.
If mediating technologies are central to how one measures and (re)makes 
(and makes over) the world, then those individuals with greater access to and 
greater affluence with mediating technologies (and their rippling implications) 
possess greater rhetorical capacities for action. To put it another way: those 
rhetors most adept with technologically rooted acts of perception, interpre-
tation, and representation are uniquely advantaged and can, in turn, poten-
tially leverage more rhetorical/cultural power in the hypertechnologized 
mediascapes of the contemporary moment. What takes center stage, then, 
is not the degree to which techno-human assemblages may render a person 
more or less human but rather the degrees of fluency (if not intimacy) that 
one possesses with technologically enhanced ways of being in the world (an 
increasingly mediated condition).
Therefore, it is my contention that the most important issue facing rheto-
ric today is understanding the relationships between humans and mediating 
technologies. For these relationships, and how they are rhetorically situated, 
not only influence (and reflect) the practices and purposes championed in 
current rhetorical pedagogy but also shape the very performances and prag-
matic engagements that working creatives (rhetoricians included) pursue in, 
with, or through screen-mediated discourse and the production of digital/
cultural artifacts. In taking up with emergent mediating technologies (and 
related phenomena like the New Aesthetic), rhetoric must include more than 
 9. In “Dwelling with New Media,” Bay and Rickert argue that “new media restructure our 
world” (118), which is not simply a matter of how new media help construct particular objects 
and artifacts in the world (and/or representations of such) but includes an ontological dimen-
sion that concerns “the totality of things and relations . . . within which we are situated” (118), 
including the conceptual ways in which one imagines and articulates her own technological 
relations.
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just a concern for how digital tools expand the “available means” or how new 
mediating technologies introduce different forms of writing. Instead, what is 
needed is an increased attentiveness to the human–technology assemblage 
and, as Boyle intimates, to how minor and major techno-human alterations 
introduce fundamental transformations in the available capacities of rhetoric 
and rhetorical being (“Rhetorical”; “Writing”).
To date, the scholarly area most concerned with technology’s impact on 
this shift in rhetorical capacity has been digital rhetoric, which I pick up in 
the next section—particularly trying to retain the aesthetic dimension opera-
tive in the formative moments of digital rhetoric, which has been somewhat 
abandoned in more recent efforts (from histories to new trajectories).
DIGITAL RHETORIC
Digital rhetoric has taken shape through a number scholarly fields—com-
puters and composition, humanities computing, media studies, new media 
studies, contemporary rhetoric, and the like—but its first known articulation 
comes from rhetoric scholar Richard Lanham, who coined the term in a lec-
ture in 1992.10 In this earliest of formations, Lanham made the case that com-
puters were as much rhetorical devices as logical ones (Electronic 31). But what 
Lanham understood, perhaps better than most, was that computers were more 
than just (the sum of) their operative practices. They were media devices—the 
very “machine created for Art-about-Art” (47)—and the media they produced 
and the representational practices they made possible were ripe with rhetori-
cal consideration. Instead of focusing on the “familiar Platonic, mathemati-
cal center of human reason,” which manifested regularly in the proffering of 
the computer as a logic machine (31), Lanham paid attention to the “com-
plete renegotiation of the alphabet/icon ratio” that was taking place through 
computational displays (34). What Lanham was doing, then, was not defining 
a digital rhetoric but rather drawing attention to “the extraordinary conver-
gence of twentieth-century thinking with digital means .  .  . [of] expression” 
(51). Thus, his digital rhetoric (as one major root) was ultimately grounded in 
screen-based representation and the expressive capacities emergent between 
human and screen mediations; and the mediating practices manifest on/
through computational displays were, in Lanham’s view, culturally situated 
 10. Lanham’s lecture, “Digital Rhetoric: Theory, Practice, and Property,” was originally pub-
lished in 1992 in the journal Literacy Online. He republished that lecture in 1993 in The Elec-
tronic Word, under the chapter title “Digital Rhetoric and the Digital Arts.”
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endeavors directly altering the practices of ekphrasis—an important element 
for this conversation.
Coming out of the rhetorical tradition as part of the progymnasmata (a 
series of exercises designed to prepare students for the production and per-
formance of oral declamations), the ekphrastic act involved bringing (via 
description) something visual, material, or experiential clearly before the eyes 
or minds of an audience. This was the job of the rhetor, particularly in public 
declamations: to present to an audience, via description, the scene or image or 
act or object of importance / under question. In thinking about the practice 
of ekphrasis more abstractly, however, one might understand its central act as 
a kind of transmediation: the act of translating the essence and/or form of a 
visual/material object, person, or experience from one medium or material-
ity into another—such as when one creates a painting of a sculpture or writes 
a poem about a painting or puts into words an otherwise phenomenological 
experience. By definition, then, ekphrasis is not limited to oral or alphabetic 
representation but can manifest with any medium serving as its actor or its 
object. In some respects, one might see the bulk of the arts as ekphrastic, as 
they employ various techné to translate experience, imagination, feeling, and 
the like.
Given Lanham’s attunement to ekphrasis, it is not surprising that he was 
quick to notice how computational media were altering established forms 
of representation and introducing new representational practices as well as 
making an array of old representational practices available in new ways. As 
a simple example, Lanham looked at the increased ease and speed by which 
one played with typography, color, font size, and layout on the personal com-
puters of his era. He saw computer-inflected textuality as an extension of the 
practices of previous avant-garde artists—particularly that of Italian Futurist 
Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, with computers (hardware + software) essentially 
making Marinetti’s advanced techniques readily available to an entire class of 
novices. But, of course, the changes to textuality via computationality did not 
stop with typographical play or manipulation of format. Rather, the combina-
tion of increased affordances of manipulation (Marinetti in a machine) and 
new functions for engagement (the promises of hyperlinks and algorithmic 
augmentation) brought textuality alive in unprecedented ways—dramatically 
altering the range (and impact) of ekphrastic practices (whether put to rhetori-
cal ends or not).
But Lanham noted something else of significance: changes in mediating 
technologies also necessitated the inhabiting of new perspectives. That is, new 
practices of representation, computational or otherwise, required that one 
adopt new perspectives for making with and making sense of those mediations. 
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Further, Lanham noticed that certain computational media ushered in a kind 
of self-conscious awareness of their own mediation (Electronic 82), which, 
in turn, called attention to the ways in which media created meaning. This 
increased awareness not only reflected tendencies in visual modernism11 but 
also emerged by default from the juxtaposition of new media forms with older 
mediating technologies—exposing (via unavoidable comparison) the opera-
tive logics, functions, values, and limitations of the mediations involved. For 
Lanham, these developments shifted the focus away from specific mediating 
technologies toward the more transferable (and transversal) acts and practices 
of mediation (from certain devices of mediation to the rhetorical modes and 
manner of mediation). Meaning, what Lanham was taking stock of in the for-
mative moments of digital rhetoric was less a matter of technological deter-
minism and more a matter of cultural and rhetorical convergence—a focus on 
the practices of representation (as constrained by computational media) and 
how those practices set upon particular audiences, users, cultures. At the very 
beginning of digital rhetoric, then, one can find an important value in adopt-
ing a rhetorical orientation to something like the New Aesthetic: for what 
New Aestheticism exposes is not just radical change in the means of produc-
tion (a condition that Western culture has been undergoing on a regular basis 
for two if not three decades now) but rather notable shifts in the practices of 
mediation and the corresponding aesthetic sensibilities of an audience. Which 
is to suggest that while the technologies and rhetorical practices involved are 
of interest in this work, one of the major implications of looking at the New 
Aesthetic is an increased attunement to contemporary audiences (small and 
large)—including both human and nonhuman members, particularly those 
who operate with a different set of expectations, sensibilities, and default con-
ditionalities toward media (and mediations) than the new media audiences of 
yesterday and the print-media audiences of yesteryear.
It is important to note, therefore, that though Lanham opened much for 
rhetoric via the conceptual orientation of digital rhetoric—grounding, as he 
did, the computational mediascapes of the digital rhetoric 1990s in relation 
to avant-garde art practices, orienting digital rhetoric scholars toward medial 
experiences (and more abstract concerns of ekphrasis), and foregrounding 
screen mediation in particular ways—what he did not do was provide an 
operative definition for digital rhetoric. In fact, it would be more than another 
 11. In Graphesis: Visual Forms of Knowledge Production, Johanna Drucker argues that 
“the self-referential attention to the picture plane” is something that can be associated “with a 
phase of visual modernism” (30), and she uses this visual attentiveness to explore the epistemic 
dimensions of visual/graphic development.
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decade before any formal scholarly attempt to take stock of digital rhetoric 
emerged.
In his 2005 article “Digital Rhetoric: Toward an Integrated Theory,” rheto-
ric and media scholar James Zappen attempted to collate the various threads 
(and modes of inquiry) that had, to that point, been formative of the field of 
digital rhetoric. While he (indirectly) established a set of considerations for 
digital rhetoric—for example, how rhetorical strategies factor into produc-
tion/analysis of digital text, the affordances and constraints of new media, the 
formations of digital identities, and the potential for digital technologies to 
contribute to social community formation—what he did not do was provide 
an actual integrated theory of digital rhetoric (nor a specific orientation to 
human–technology dynamics). Instead, Zappen took stock of a survey of con-
tributions, and then raised considerations for the opportunities that a poten-
tial integrated theory might offer rhetoric.
Four years later, however, the nebulous formations of digital rhetoric 
would change as media histories and literacies scholar Elizabeth Losh, in her 
Virtualpolitik: An Electronic History of Government Media-Making in a Time 
of War, Scandal, Disaster, Miscommunication, and Mistakes, penned/pinned 
down a formalized articulation—offering something of a galvanizing point 
for the field of digital rhetoric. Up until Losh’s book, digital rhetoric had been 
understood primarily as either rhetoric about digital practices, environments, 
ontologies, and the like or rhetoric constructed in or conveyed by digital plat-
forms, screen-media interfaces, programming and code, and so on. To be fair, 
that loose structure served well enough to orient scholars in and around digi-
tal rhetoric—and is, in a general capacity, still quite functional, even for some-
thing like New Aestheticism: for not only is the New Aesthetic tied to digital, 
network practices (with Bridle and others intermittently referring to the New 
Aesthetic as a network aesthetic) but also its archive and its many commentar-
ies reside on the network itself and are distributed via digital platforms. But as 
Losh argued, the about/in/by dynamic was not sufficient because it ignored, in 
her view, the rich epistemological and operative complexities that information 
culture brought to bear on communicative and cultural practices. Thus, Losh 
offered her own fourfold: positioning digital rhetoric as being concerned with 
(1) rhetorical conventions of digital genres of everyday discourse, (2) pub-
lic rhetoric distributed via networks, (3) rhetorical analysis/criticism of new 
media (objects and scholarly communities), and (4) the rhetoric of informa-
tion theory, rather than epistemic or institutional rhetorics (a rhetorical ori-
entation to the theories and applications of informatics). This echoes Zappen 
in certain ways but also adds a strong consideration for information culture 
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(and the ways in which information sciences come to bear on communication 
and knowledge-making in a computational era).
If one were to take up Losh’s fourfold as an operative guide for digital rhet-
oric, the New Aesthetic would still have value, as (a) its artifacts are distrib-
uted online and curated in a digital archive, (b) it demarcates a set of objects 
(individually and as a collective) for rhetorical analysis, and (c) many of its 
artifacts bear what Losh might situate as the aesthetic markers of information 
culture—with things like glitch and pixelated imagery owing at least part of 
their aesthetic qualities to information theory’s marriage with screen-based 
mediation. But Losh’s fourfold for digital rhetoric introduces at least two ten-
sions important to this work (one specific, one general): (a) an absence of 
consideration of the aesthetic, and (b) an implicit distance between rhetoric 
and digital rhetoric.
Absent Aesthetic
While Losh’s categories offer considerations of genres, publics, analyses, and 
other staples of rhetorical studies, there is simply not much among them that 
accounts for the aesthetic (digital or otherwise) or for how the aesthetic plays 
out among her formulations (minus a few quick treatments in some of the 
website examples she analyzes). This absence is particularly interesting given 
how much of the early formations of digital rhetoric (and other substantive 
influences like Kathleen Welch’s Electric Rhetoric: Classical Rhetoric, Oral-
ism, and a New Literacy and Gregory L. Ulmer’s corpus on electracy) were 
concerned with representation, with the screen, with a rhetorical aesthetic of 
computers, and so on. But this aesthetic absence is not specific to Losh. Many 
in the field of digital rhetoric have, in the last decade-plus, simply (though not 
simply) moved further and further inside the machine as a scholarly focus. 
In a recent example, James J. Brown Jr.’s Ethical Programs: Hospitality and the 
Rhetorics of Software offers an insightful and critical narrative about compu-
tationality, software, and network culture, with Brown deploying Jacques Der-
rida’s concept of hospitality as a way of thinking about software-to-software 
processes. Or, as another contemporary example, David M. Rieder’s Suasive 
Iterations: Rhetoric, Writing, and Physical Computing calls for a different kind 
of movement through the screen, toward critical considerations of hardware—
sensors, circuits, actuators, microprocessors, and the like—which Rieder sees 
as the focal point of today’s creative computing. Although both Brown and 
Rieder, like Losh, do offer significant contributions to digital rhetoric, Brown 
does not explicitly take up with the aesthetic, and when Rieder does it is often 
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of secondary consideration to the techno-material and operative core of com-
putationality. Interestingly enough, this absence is also reflected in Douglas 
Eyman’s Digital Rhetoric: Theory, Method, Practice, which offers a fairly exten-
sive history of the field of digital rhetoric (its evolution and trajectories). In 
that work, Eyman presents his definition of digital rhetoric (as a field/set of 
inquiry practices) that includes Losh’s fourfold of considerations, but to which 
he adds the development of the rhetorics of technology, the use of rhetori-
cal methods for interrogating digital works, the critical examinations of the 
rhetorical functions of networks, and the theorization of nonhuman agents 
(software interlocutors) that possess varying degrees of agency. But even in 
this extended Losh–Eyman four-by-four matrix, the aesthetic is secondary (if 
considered at all), which, again, is especially interesting given digital rhetoric’s 
roots in screen representations and the sheer overtness of the visual (and its 
proliferating aesthetics) in today’s screen-oriented culture.
Of course, pointing out the aesthetic as absent or as secondary consid-
eration is not meant to denigrate any of these works, for they each offer 
an excellent scholarly engagement in their own right that expands current 
thinking about the intersections of computational technologies and rhetori-
cal practices. Rather, it is merely to indicate that my efforts here may add (if 
not return) a necessary dimension to the conversation, a rhetorical-aesthetic 
dimension, which is paramount to actual human interactions with compu-
tationality. Meaning, as just one example within this aesthetic dimension, if 
one is operating in a world before the advent of the graphical user interface 
(GUI), then focusing extensively on computationality and even the numeri-
cal encoding (1s and 0s) at the base of digital computing makes a lot of sense. 
But in a GUI (if not post-GUI) culture, this can be somewhat problematic: 
for as technology and aesthetic critic Jonathan Openshaw suggests, while the 
screen (and screen-based visual aesthetics) may not be “the most important 
part of the computer,” the screen is often “the most absorbing” (6).12 Digital 
traces, programming, algorithms, microcodes, silicon, electric signals, and so 
forth may make up most of what comprises computationality, with code (and 
numerical encoding) being central to what makes the computational world 
go round, but the vast majority of people do not interact with everyday com-
putationality at the level of code, nor at the level of digitization, but rather at 
the level of the screen: making or making with digital media primarily through 
 12. Openshaw explores the significance of screen mediation along with other material and 
technical considerations in Postdigital Artisans: Craftsmanship with a New Aesthetic in Fashion, 
Art, Design and Architecture, a beautifully designed work interspersing artworks with inter-
views with artists and curators as well as think pieces from techno-theorists and media and art 
scholars to capture something of the depths to which technologies are influencing the practices 
and performances of contemporary art and culture.
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(and with) the visual and culturally laden metaphors of the screen (the logics, 
aesthetics, and rhetorics of the interface).13 This is the point of what-you-see-
is-what-you-get (WYSIWYG) and drag-and-drop editors, which allow every-
day people to work from the screen up, so to speak (interacting routinely, if 
not ubiquitously, with screen-based, visual aesthetics). Even software engi-
neers interact with the machine at the level of the screen—with their pro-
gramming code represented on screens, manipulated on screens, and often 
executed on screens. Given today’s visually saturated, social-media-infused, 
digital-camera-laden, techno-cultural moment, one might see the pixel of the 
screen, not the 1s and 0s of computationality, as the lowest common denom-
inator among most human–computer interactions. This is not to disregard 
the value of pushing beyond the pixel-screen and into the machine and/or 
network apparatus—as algorithms and data processors help make digital and 
post-digital culture possible—but there is, I believe, much to be learned about 
human–technology dynamics from screen-based, aesthetic considerations; 
and here I am not alone.
As visual theorist and digital humanist Johanna Drucker argued in Graph-
esis: Visual Forms of Knowledge Production, the visual and aesthetic elements of 
computational mediation are not just accoutrement; they introduce additional 
approaches to knowledge.14 Similarly, Knight’s scholarship on multimodal 
composition calls for reclaiming experience-based ways of knowing—arguing 
that the aesthetic dimension of multimedia operates rhetorically and that it 
necessarily opens different epistemological avenues (“Reclaiming”). Moreover, 
as I explored in the introduction to this work, in addition to introducing the 
problematic tensions of reducing visual forms of inquiry and understanding to 
linguistic and/or logocentric systems, Barbara Stafford’s Good Looking: Essays 
on the Virtue of Images actually makes the case for visual ways of knowing, 
understanding, and engaging as being critical for a screen-saturated, visual 
 13. This is not meant to suggest that Rieder, Brown, and Losh do not offer rich consider-
ations of everyday computationality and its impact on everyday rhetors or everyday cultural 
practices and values—for they each make notable contributions in these areas. Rather, it is to 
set up a greater consideration for attentiveness to the screen, which in many ways serves as 
the primary point of contact between humans and most computational technologies. Further, 
Western culture is ocular-centric, and the screen exists as the primary form of ocular-oriented 
mediation—although, as I also explore in chapter 4, the screen (and its pixels) operate in the 
haptic dimension as well.
 14. Drucker makes an argument for the importance of visual epistemology and traces out 
the implication of visual approaches to knowledge for screen-mediated culture. She offers a 
solid history of graphic, visual design, considered from multiple perspectives and across mul-
tiple media, with a particular humanist orientation that calls into question certain values and 
practices. Her work addresses the rhetorical dimensions of visual media, though it is surpris-
ingly devoid of scholarship on visual rhetoric.
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culture. What these authors establish in their own unique manner is that there 
has been (and continues to be) a long-standing bias against visual and other 
aesthetic forms of knowledge, particularly when considered in relation to 
logocentric and numerocentric attitudes toward computational, screen-based 
mediation—not only privileging a disconnected dynamic between humans 
and computational media but also necessitating something of a recovery of 
an aesthetic orientation to knowing (and situating that knowing as part of a 
human–technology relationship)—a matter to which I more fully attend in the 
“Recovering the Aesthetic” section below.
A second reason for the recovery of an aesthetic dimension here is that 
the few limited orientations to visual ways of knowing that are in general 
circulation have, as Drucker argues, taken shape not from art history, nor 
the humanities more generally, but primarily from computational engineers 
and user-oriented production experts who routinely design interfaces or digi-
tal environments for efficient action (151), approaching the screenic-visual in 
terms of function first, aesthetics second, and epistemic value third (if ever at 
all). Interestingly, it is this very condition that establishes part of the value (if 
not rhetorical necessity) of the New Aesthetic, which features an assortment 
of products and performances that serve as a kind of return of the repressed: 
for example, an aesthetic (if not epistemic) dimension that pushes back into 
and destabilizes the controlling impulse of functional computationality. But 
the aesthetic dimension has more to offer than just an interrupting of the 
ways that computers have been made to organize content/culture or struc-
ture interfaces and user engagements; as Lanham’s work demonstrates and as 
Berry argues, the aesthetic can be employed to further “explore the computa-
tional practices that underwrite and mediate” the relational dynamic between 
screen-based representation and function (“Postdigital” 51). And this reiter-
ates Bridle’s take on the value of the visual cues of New Aestheticism—seeing 
them not as definitive qualities representative of an aesthetic movement but 
as directing attention to matters of computationality, culture, techno-human 
conditionalities, and the like, which all come into play as changes in mediating 
technologies generate new capacities for being in the world.
Although I do not agree with Berry’s championing of computationality 
as the focal lens for all things New Aesthetic (“Postdigital”), what his and 
Bridle’s take on New Aestheticism point to is the critical relationality between 
aesthetics and architecture, ornamentation and function, or screen-based 
representation and programming, all of which are central to developing and 
understanding contemporary mediascapes. Given this critical relationality, it 
would seem that the more effectively one might engage, conceptualize, and 
articulate aesthetic considerations of practices and experiences tied to screen-
based (or screen-inspired) representation, the more readily one might explore, 
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position, and even contextualize the computational underpinnings of those 
screen mediations and their related rhetorical implications. But before I turn 
more fully to this aesthetic dimension, let me first address the second tension 
hinted at above: a rhetoric/digital rhetoric divide.
Rhetoric / Digital Rhetoric
The second tension introduced by Losh’s work is not exclusive to her efforts 
but more of a general concern reflected in her deployment of the term digi-
tal rhetoric: that is, the potential construction of a rhetoric/digital rhetoric 
divide. The term digital rhetoric is clearly a marker for the conversations in 
which this work hopes to participate (and valuable for locating this work 
among a specific subfield, in a particular history, and/or for a target reader-
ship), but it is equally important to note the perspective gap that emerges 
when using the term digital rhetoric (a gap that simply may no longer serve 
rhetoric’s best interests). For example, Rieder’s work on suasion moves across 
this tension by offering views in which physical computing is seen not as 
a digital-other but very much as part of the material experiences of every-
day culture; and Morey and Tinnell’s collection on augmented reality moves 
beyond this division by dealing with things that emerge when digital rep-
resentations and the physical world fold into one another. Part of what this 
work offers, then, is not only a muddying of the digital/real divide and its 
rippling implications (more fully addressed in chapter 3) but, by extension, a 
muddying of the rhetoric/digital rhetoric divide—situating this conversation 
in a different rhetorical ecology.
However, keeping the above tensions in mind, I do understand the neces-
sity of offering a working definition of digital rhetoric in a text like this, which 
draws from rhetoric as much as from aesthetic and new media perspectives. 
To this end, as I deploy it here, digital rhetoric means the study of and prac-
tice concerned with (1) acts and artifacts of mediation, (2) systems (compu-
tational, cultural, communicative, etc.) that produce or allow for particular 
types of digital and nondigital creations, and (3) human–technology assem-
blages at the center of contemporary making practices—with the latter being 
the primary impetus of this inquiry. Now, there are, of course, opportunities 
for slippage in this definition, as (a) the aesthetic dimension will manifest 
in all three areas, and (b) nearly all forms of rhetorical production today are 
intertwined with the material and conceptual practices of “the digital,”15 but 
 15. “The digital” here refers to the more popular usage that situates the concept as a met-
onym for all things computational and networked. It includes everything from new materiali-
ties and technological devices to social media platforms and broadcast signals. Additionally, 
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hopefully the above definition offers enough of an orientation to allow readers 
to move forward in meaningful ways—particularly as I allow the New Aes-
thetic to inform digital rhetoric and digital rhetoric to help contextualize (and 
locate) the contours of the New Aesthetic.
Part of what this overview sets up, however, is that digital rhetoric in its 
formative moments and digital rhetoric in its more contemporary articula-
tions may not be sufficient in their individual orientations for framing, think-
ing about, or working through something like the New Aesthetic, which 
uses the aesthetic dimension to illuminate particular computational condi-
tionalities, leverages computationality as aesthetic style (often deployed for 
rhetorical purposes), and mobilizes an attentiveness to mediation through a 
rhetorical-aesthetic experientiality. What is needed, then, as I suggested in 
the introductory chapter, are additional lenses through which one might trace 
and triangulate the multitude of human–technology relations. But turning to 
the New Aesthetic as one of those potential lenses necessitates something of 
a recovery of the aesthetic dimension, for it is often held at arm’s length (if 
not given second-class status) in rhetorical studies and/or in critically rooted 
approaches to knowledge.
RECOVERING THE AESTHETIC
In the eighteenth century, in his Reflections on Poetry, German philoso-
pher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten offered a split between things known 
and things perceived—with the known falling under the faculty of logic and 
things perceived under the science of perception (the aesthetic) (17). What 
he attempted there (and in subsequent works) was to draw attention to the 
role that the aesthetic plays in how individuals perceive and understand the 
world, as well as to provide rules for aesthetic judgment. But Baumgarten’s 
movement toward a theory of aesthetic experience (see Knight, “Reclaiming”) 
was relatively short-lived. For philosopher Immanuel Kant, writing a couple 
decades later, would firmly re-ensconce the aesthetic under the banner of rea-
son and would, in the process, establish the modern disposition toward the 
aesthetic: grounding the aesthetic in a priori conditions—“truths” that can be 
determined via reason and which appeal to a common sense, rather than in 
posteriori (experience-based) knowledge of the world. As Knight has argued, 
the aesthetic in a post-Kantian frame was to be understood “in other terms, 
“the digital” often serves as a substitute for related concepts like the virtual of virtual reality and 
notions of cyberspace (all matters I more critically address later in this work).
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with other criteria” (“Reclaiming” 150), and aesthetic ways of knowing were 
to be “subsumed by other ways of knowing and relating to the world” (151).
Given Kant’s influence, the aesthetic has been shrouded in this kind of 
intellectual and disembodied aestheticism ever since—leading to an overly 
philosophized aesthetic whereby the aesthetic is understood not as a specific 
thing or value, nor even as a set of qualities, nor tied explicitly to the human 
sensorium, but instead as an abstracted kind of “sense” (e.g., to be sensible, to 
make sense of). Although pursuing this philosophized “sense” in any depth is 
beyond the scope of this work, the primary evolution for this “sense” (and the 
aesthetic understood in this way) has been for it to function as the grounds 
on which particular community formations take shape: in other words, as 
Jacques Rancière argues in The Politics of Aesthetics, as that condition or qual-
ity or thing that creates clear divisions between what is acceptable (sensible) 
and what is not (nonsense) for specific groups of people; or, as Pierre Bour-
dieu framed it in Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, as 
that which is productive and/or reflective of particular social/class inequali-
ties. There remains, of course, much to do with the aesthetic in this vein, 
particularly as related to matters of axiology and considerations of the polis, 
but the larger result of this orientation is that the aesthetic has ceased to be 
“an acceptable way of knowing the world” (Knight, “Reclaiming” 150; see also 
Stafford). But this works directly in contrast to the earliest formations and 
understandings of the aesthetic.
To follow Knight’s efforts, the etymological roots of the aesthetic come not 
from Greek concepts of logos or techné but rather from aisthetike (noun) and 
aisthanomai (verb). The aisthetike marks that which pertains to sense percep-
tion, while aisthanomai refers to knowing through an embodied sensorium. 
Together they situate the aesthetic as being rooted, fundamentally, in sense 
perception (and/or a general condition of perceptibility)—to a bodily sense-
ability operating as a basis for understanding. Of course, the Greeks would go 
on to create a sense hierarchy, elevating sight and hearing over smell, taste, 
and touch because the former revealed the world external to the body and 
were simply more objectively verifiable than the latter (see Aristotle’s Meta-
physics). But the outcome of this sense hierarchy was, as Knight argues, the 
“favor[ing of] a priori knowledge, based on logic, over posteriori knowledge, 
based on experience” (“Reclaiming” 149). And this simple crack began the 
long march to Kant’s intellectual and disembodied aestheticism. But as the 
postcritical turn set up over a half-century ago, and as has been reflected in 
posthumanism and new materialism considerations since, any disembod-
ied, intellectual-focused approaches are, at minimum, incomplete given the 
greater complexities in which human actions, agencies, and even aesthetics 
take shape.
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Here is where turning to someone like American pragmatist and edu-
cational theorist John Dewey can help; for unlike his transcontinental phi-
losophy contemporaries, who in the 1930s had taken up with matters of 
mechanical reproduction and aesthetics as related to a body politic (particu-
larly that of fascism), Dewey was concerned with the establishment of the 
rhetorics by which the aesthetic became isolated from the very human condi-
tions of their making and from their contexts and consequences of daily life. 
In Art as Experience, Dewey writes, “Objects that were in the past valid and 
significant because of their place in the life of a community now function in 
isolation from the condition of their origin”; and it is this setting apart, this 
“disconnect[ing aesthetic experience] from other modes of experience,” that 
is the very movement that makes possible the aesthetic branch of philoso-
phy and the specialized secularities of art (9). But this separation is by no 
means inherent in the aesthetic itself; it is a constructed position (much like 
the computationality/aesthetic divide) that has come to completely infect cul-
tural institutions and habits of practice, and it has created the very rhetorical 
conditions from which arises the illusion of a group of master thinkers and 
master artisans who can speak to (and speak into existence) the aesthetic.
What is needed, then, is a “recovering [of] the continuity of [a]esthetic 
experience with normal processes of living,” because, as Dewey presents it, 
“even a crude experience, if authentically an experience, is more fit to give a 
clue to the intrinsic nature of [a]esthetic experience than is an object already 
set apart from any other mode of experience” (9). This is doubly the case for 
the New Aesthetic, which points to an emerging (if not emerged) aesthetic 
sensibility that is captured not only through objects (and practices) set apart 
in art galleries and museums but also (perhaps more so) in everyday manifes-
tations: in advertisements and architecture, digital signals and digital design, 
cultural artifacts and creative expressions. Which is to say, in Dewey’s per-
spective, that a glitched broadcast signal on one’s home television reveals as 
much about aesthetic experience and current human conditions as do the art 
installations of Kello (Plate A) or Aram Bartholl (Plate C). This is not to sug-
gest that Kello’s or Bartholl’s works are not more poignant, but to point out 
that the underlying conditions to which the everyday glitch draws attention 
possesses equal magnitude in its ability to illuminate Western culture’s cur-
rent, digitally saturated conditionality.
Naturally, Dewey recognized that returning the aesthetic (and aesthetic 
experience) to everyday materiality and ordinary practices would “seem to 
some unworthy” (10), and I expect the efforts of this work to encounter some 
of the same dismissiveness given the traditional distance between rhetoric 
and the aesthetic. But the very implication of “unworthiness” is only pos-
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sible as a designation if one is already operating from a perspective embed-
ded within the very separative rhetoric that Dewey finds problematic. Further, 
understanding the aesthetic, the experiencing of the aesthetic, and the value of 
an aesthetic outside of the very practices, contexts, and common experiences 
from which that aesthetic arises seems an impoverished position. Dewey 
contends:
No amount of ecstatic eulogy of finished works can of itself assist the under-
standing or the generation of such works. Flowers can be enjoyed without 
knowing about the interactions of soil, air, moisture, and seeds of which they 
are the result. But they cannot be understood without taking these interac-
tions into account.  .  .  . It should be commonplace that [a]esthetic under-
standing—as distinct from sheer personal enjoyment—must start with the 
soil, air, and light out of which things [a]esthetically admirable arise. (11)
Thus, to understand the aesthetic experience and/or to embrace aesthetic ways 
of understanding the world, including those offered by the New Aesthetic, 
one must begin, then, not with abstracted, a priori principles, but rather, as 
Dewey says, “in the raw; in the events and scenes that hold the attentive eye 
and ear” (3). In this regard, the aesthetic experience to which Dewey directs 
attention is not the product of any will to mastery of aesthetic principles but 
is instead “determined by the essential conditions of life”—the very condi-
tions of being: in other words, the aesthetic is something that emerges out 
of humans undergoing/initiating “interchanges with [their] environments” in 
the “most intimate way” (12). Human values (aesthetic or otherwise) emerge, 
then, in balance with the environmental and essential conditions in which and 
by which they live, and any surge in these conditions (e.g., changes introduced 
by new mediating technologies) both necessitates and allows for transition-
ing to new equilibriums of interchange—with one’s own values, expectations, 
sense-perceptions, and rhetorical tendencies and practices reforming and 
restabilizing in relation to these new equilibriums.
This is one of the many reasons for turning to the New Aesthetic. For 
while contemporary mediascapes are littered with flash, whiz, bang; with 
smart agents and anticipatory algorithms; with echo chambers and ubiquitous 
computing narratives, Bridle’s Tumblr archive showcases everyday artifacts 
and occurrences that captivate the senses (as representations and interrup-
tions, simulations and interventions). In other words, the New Aesthetic 
collection presents, as Dewey might articulate it, “objects of intense admi-
ration” that intensify through awareness and acquiescence of one’s “sense of 
immediate living” (5). In the New Aesthetic, that “sense” not only depends 
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on human–nonhuman interaction but, as Curt Cloninger argues, reflects the 
unequal distributions of the digital (its pockets of intensities)—offering at 
least one alternative to the delusion of democratic distribution through ubiq-
uitous computing (n. pag.).16 Thus, in touching upon any number of aesthetic 
considerations (proper and improper alike), the New Aesthetic (and its related 
post-digital siblings17) may serve, in varying capacities, to expose, to reflect, to 
highlight, and possibly even to provide a language and/or set of responses for 
describing new equilibriums of interchange.
Once we begin to rethink (and reclaim) the aesthetic as an embodied 
understanding through sensory perception, the role of mediating technolo-
gies (and their related artifacts) becomes extensively more profound. For as 
media studies pioneer Marshall McLuhan argued in Understanding Media: 
The Extensions of Man (resonating with Dewey’s new equilibriums of inter-
change), new mediating technologies and their related practices of expression 
and mediation transform human sensory perceptions—that is, they change 
the ways (and scales) by which individuals make sense of the world around 
them. Writing a couple decades after McLuhan, cultural theorist Paul Virilio 
would include a further gesture: proffering, in Open Sky, that new mediating 
technologies introduced changes to how people make sense of things in the 
world by altering the very intervals of time and space against which all man-
ner of human understanding occurs.18 New mediating technologies, then, do 
more than just introduce new aesthetics and new aesthetic experiences; they 
also alter the very measures and perspectives by which one understands expe-
rience itself.
On its own, this would be important for rhetorical studies, as it would 
indicate a need for rhetorical practices and theories to evolve as new equi-
libriums are introduced or as new sensory perceptions (and intervals) shape 
how people make sense of their world. But N. Katherine Hayles suggested that 
something more essential might be taking place. In her foundational works on 
 16. In “Manifesto for a Theory of the ‘New Aesthetic,’” Cloninger offers gestural orienta-
tions for the New Aesthetic. While his efforts do not formalize into any traditional sense of 
a manifesto, he does foreground the New Aesthetic as an orientation rather than a singular 
aesthetic, with its value stemming from how it puts its finger on certain intensities that result 
from and constitute the digital residue of daily life.
 17. The post-digital not only marks a set of practices and orientations but also, more 
recently, serves as a cultural marker—as in the post-digital is what comes after the new media 
era. To this end, as media art scholar Caroline Bassett has argued, many contemporary media/
art constructions get lumped under the heading of the post-digital (the New Aesthetic, Accel-
erationism, Glitch Art, Dirty New Media, etc.).
 18. For Virilio, time and space are giving way to the interval of light, and when the world 
operates at the speed of light (through electronic tele-technologies), standard measures of 
duration and distance become compressed, and events and experiences get dispersed instanta-
neously and everywhere at one and the same moment.
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cybernetics and posthumanism, she argued that working with new mediating 
technologies like virtual reality (headsets and interfaces) does not just extend 
one’s sensory world in new ways, but rather has the potential to actually alter 
the neural configurations of the brain (How We Became; “Hyper”)—in other 
words, technological change has the capacity to lead to physiological change. 
Hence, changes in mediating practices and technologies are not simply exter-
nalized in a tool or object, or simply extensions of a human sensorium, but 
instead can become embodied, material, biological. It is not just that people 
use technologies, nor that humans exist as part of the circuitry in which medi-
ating technologies operate, but that there is a capacity for people to internal-
ize (in multiple senses) technologized ways of representing, measuring, and 
mapping the world. This suggests that it is no longer sufficient to think of the 
human as the dominant measure; rather, as critical design architect and film-
maker Liam Young claims in his short piece “Shadows of the Digital: An Atlas 
of Fiducial Architecture,” what now defines how people make their worlds and 
make sense of their worlds is “the technologies through which . . . [they] see 
and experience the world” (15).19
Given this framework of the aesthetic, if we understand the aesthetic as 
an intellectual, disembodied, a priori value beholden to a Kantian truth, or if 
the aesthetic is situated as merely the techniques invented and controlled by 
a master class (yet another element of the separatist rhetoric Dewey resisted), 
then the New Aesthetic has notably limited value. But if the aesthetic is tied 
to embodied sensory perception—to embodied, experience-based ways of 
knowing—then what the New Aesthetic does, and what it has the potential 
to expose, becomes crucial for aesthetics and rhetorics alike. This is because 
the New Aesthetic not only illuminates (and reflects) computational-infused 
aesthetic sensibilities but also foregrounds changes in audience expectations 
of the experience of media.
Dispositions and Apperception
One way to approach something like the New Aesthetic, following Dewey, 
would be to take keen interest in our “motor dispositions”: the orientations 
toward particular mental and physical preferences that form in people in 
 19. Critical to Young’s position is the call for a new design sensibility that has the capac-
ity to “resonate across both human and machinic experience” (15). To this end, he turns to the 
machinic vision concept “fiducial” (a recognizable marker in an environment that functions as 
reference or measurement) to describe a new genre of architecture that is machine-readable 
(anchor point for augmented reality systems), that possesses a representational value that cir-
culates (as image) in network platforms, and that occupies/inhabits a physical space on earth.
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the production and/or reception of everyday aesthetic artifacts (101). For, to 
extend an earlier metaphor, in taking stock of the “soil, air, and light” of aes-
thetic considerations (the larger material, social, cultural, and environmental 
complexities necessary for any attempt to understand particular aesthetics), 
motor dispositions reveal the particular types of attentiveness that one pos-
sesses in relation to different materialities and media (and their potential 
manipulations). This is demonstrated most expertly in Steph Ceraso’s “(Re)
Educating the Senses: Multimodal Listening, Bodily Learning, and the Com-
position of Sonic Experiences,” which introduces a realignment of the motor 
dispositions associated with listening. Ceraso seeks to move out from under 
ear-sound binarism so as to reconfigure contemporary dispositions toward 
listening around a multisensory ecology and, in so doing, highlight the greater 
complexity of relations between individual bodies and sound.
Like this work, Ceraso picks up with Dewey’s aesthetic (and the experi-
ence of the aesthetic), but does so to situate listening as an embodied way 
of knowing. She argues that ignoring the multitude of ways in which sound 
penetrates the body or is perceptible to other parts of the human sensorium 
notably delimits the rhetorical capacities of sound. To counter this position, 
she calls for multimodal listening, which not only “draw[s] attention to listen-
ing as an expansive multisensory practice” (104) but which is intended to (a) 
defamiliarize students’ listening habits/practices (112) in order to (b) prepare 
them “to become sensitive, reflective participants in and designers of sonic 
experiences” (103). At its core, Ceraso’s multimodal listening invites a reinvent-
ing of the field’s motor dispositions toward sound—advocating for “a bodily 
retraining” that can help rhetors (students and working creatives alike) “learn 
to become more open to the connections between sensory modes, materials, 
and environments” (120).
What Ceraso offers, beyond a smart take on multimodality and listen-
ing, is a contemporary work in rhetorical studies that uses Dewey’s aes-
thetic inflection to counter habituated motor dispositions. More succinctly, 
her work is grounded in human apperception (and/or the human sensorium 
more broadly), and she offers one approach (multimodal listening) by which 
to extend the rhetorical capacities available to varying sensory modalities (in 
this case, matters of sonic writing/making).
The argument at the center of this book operates in a similar capacity, 
turning to the New Aesthetic precisely because it exposes, as communica-
tion scholar Geoff Cox argues, “the limits of human apperception” (152). But 
whereas Ceraso’s work uses Dewey’s embodied aesthetic (among others) to 
push against the habituated practices championed in listening, inviting a more 
nuanced orientation to the experience of sound, this work turns to the New 
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Aesthetic to push against apperception itself, to grasp how changes in human–
technology assemblages (related to both changes in technology and changes 
in the human condition) introduce new capacities and new expectations for 
human experience and perception more broadly.
Additionally, while Ceraso’s aesthetic and embodied orientations to sound 
find resonance with the holistic listening practices of solo percussionist and 
composer Dame Evelyn Glennie—which Ceraso employs as a means to help 
others attune to synesthetic convergences in sound, to experience sound in 
embodied ways, and to be attentive to the formation of bodily habits—the 
New Aesthetic is, at least on the surface, less available for this kind of lever-
aging. For as art and aesthetic scholar Katja Kwastek indicated, the New 
Aesthetic is not really concerned with matters of critique or even creative 
explanation; it appears content to just present its objects and their aesthetics 
“largely without classifying them, judging or theorizing them” (80). However, 
this does not mean the New Aesthetic is without critical value. For while it 
may not operate in terms of criticism, or in the established methods of an 
expert practitioner (e.g., Glennie), or in clearly delineated categories or meth-
odological operations, it does, as Kwastek argues, provide commentary and 
critical insight from its “fuzzy areas”—on the margins and in the vibrating 
intensities among its example artifacts and myriad conversations (80). Or, to 
put it another way, the contributions of the New Aesthetic emerge not from 
any categorical order but rather, as Kwastek indicates, from the rhetorical res-
onances that manifest in the margins of its demarcated objects and objections. 
To grasp the New Aesthetic with any significance, then, one must take stock 
of its rhetorical dimensions as much as its archive.
Therefore, what the New Aesthetic presents, at least in part, is an element 
of rhetorical awareness specific to human apperception itself (and the related 
motor dispositions that reveal such apperception). But that awareness and its 
qualities are difficult to track because New Aestheticism was located in, part 
of, and emergent from the very techno-human apperception it helped illumi-
nate. Thus, to take stock of the New Aesthetic with any validity requires that 
one be attentive to its flux, its fuzzy areas, its margins and vibrating intensi-
ties, as these are where its constitutive dimensions reside. Which means that 
one must adopt (or adapt) methods of engagement and inquiry that allow for 
degrees of fluidity (in perspective, in perception, and in procedure). To this 
end, in chapter 2 I turn to a rhetorical ecologies methodology, deploying this 
framework as a way for understanding the complexities operating within the 
New Aesthetic and for identifying its critical contributions to any post-digital 
rhetorical practice. 
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Rhetorical Ecologies and 
New Aestheticism
MAKING SENSE of the New Aesthetic presents a bit of a challenge. For one, it 
actively resists codification, as James Bridle has argued in “The New Aesthetic 
and Its Politics”; two, it emerges as part of a larger collection of tendencies 
and tensions, conversations and critiques—encompassing not only its tangible 
artifacts (digital and non) but its many fleeting and competing discourses (its 
rhetorical dimension). More succinctly, the New Aesthetic takes shape as part 
of an ongoing rhetorical ecology: one that includes its artifacts, representative 
practices, and intentional and unintentional techniques of expression, as well 
as the particular ways in which these entities have been taken up, positioned, 
challenged, and co-opted in the commentaries on and criticisms of New Aes-
theticism. Thus, any approach to the New Aesthetic that does not take into 
account its rhetorical dimensions ends up presenting something of a limited 
perspective.
For example, filmmaker and media scholar Michael Betancourt’s “Auto-
mated Labor: The ‘New Aesthetic’ and Immaterial Physicality” employs a 
critical Marxian perspective to position the New Aesthetic (particularly its 
archive) as documenting the shift from a machine labor that augments human 
action (amplifying and extending human action) to a machine labor that sup-
plants human action. But then he reduces the New Aesthetic archive to four 
overlapping categories of artifacts:
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 1. autonomously generated images that contain markers of the 
digital;
 2. physical constructions employing signifiers of digital forms;
 3. translations of digital forms into visual style; and
 4. dynamic, interactive data visualizations (“Automated” n. pag.).
While these groupings have potential, I hesitate to extend them because they 
are so tied to (inconsistent) surface patterns of the archive that they ignore 
the larger conversations in which the New Aesthetic participates as well as the 
underlying structures central to the very ways in which meaning can be made 
of the “patterns” themselves (the rhetorical dimensions). Additionally, part of 
what I am arguing here is not that humans have undergone a loss of agency, as 
Betancourt suggests, but rather that shifts in human–technology assemblages 
have reconfigured human and nonhuman structures altogether.
What is needed is not a decree of the loss of some agential condition, nor 
the imposition of a categorical order on an otherwise instable archive, but a 
mapping of the larger rhetorical ecology of the New Aesthetic, which gives 
shape and depth to the reconfigurations themselves. In focusing on the intri-
cate relationships among its many components and momentary performances, 
the goal is to investigate, through rhetorical means, what the New Aesthetic 
is and how it can be meaningfully leveraged for rhetorical purposes. To get 
at these more abstract patterns, however—these shadows and silhouettes of 
momentary figurations—one must ignore the impulse to critically define a set 
of objects among a fluid and sometimes frivolous archive and instead post-
critically drift among the gestures and gyrations of the New Aesthetic rhetori-
cal ecology.
RHETORICAL ECOLOGIES
The term ecology stems from the discipline of biology, particularly in rela-
tion to the study of organisms and their interactions with one another. But in 
the early 1970s anthropologist Gregory Bateson’s Steps to an Ecology of Mind 
helped open ecology to a larger set of metaphorical and modular consider-
ations, as he used ecology as a conceptual orientation for understanding cer-
tain acuities, capacities, and processes of the mind. Some twenty years later, 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Bateson’s extensions found resonance in 
rhetorical studies—with the ecological perspective offering rhetoric scholars 
an explanatory power that aligned with the impulses of late postmodernism 
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and early posthumanism that were proliferating in contemporary thinking. 
For example, in The Wealth of Reality: An Ecology of Composition, Marga-
ret Syverson adopted an ecological perspective to locate rhetoric/writing as a 
practice distributed across a complexity of networks and relations, from mate-
rial nodes to varying social fields; this situated rhetoric/writing as involving 
greater complexity than what had been presented by the dogmatic rhetorical 
triangle. As such, Syverson’s work was foundational in creating inroads for 
ecology in rhetoric—with her going so far as to offer an analytical matrix for 
working with ecology as an expansive framework for writing studies (7–20). 
My particular approach to rhetorical ecologies, however, is grounded not in 
Syverson but in Jenny Edbauer’s extension of Syverson: for what Edbauer 
offers is not a set of analytical (and/or operative) heuristics but rather a con-
centrated focus on the flows and connections among the elements of a given 
ecology. Edbauer’s attempt to take stock of and give articulation to that which 
is invariably “in flux” is crucial because the New Aesthetic, as Bridle suggest, 
is itself in flux and of the flux (“New Aesthetic” n. pag.). It is critical, therefore, 
to further unpack Edbauer’s work and more fully situate how it contributes to 
and/or shapes this explication.
In “Unframing Models of Public Distribution: From Rhetorical Situa-
tion to Rhetorical Ecologies,” Edbauer calls for rhetorical studies to adopt an 
ecological rather than a situational orientation. She argues that while Lloyd 
Bitzer’s classical construct of rhetorical situation1 has served as a valuable her-
meneutic, it and its counterrhetorics inherently frame rhetoric as a collection 
of discrete elements: audience, exigence, constraints, and so on (7)—similar 
to Syverson’s tensions with the rhetorical triangle. Element-based approaches 
like Bitzer’s do possess “important explanatory power,” but they are, in Edbau-
er’s view, insufficient for taking stock of the “wider sphere of active, historical, 
and lived processes” as well as the material and medial influences in which 
rhetoric (and rhetorical artifacts) take shape (8). There is, Edbauer contends, 
always a complexity operating in excess of any given elemental framework, 
which is especially the case with rhetorical artifacts and utterances because 
 1. In 1968 Bitzer’s “The Rhetorical Situation” argued not only that rhetorical discourse was 
situational but that it was actively called into existence by situation. He defined situation as a 
“complex of persons, events, objects, and relations” that took shape in relation to an exigence 
(or potential exigence) that called for particular kinds of discourse (3). This discourse and the 
human decisions associated with it were, in turn, constrained by the situation. Bitzer went 
on to identify the constituent parts that compose any rhetorical situation: exigence (problem 
existing in the world), audience (those capable of enacting change), and constraints (persons, 
events, objects, relations, and the like that limit decisions and discourse as well as any resulting 
actions).
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they take on different degrees of significance as they traverse across different 
social constructions and purposes—what she refers to as the “‘constitutive 
circulation’ of rhetoric in the social field” (7). We can see Edbauer’s concerns 
similarly operating in Betancourt’s categories: while the categories do offer 
an explanatory framework for specific tendencies among aspects of the New 
Aesthetic, they are not sufficient for accounting for the “wider sphere” in 
which (nor the underlying substrate from which) the artifacts take shape—
from technical considerations to the social field. Moreover, the categories also 
seem surprisingly devoid of connections with Betancourt’s own framework 
(his Marxian orientations), which suggests that they are themselves in excess 
of his own explanatory moves.
What Edbauer argues is that rhetors should consider elemental orienta-
tions like Bitzer’s or Betancourt’s frameworks (and the larger arc of situational 
rhetoric in general) as part of “an ongoing social flux” (9). In this reorienta-
tion, the rhetorical power comes not from the imposition (or fit) of a par-
ticular categorical order (nor its related cause–effect logics) but rather from 
describing the fibers and fissures that formulate the flux: the relations, flows, 
and points of contact among the entities and organisms of a rhetorical ecol-
ogy, and the social, institutional, and historical backdrops against which arti-
facts and utterances move. Rhetoric (and/or the rhetorical significance of any 
artifact or utterance) becomes constituted, then, not through declamation by a 
critical hermeneutist but rather as emergent among/through networked “flows 
and connections” (9). Moreover, and this is perhaps the most significant ele-
ment of Edbauer’s orientation, these flows and connections accrete over time, 
creating specific “intensities and mutations” that (a) transform and condition 
the network itself (including human participants), (b) orient the social flux 
toward particular perspectives and purposes, and (c) generate new rhetorical 
ecologies, which, in turn, further expand via counterrhetorics, co-optation, 
circulation, and the like (10; 20).
To demonstrate her position, Edbauer tracks the evolution of the “Keep 
Austin Weird” slogan, now central to the identity of Austinites in/from Aus-
tin, Texas. She shows how the slogan, which was initially enacted as a form 
of small business resistance to big-box corporate infiltration, came to partici-
pate in a multitude of rhetorics in and around Austin—from city government 
proceedings to street art, from academic branding to counterculture irrup-
tions. In tracing “Keep Austin Weird,” what she sets up is an articulation of 
how utterances, artifacts, and events are able to move fluidly through social 
and institutional discourses, forming their own networks and ecologies while 
remaining rhetorically pliable. For Edbauer, being attentive to the pliability 
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of rhetorical artifacts in and across networks allows scholars to ask different 
questions and take stock of different considerations, all while situating the 
rhetor as both transformative of and conditioned by the ecology.
By tracing “Keep Austin Weird” across a set of artifacts, discourse com-
munities, counterpublics, and other rhetorical manifestations, Edbauer offered 
not just a narrative of the slogan but also a loose description of its accretions. 
There was no definitive articulation to be had (nor was that Edbauer’s intent); 
rather, by exploring the motility of “Keep Austin Weird,” Edbauer showed 
how an ecological rather than situational (or even categorical) perspective 
provided access to material and medial effects and processes as well as to the 
everyday, lived capacities associated with a given object of study. In adopting a 
rhetorical ecology orientation to the New Aesthetic, I inherently consider the 
designated artifacts of the New Aesthetic archive but also, as suggested above, 
the ways in which the artifacts are given meaning, circulate among various 
discourses, and manifest in relation to different materialities, social fields, his-
torical moments, and institutional structures. What takes center stage in this 
approach is not the imposition of a particular (external) hermeneutical order 
onto a relatively nebulous archive (à la Betancourt) but rather an increased 
attunement to the circulating intensities that constitute (and reflect) the New 
Aesthetic rhetorical ecology. The challenge, however, is finding a way to put 
into relief the circulating intensities, as they are themselves in flux and some-
what resistant to the description that Edbauer situated as part of the power 
of this model.
My response, then, is not to describe any circulating intensity itself but 
to glimpse its edges and outlines, colors and contrasts, which accrete as the 
intensities move across different flows and connections, conversations and 
contentions. This allows, in my view, one to articulate the contours of the 
accretions, which in turn can offer something of a tentative shape to particu-
lar circulating intensities. As contour is a key term in this work, let me take 
a moment to better situate its meaning and use in this context, which draws 
from a multitude of its potential meanings.
WHAT IS A CONTOUR?
First, contour is commonly used to refer to the general shape or form of some-
thing (e.g., the contour of the hood of a car). Second, it is associated with 
malleability—as when used as a verb (e.g., to contour something [mold into 
specific shape] so as to fit it into something else). Third, contour is a practice 
used in cartography to denote multiple levels of elevation (i.e., mapmakers use 
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contour lines to indicate height or depth). While the critical impulse would be 
to situate contour in relation to a single meaning (as concept), the postcritical 
move here is “punceptual,” a neologism introduced by Gregory L. Ulmer in 
Heuretics: The Logic of Invention, which, like the pun, allows for thinking with 
all the meanings of a term (and all its registers) simultaneously. In this way, 
the contours of the New Aesthetic are meant to (1) denote general shapes and 
shades, (2) demarcate entities that can readily be made to fit into/with other 
registers (e.g., digital rhetoric), and (3) designate the depths and intensities 
of New Aestheticism. They are not part of a fixed categorical order, nor of a 
singularity, but rather are more akin to the shifting silhouettes of an evening 
dress (as its wearer dances in the moonlight).
If working from a traditional critical perspective, constructs like contours 
are hard to deal with because they do not satisfy the hermeneutic imperative 
(they are not necessarily stable). But I am attempting something different here, 
with the contours of the New Aesthetic meant to function rhetorically: serving 
as a set of operative guides for mediated beings making in a mediated world. 
While they may offer something akin to “a rhetoric” (perhaps a post-digital 
rhetoric), I stop short of such a label, as the contours themselves possess nota-
ble degrees of instability. Further, as I demonstrate in the remaining chapters, 
New Aesthetic artifacts can at one and the same moment be seen to fit with 
multiple contours, apply to different contours in contradictory ways, and even 
point toward the inevitable excess of the ecology (that which resides beyond 
what the contours here can provide). By focusing on the individual contours 
(and not approaching them as a stable collective), I aim to keep open the pos-
sibility of adding new contours or, as is more likely, completely remaking the 
contours as the postcritical winds continually shift the dress’s silhouette.
To put the contours into relief, then, one must work in relation to the 
objects of the New Aesthetic as well as its many arguments and articulations. 
For not only does moving through the rhetorical dimension in which New 
Aesthetic artifacts participate help one develop a richer context for under-
standing the contours that emerge, but it is the very process that must be 
undergone to glimpse the contours in the first place. Thus, the next sections 
pick up with key challenges to the New Aesthetic, offering responses to those 
challenges while using the depths they provide to better illuminate particular 
contours and considerations.
As a kind of pre-first step to this rhetorical ecology orientation, however, 
it seems important to acknowledge the online dynamic of the majority of 
sources in this chapter (and in subsequent chapters when dealing explicitly 
with commentary on New Aestheticism), for most of the rhetorical elements 
of New Aestheticism live in blogs, online journals, video-recorded talks, book 
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sprints, and electronic as well as print versions of magazines like Atlantic and 
Wired. While it has, of course, become more common for academics to work 
in relation to sources from the blogosphere, it seems nonetheless important 
to note this element here because (a) the degree of online source material 
involved may feel different from most academic writing practices, and (b) the 
online, networked quality of the sources is central to the engagement: that is, 
central to what media culture historicist and theorist Anne Friedberg would 
have called the “born digital”2 quality of New Aestheticism.
RHETORICAL DIMENSIONS
For all of its faults, failures, and finicky manifestations, the myriad engage-
ments on the New Aesthetic collectively serve in at least one capacity: tes-
timony to its existence, to its potential value, and to the need to continue 
working it through. For whatever it is, has been, or may become, the New 
Aesthetic did manage to put its finger on the pulse of something—something, 
as Bruce Sterling suggested, that only emerges in a world increasingly defined 
and organized by human–technology relations. If there were not something 
to the New Aesthetic, it would not have spawned such a variety of presenta-
tions, keynotes, and responses (from bloggers and artists to popular writers 
and ivory-tower academics). But the range of reactions suggests that while 
there may be value in New Aestheticism, there are also many tensions that 
cannot be ignored.
The primary charge levied at the New Aesthetic begins with the most fun-
damental of rhetorical components, its label: whether the New Aesthetic is an 
aesthetic movement at all. More than a few critics and public intellectuals do not 
see the New Aesthetic as a movement—maybe as a meme, as techno-theorist 
Robert Jackson argued in “The Banality of the New Aesthetic,” or perhaps a 
vibe, as media studies scholar Lukasz Mirocha suggested in “Communication 
Models, Aesthetics, and Ontology of the Computational Age Revealed,” but not 
a movement. Even Bridle, as indicated in chapter 1, hesitated to call it a move-
ment. And Sterling did the same, though on different grounds (e.g., metaphys-
ics). But whether a movement or not, what the various challenges to its stature 
reveal are different potential understandings of aesthetic movements them-
selves as well as why New Aesthetic artifacts operate and inculcate the way 
they do. To this end, the myriad of challenges to its movement status include 
 2. When digital artifacts and objects are not produced as a transmediation of a text but 
rather are conceived and constructed from the start in digital platforms, they are, as Friedberg 
argues in “On Digital Scholarship,” born digital: inception, conception, and reception all taking 
shape in and through digital materialities.
 R H E TO R I C A L E CO LO G I E S A N D N E W A E S T H E T I C I S M •  43
the world now being too fragmented and dispersed to sustain a movement (or 
any type of avant-garde for that matter), the New Aesthetic being a “backward-
facing” aesthetic and lacking any sense of futurecasting, or it being all about 
style, having no content or politics of its own. Further concerns include the 
New Aesthetic’s lack of history (or any sustained sense of history) or its pursuit 
of human aesthetics (and/or that it focuses too much on the human element) 
at the expense of objects or an object-oriented aesthetic. This, of course, is by 
no means an exhaustive list, but together these rhetorical maneuvers provide 
the backdrop and flux upon which the New Aesthetic’s circulating intensities 
accrete; that is, they offer the discursive and material points of contact from 
which one might begin to draw out the contours of New Aestheticism.
To begin this rhetorical engagement, let me focus first on the challenges to 
whether the New Aesthetic is a movement, for that claim (and its related con-
tentions) establishes a comparative dynamic by which one can further inves-
tigate the other rhetorical challenges to the New Aesthetic.
Movement
Avant-garde artists and other aesthetic movements have traditionally used 
creative works as ruptures of or exceptions to established practices and values. 
That is to say, as freelance writer and techno-critic Kyle Chayka argued in 
“The New Aesthetic: Going Native,” aesthetic movements typically use dis-
sidence to “shock a society” into an (often revolutionary) aesthetic shift or to 
draw critical attention to a prevailing cultural condition they are confront-
ing (n.  pag.). The Dadaists, for example, used a range of tactics to respond 
to the violence and trauma of World War I, the industrialized technology of 
the early twentieth century, and the prevailing standards of modernity. They 
championed irrationality and the nonsensical, took up an anti-art culture, 
and laid the groundwork for abstract art. The Surrealists, as an extension of 
Dada, pursued instinctive thinking as art practice. In a very Freudian sense, 
they intended to reconcile dreams and depth psychology with reality in order 
to break the chains imposed on imagination. Both Dadaism and Surrealism 
challenged the aesthetics and rhetorics of rationalism (particularly excessive 
rationalism) and offered a different future, one where imagination, instinctual 
thinking, and the nonsensical qualities of human beings had space to flourish 
in and through representational practices. The artists in these movements cre-
ated works that showcased a different value set, “shocked” an overly rational 
cultural ideology, and pointed toward a different future-to-come.
If one takes Dada and Surrealism as possible models, the question 
becomes how might the New Aesthetic stack up? And here the matter is not 
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a measure of impact, for that would be an unfair equation on a number of 
accounts. Rather, the issue is in determining what makes an aesthetic move-
ment an aesthetic movement. In this regard, one element commonly aligned 
with aesthetic movements is the notion of shock or a revolutionary spirit that 
challenges well-established practices and paradigms, seeking to exchange 
the familiar with the unfamiliar. But in thinking of the New Aesthetic as a 
rhetorical ecology, operative in a particular historical and cultural context, 
the reality is that the beginning of the twenty-first century is nothing like 
the beginning of the twentieth; there have been major cultural, ideological, 
epistemological, ontological, and technological shifts in the past one hundred 
years. It is simply more difficult to shock a society in a post-, post- moment 
because the fragmentation and dispersion ushered in by postmodernism and 
poststructuralism coupled with the affordances and ubiquity of networked 
culture make it difficult to find anything solid enough to work against, any-
thing established enough to legitimately be “shocked” by something. As digital 
humanist Caroline Bassett has argued in “Not Now? Feminism, Technology, 
Postdigital,” the “enchantment with the technological as new” has passed, no 
longer functioning “as a privileged site,” at least not in the same ways (137).3 
Instead, what the New Aesthetic is doing, as Chayka claimed, is “respond[ing] 
to a[n already] shocked society and turn[ing] the changes we’re confronting 
into critical creation” (n. pag.). The New Aesthetic is not replacing or subvert-
ing an established order so as to “shock” society or culture; rather, it is show-
casing artifacts and attunements, practices and preferences that draw critical 
attention to the technological “shock” that the developed, Western world has 
already undergone.
Interestingly, Marshall McLuhan, writing in the 1960s, provided a way to 
understand this New Aesthetic function. In Understanding Media: The Exten-
sions of Man, he argued that people are often numbed to the actual impact of 
technologies. That is to say, the public gets distracted by particular relational 
understandings of technologies (e.g., the conventional user–used relation-
ship) and fails, McLuhan says, to take stock of the effects that those tech-
nologies have on human patterns of perception and/or ways of being in the 
world (18). People so readily adopt, use, and internalize the logics and new 
ways of being afforded by technologies that they typically are unable to take 
stock of how technologies alter their sense ratios, aesthetic preferences, and 
worldly sensibilities. Of course, the crazy thing about McLuhan’s claims is that 
radio and television were the dominant emerging media when he was writ-
 3. Bassett’s work here attempts to account for a variety of medially aware responses to 
contemporary technological developments (and the different ways in which those might be 
read).
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ing. These were unidirectional broadcast technologies, blanketing a relatively 
stable consumer culture. But today’s technology and media no longer exist as 
singular entities. They function as networked devices that communicate with 
one another as much as with humans—a mediated world where to be has 
become intertwined with to make, where cultural participation is enmeshed 
with producing digital/network artifacts. Therefore, there may be no posi-
tion for a general public to take up with other than what McLuhan calls “the 
numb stance of the technological idiot” (18). For when people are saturated by 
(and infatuated with) their technological devices, they may not be equipped 
to fully attune to new mediating technologies or to the changes in the human 
condition ushered in by those technologies. And the reasons are at least two-
fold. First, as Walter Ong suggested in Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing 
of the Word, one needs the highest technology available to be able to assess 
the ways in which previous technologies set upon the human condition. For 
what newer technologies reveal are not only the blips and imperfections of 
previous representational practices but also the depth and degree to which 
those technologies influence human ways of being/thinking in the world (80). 
This suggests, on some level, that it may be impossible to take stock of the 
impacts of the highest technological forms themselves; but part of what the 
New Aesthetic is doing, specifically in relation to its larger rhetorical ecol-
ogy, is prompting a particular kind of awareness of these human–technology 
considerations—revealing the assemblage through manifestations of its own 
granularity.
Second, the “numbed stance” to which McLuhan refers results from socio-
cultural practices that have conditioned people to put technologies to use, to 
do things with them, and, perhaps more importantly, to use them for what 
they were designed. This conditioning has created a general hesitancy to 
employ technologies differently and to play with them critically (processes 
that allow for intervening in technological assumptions and logics and attun-
ing to the ways in which technologies set upon the human condition). Being 
indoctrinated in this way is, perhaps, a remnant of industrial/machinic cul-
ture, which saw a decrease in multifunctional tools and an increase in special-
ized artifacts for specialized purpose: one tool (one worker) for one job (one 
task). But while the more recent hacker/tinkerer/do-it-yourself (DIY) men-
tality coming into mainstream culture may be changing this orientation—the 
kind of hacker-bricoleur to which media and technology scholar Jan Hol-
mevik refers4—by and large people still commonly relate to technologies with 
 4. The hacker, of course, is something of a cult figure—coming to mainstream culture 
through literature and cinema narratives that position her as a subversive, one who can inter-
vene in various technological systems and/or expose what is hidden by black-boxed computa-
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the numbed stance: ubiquitously using technologies while failing to take stock 
of how they alter individual and collective patterns of perception.
But artists, “serious artists,” as McLuhan might say, are a different breed. 
Unlike the average Jane or Jimmy, they are “able to encounter technology with 
impunity” because they are experts at accounting for “changes in sense per-
ception” (18)—which includes taking stock of the “shock” already undergone. 
Dutch media art critic Arjen Mulder echoed these sentiments, arguing that 
artists are “able to be conscious of the present” and possess the ability to make 
the rest of culture more aware of present, technologized sensibilities (in Brou-
wer, Mulder, and Spuybroek; qtd. in Berry et al. 15). And while I agree, to 
a certain degree, about the role that “artists” may play in helping the larger 
culture more readily attune to how technologies influence sense perception, I 
would move outward from the specific class of working creatives designated 
by McLuhan’s and Mulder’s “artist.” For example, the New Aesthetic itself is 
tied to this consciousness of the present; its artifacts and occurrences come 
as much from maker culture, industry, and commerce as from art-proper. 
And part of the very value of the New Aesthetic is that it highlights how 
changes in human–technology assemblages reconfigure structures of atten-
tion that lead, in turn, to differently attuned types of awareness on the part 
of everyday working creatives and rhetors who make as part of an operative 
assemblage. For what is taking shape in the New Aesthetic is less a transition 
from no awareness to awareness, and more a change in the level of attun-
ement that results from shifts in human–technology assemblages—with con-
temporary assemblage formations directing human and nonhuman attention 
alike toward a root condition of mediation as well as opening access to a level 
of awareness that would be otherwise obfuscated by the sense of immediacy 
or emersion in one’s own techno-cultural moment (Ong’s highest technology 
position). Thus, the capacity of the “artist” to take stock of the present and to 
encounter technology with impunity may be true of any individual who pos-
sesses a certain attunement to the technologies and materialities with which 
she works (and/or to how they set upon her and her upon them); and part of 
what makes the New Aesthetic valuable to rhetoric is that it helps foster this 
attunement in everyday rhetors by exposing core elements of mediation and/
or by subverting human expectations of mediation, which are also part of the 
tionality. The bricoleur, coming from French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, is a tinkerer, 
an assembler, an individual who improvises with the material and nonmaterial possibilities 
at hand. The hacker-bricoleur, then, as Holmevik presents it, is one who “works with what 
is available to create new and exciting possibilities” that allow for new representations in the 
world and for interventions into socio-culturo-political orders (44). What limits this figure is 
not materialities but her abilities to imitate, simulate, replicate, and leverage aesthetics, objects, 
and artifacts in, of, and through computational systems.
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ecology in which it participates. Thus, on at least one level, part of the very 
purpose and value of this work is in helping everyday rhetoricians attune to 
reconfigured structures of attention by working in relation to the contours of 
the New Aesthetic so as to move away from McLuhan’s numbness and open 
heuretic avenues for rhetorical practices in post-digital culture.
It seems important to acknowledge, however, that the New Aesthetic—a 
“particular kind of sensibility” attuned to a ubiquitous computing and net-
worked present (Berry et al. 11)—does actually come into existence via Bridle 
and other digital futurists (artists) playing in the digital and nondigital art 
galleries and streets of London. As post-digital artists who work among and 
through digital and nondigital medial interfaces, these folks are highly sen-
sitive to changes in patterns of perception with regard to mediation. They 
do possess something of an orientation to seeing, hearing, and feeling dissi-
dence in media in ways that a general population may not, at least not without 
prompting; and this is a vital component of what the New Aesthetic contrib-
utes—the prompt—as it exists, at least in part, to make the rest of culture 
more aware of present, technologized (in)sensibilities.
What this also suggests, from a rhetorical analysis perspective, is that Bri-
dle’s “hey, look at this cool thing” approach to gathering artifacts is not as 
arhetorical as it may seem. It is a trained practice of recognition by an indi-
vidual attuned to particular human–technology tensions. Further, his project, 
which launched the New Aesthetic but is not totalizing of it, was a curatorial 
act; and as Berry et al. argue in New Aesthetic, New Anxieties, this “implies a 
public gesture and a subject position” that “frames the collection” and “pro-
duces connections” among the artifacts (32–33). So, games scholar Ian Bogost’s 
joke that the New Aesthetic can be defined as “things Bridle posts to its tum-
blr” is not as flippant as it may appear (“New Aesthetic” n. pag.). Even that 
reductive view still situates the New Aesthetic as curatorial practice, gather-
ing examples of emergent patterns of representation that help foster a kind of 
attunement—patterns that have not, up to this point, coalesced enough into 
an articulable platform or paradigm but nonetheless remain recognizable as 
(a) touching on something of importance and (b) helping others attune to 
the implications of human–technology shifts (particularly as reflected in the 
forms and materialities of mediations). This is partly why it is important to 
try to grasp the accretions among the New Aesthetic ecology, for what is being 
introduced by New Aestheticism is not a definitive set of categories for mak-
ing sense of contemporary art and media but rather a rhetorical attunement 
to how shifts in human–technology assemblages, and the new patterns of per-
ception they introduce, are themselves ushering in a kind of mindfulness that 
realigns (if not counters) McLuhan’s numbness.
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One example of the “new” patterns to emerge among the reconfigured 
structures is something of a destabilization of an old dichotomy: the digital/
real divide. Bridle, as indicated in chapter 1, was pretty consistent on the fact 
that much in and of the New Aesthetic was blurring the boundaries between 
the digital and the real. This is echoed, of course, in the many commentaries 
on the New Aesthetic but is also demonstrated in things like (a) pixel aesthet-
ics manifesting on T-shirts, in hairstyles, and as exterior building designs; 
(b) cityscapes becoming blanketed by a digital layer of maps, reviews, check-
ins, and so forth; and (c) digital interfaces themselves being constituted by 
the metaphors and images of everyday reality (from icons to social media 
feeds). In other words, the first accretions that one might identify among 
the New Aesthetic ecology involve the ways that New Aesthetic objects and 
ostentations direct attention to the rhetorical interplay across the digital/real 
divide—revealing, on the one hand, that the digital and the real were perhaps 
not as separate as originally thought and, on the other, that each operates in 
an aesthetic as well as material and representational dimension for today’s 
working creatives. As I explore more fully in the next chapter, science fiction 
writer William Gibson referred to this blurring as eversion—the eversion of 
cyberspace into the real—but in the New Aesthetic it functions as a two-way 
orientation (the digital everting into the real; the real everting into the digi-
tal), offering the overarching gesture of the first contour: eversion as/of design.
But before moving on to that (and other) contours, it is important to con-
tinue with this rhetorical exploration of the tensions of the New Aesthetic, 
for the more deeply one can understand New Aestheticism, the more signifi-
cantly one will be able to position (and leverage) the contours for rhetorical 
considerations.
Challenging the Challenge
The first response above situates the New Aesthetic as an awareness aes-
thetic rather than a revolutionary one—suggesting that the New Aesthetic is 
intended not to shock a society into a particular mode or order but rather to 
draw attention to (a) the technological shock that everyday culture has already 
undergone and (b) the reconfigured attention structures that this undergo-
ing has introduced. The second potential response, in contrast, is to make 
the case that the New Aesthetic does in fact respond to a prevailing cultural 
condition. Of course, the triggers of this responsivity do not carry the politi-
cal and/or rationalist overtones to which Dadaism and Surrealism responded, 
but they nonetheless function as a counter to the widespread, McLuhan-esque 
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“technological idiotism” indicated above—large-scale populations increasingly 
unaware of the screen-mediated, computationally constructed, and network-
oriented patterns of perception and representation rampant in their current 
moment. Not only unaware, but unaware that they are unaware—which, 
again, may simply be a position that one cannot occupy without some sort of 
prompt (e.g., the New Aesthetic) or trained sensibility (McLuhan’s and Mul-
der’s artist). A popular, commercial example of this “unaware” mentality is 
demonstrated in the marketing strategy of the iPad 2 release. In the same year 
as Bridle’s launch of the New Aesthetic, Apple aired a television commercial 
for the iPad 2 that included the following voiceover: “When technology gets 
out of the way, everything becomes more delightful, even magical. That’s when 
you leap forward. That’s when you end up with something like this” (“We 
Believe” iPad 2 Commercial). Here, technology “getting out of the way” refers 
not to the technological device itself but specifically to keeping the techni-
cal, computational, machinic interruptions from intervening in regular user–
tool dynamics (the numbed stance). The more the technology “gets out of the 
way”—the more black-boxing that occurs with corporate/commercial tech-
nologies—the more people can remain oblivious to the device, its functions, 
and its impact. It is difficult to grasp the patterns and practices of representa-
tion when one is disconnected from the operative logics that produce them 
(which is as true for writing as it is for computational media). But the simple 
reality is that the more difficult it is for one to intervene in a given technology 
(device, system, practice, or other), the harder it is to take any position other 
than the numbed stance of the technological idiot. Hence, there is a rhetorical 
value in fostering awareness: creating opportunities for individuals not only to 
intervene in the human–technology coupling but also to grasp shifts in their 
very own sensibilities. For when interventions are possible or when interrup-
tions occur—technical, cultural, political, or otherwise—these instances draw 
attention to the technology, to its mediating acts, to the device as device (no 
longer merely a window or portal to the digital world), as well as to the role, 
function, and position that humans may take up in relation to these matters. 
They ask, in Richard Lanham’s terms, that users look at the human–technol-
ogy assemblage (its technological and human components alike) rather than 
merely operate through it. Or, to put this in philosopher Martin Heidegger’s 
terms: in those moments of intervention or interruption, the iPad2 becomes 
“present-at-hand” (vorhandenheit) and Apple wants them to be or remain 
“ready-to-hand” (zuhandenheit). That is, Apple (as corporate metonym here) 
wants users to use the device, to move through it to access or make digital 
content in the ways that Apple has designed, and not necessarily to be aware 
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of the device’s computational workings or of it as computational device, prone 
to all sorts of miscues, malfunctions, and misfortunes.
In counterdistinction, part of the very rhetorical function of the New Aes-
thetic is making “present-at-hand” (via aesthetic triggers) a litany of mediat-
ing practices that general culture associates with network activity and drawing 
attention to the operations of the systems of digital culture. For example, one 
might look at something like computational artists Jon Satrom and Ben Syver-
son’s sOS operating system, which is an extension of their earlier collaboration 
Satromizer. sOS is basically a corrupted version of Apple’s operating system, 
which merges glitch practices with problem-based (if not problem-inducing) 
operations. As users tap the iPad screen, they have no real way of anticipat-
ing what the operating system will do. The un-anticipatable outcome of the 
operative system calls into question, as Casey Boyle suggests, the assump-
tions (as well as epistemological order) most people have with computer 
systems (“Rhetorical” 14). While this particular example is not part of the 
New Aesthetic curation, how it works to destabilize expectations of a device’s 
operative system—by turning glitch itself into a procedural methodology for 
operation—foregrounds much of what people take for granted in human–
computer relationships. Or, put another way: the very experience of sOS, like 
most New Aesthetic artifacts, creates an awareness of (or at least attentiveness 
to) the medial platform, process, or product of which it is a parody, including 
the human dimension within that assemblage.
Therefore, one way to understand New Aestheticism (and, by extension, its 
contours) is not as an arhetorical entity, devoid of the political fervor of Dada-
ism, but rather as a direct response to the medial numbness that has served as 
default cultural position. This numbness exists, however, not only in relation 
to computational systems of mediation but also in relation to the very underly-
ing assumptions of those technologies and how they shape human perception. 
Further, the more that people fetishize technologies and the more “the real” 
gets inundated with “the digital,” the more significant the need for something 
like the New Aesthetic (whether movement or not) and its rhetorical implica-
tions. For, as McLuhan argued, the change ushered in by technologies does 
not require cultural consent (19). The change occurs, regardless. It may unfold 
differently depending on the technologies and degree of general (dis)approval, 
but it unfolds nonetheless. All one can do is try to attune oneself to its effects, 
take stock of the patterns of perception being introduced, and work to under-
stand how technologies alter (and can be made to alter) one’s conditions of 
being in the world. Of course, in twenty to thirty years, this awareness may 
simply be part of everyday life—similar to the way Dadaism opened the world 
to abstract art and readymades as leverageable artifacts. But in the meantime, 
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the New Aesthetic reflects the reconfigured attention structures introduced by 
new/different human–technology assemblages and serves as one postcritical 
engagement of today’s increasingly technologized conditions.
Perhaps this is why the general consensus on the New Aesthetic is that it 
functions primarily by pointing to the technologized reality of contemporary 
lives: people are living a technologized reality—living in it, of it, and becom-
ing beings through it. What Bridle has been doing, then, is merely (though, to 
be sure, not merely) pointing to things in the world as they already are—and 
what makes this central for rhetoric is that it offers an attunement to practices 
and relations, preferences and representations reflective of a contemporary 
condition. To enact change in/on/of/through networked discourses, which are 
as much visual and textual (as well as volatile and tactile) as they are com-
putational, one needs to be attuned to a perspective in which the aesthetic 
dimension not only directs attention to mediation but also operates as suasive.
In mapping or merging an aesthetic dimension with a rhetorical orienta-
tion, one needs to consider the larger set of expectations and anticipations 
that are part of both registers. This includes, on the one hand, understanding 
the value of the aesthetic to rhetorical practice—the kind of Dewey-based 
pragmatism presented in chapter 1, where the aesthetic refers not simply to 
an artistic or cultural style (deemed as such by a master class) but rather 
fundamentally introduces, as Steph Ceraso’s and Aimée Knight’s work echo, 
another mode of knowing central to the experience of (and making of mean-
ing through) everyday artifacts in a media-saturated culture. On the other 
hand, this also includes grasping the rhetorical tenets of the aesthetic tradi-
tion, which includes, in this case, discursively constructed tensions raised by 
the New Aesthetic. While I will address the former throughout this work, par-
ticularly in relation to each contour and its rhetorical implications, I want to 
continue to sketch out the latter, as knowing how the New Aesthetic comple-
ments and counters the very rhetoric of aesthetic movements helps flesh out 
its contributions to both cultural and rhetorical frameworks.
If aesthetic movements are defined, in part, by the futures they envision, 
then as artist and academic Carla Gannis argues in “A Code for the Numbers 
to Come,” the New Aesthetic is simply not an aesthetic movement (n. pag.).5 
Or, as critic Hrag Vartanian put it in “A Not-So-New Aesthetic, or Another 
Attempt at Technological Triumphalism”: because the New Aesthetic func-
tions with a backward-facing orientation, it lacks any “ability to dream into 
 5. Gannis argues that as the digital comes to saturate culture, artists will no longer be 
limited to working in the gaps between life and art but will start to work in the gaps between 1s 
and 0s, exposing not simply an aesthetic but something of contemporary digital and nondigital 
substrates.
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the future” (n. pag.). Now, while Gannis and Vartanian are just two among 
the many, they reflect a larger sentiment, which rejects the New Aesthetic 
as movement precisely because it does not adhere to this future-to-come 
conditionality. But that very conditionality is beholden to the aesthetic tra-
ditions of yore, and so there is, first, a question as to the actual necessity 
of this futurecasting quality for a contemporary aesthetic movement and the 
rhetorical ecologies in which the New Aesthetic participates. Second, if one 
does see futurecasting as a required element, then rather than maintain that 
New Aestheticism lacks any future sensibilities, perhaps it would be of greater 
rhetorical value to ask what kind of future it does suggest even with its back-
ward-facing orientation. Below I offer a few responses intended to address 
these considerations, which, in turn, illuminate additional circulating intensi-
ties among the New Aesthetic ecology.
Futurecasting
If the New Aesthetic is a movement, the simple reality is that it may not 
require the same kind of futurecasting as previous aesthetic movements. 
As rhetoric scholar Arabella Lyon has argued in her work Deliberative Acts, 
“a future-oriented theory minimizes what is happening in the moment of 
engagement” (36); and the New Aesthetic, if anything, is rooted in the con-
ditions of the here and now of its own manifestation. This echoes Dewey’s 
implications from chapter 1 that any considerations of the aesthetic must 
begin with “the events and scenes” connected to essential conditions of one’s 
everyday life (3; 12), which manifest in and through a moment of engagement 
and not as conjecture for a future-to-come. Of course, while Lyon’s work is 
on deliberative rhetoric rather than aesthetics or technology, her position-
ing of the futurecasting issue provides an unexpected but important parallel. 
According to Lyon, theories steeped in futurecasting ignore how the acts and 
events “in the present”—what one might see as Dewey’s immediate sense of 
living—“create a current worldview that is always already constructing the 
future in an infinite procession” (36). Thus, New Aestheticism’s attunement 
to the lived digital and nondigital materialities of the present signals to the 
importance of how the conditions and practices of today necessarily partici-
pate in the construction of any future-to-come (11). What is “new” about the 
New Aesthetic, then, is perhaps that it introduces a different kind of aesthetic 
movement—being not of the revolutions or subversions of Cubism, Surreal-
ism, Constructivism, and the like, but rather being an awareness aesthetic, 
one more aligned with “renegotiat[ing] the relationship between human- 
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subject and non-human-object” (Cloninger n. pag.) than with overthrowing 
any representational dogma. As an awareness aesthetic,6 what it presents is 
not a future-yet-to-come but a Deweyan attentiveness to the present-as-it-is, 
which is increasingly important in an overtly aestheticized and overly technol-
ogized world where understandings of the material world are filtered through 
(if not only accessible through) layers and layers of mediation.
Now, while the New Aesthetic may not stem from a revolution-oriented 
politic, Bridle does often work quite explicitly to associate the New Aesthetic 
with particular political (and even military) interests—specifically his work 
connected to drones, which is also rooted in this conditional awareness. In 
his 2012 work Drone Shadow 002,7 which was commissioned for the Istan-
bul Design Biennale, Bridle used chalk and tape to create a 1:1 representa-
tional outline of the MQ-1 Predator drone. The goal in this installation was to 
make the military drone visible in an exacting way: to give it representation, a 
pseudo-tangibility; and to create a kind of critical awareness of its magnitude 
(i.e., attempting to put into perspective its size, scale, and mass, things that 
most nonmilitary personnel have no way of experiencing8). While Bridle’s 
interest in drones has led some to position the drone as the nonofficial symbol 
of the New Aesthetic, what Bridle’s work pursues is an attempt to account for 
things that are generally invisible to human sensibilities alone (whether tech-
nologically or politically constructed invisibilities). There is, to put it mildly, 
an immense amount that exists outside the human sensorium.
That is to say, things exist—particularly technological things—that are non-
sensible to humans without the aid of a technology and/or without a particular 
human condition saturated by computational media and materialities. Some 
of these invisibilities include the digital layers that permeate culture, the wire-
less networks that facilitate everyday activities, and the computational mech-
anisms at work in myriad devices. But outside specific human–technology 
assemblages, many of these things or processes or signals go unseen, unno-
ticed, and unknowable. Part of what the New Aesthetic involves is bringing 
these things to attention (revealing something of the present-as-it-is) as well 
 6. By “awareness aesthetic” I mean that (a) it uses the aesthetic dimension to draw atten-
tion to (make one aware of) the underlying systems (human and non) that give particular 
mediations value, meaning, and even existence; and (b) it highlights the reconfigured structures 
that make human–technology assemblages attentive to different configurations and patterns of 
perception.
 7. An image of this work can be seen at http://jamesbridle.com/works/drone-shadow-002.
 8. The MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, for example, is not like the toy heli-
copter at the mall with a camera on it; its wingspan is the size of a typical cargo trailer of a 
commercial semi-truck, and Bridle gives this visibility by chalking out a real-size outline of the 
drone on the ground.
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as highlighting the ways in which humans and technology must collaborate 
and cooperate to give them visibility, tangibility, and understanding. Hence, 
what lies at the heart of New Aestheticism is not pixels or drones, nor even 
what future-may-come, but rather the various acts or artifacts manifesting in 
and of contemporary mediascapes that make the larger public aware of the 
prolific volume of things that (1) cannot be detected or created by human sen-
sibilities alone and (2) cannot be understood in any meaningful capacity by 
nontechnologized cultures (or even less or differently technologized cultures). 
While the former points to different capacities for action and expression, the 
latter reflects the changes in assemblage conditions that allow one to be atten-
tive in particular ways and to make sense of reconfigured structures and rela-
tions accordingly. Meaning that human–technology assemblages not only 
inform human perspectives on the world but also structure the very practices 
by which humans make meaning through mediation (shaping our ways of 
both seeing and understanding). For example, as Sterling put it, much (if not 
all) of the New Aesthetic imagery would not have made “any sense to anyone 
in 1982, or even in 1992,” as they lacked the adequate metaphors, models, or 
means for making sense of what they were seeing—matters germinated from 
particular human–technology assemblages (n. pag.).
Although the New Aesthetic may be backward-facing in the ways that 
Vartanian suggested (which only reaffirms McLuhan’s position that cultures 
typically drive into the future looking into the rearview mirror), it nonetheless 
reveals or reflects or responds to a current change in human relationships to 
technology, which, by extension, alter the human condition (and, correspond-
ingly, how one does rhetoric). By focusing on the present-as-it-is, what the 
New Aesthetic reveals is (a) the digitally crafted realities of people’s everyday 
lives (from architecture to identity formation); (b) the human–technology 
relationships that reside in, make possible, and make sense of the different 
attention structures and conceptual configurations (i.e., the digital/real divide 
and its blurring); and (c) the human–technology assemblages that grant one 
access (in terms of general awareness and in terms of rhetorical possibilities) 
to that which resides outside the human sensorium alone. As such, what this 
present-as-it-is condition points to is a number of accretions that will manifest 
in (and in relation to) the four contours that this work identifies. But while 
this conditional orientation helps to give them shape (and adds a layer of con-
sideration to contour 1), it is not enough on its own to give contours 2, 3, and 
4 figuration. Therefore, I want to work through a few additional challenges to 
the New Aesthetic, including its relationship to any particular sense of his-
tory and to its object-oriented possibilities, to better identify and introduce 
the remaining contours.
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Short-Term Memory
Vartanian chides the New Aesthetic for having only short-term memory, argu-
ing that it focuses on the recent past as a way of seeing the contemporary as 
nothing more than retro-present. He comes to this conclusion by using Eliz-
abeth E. Guffey’s Retro: The Culture of Revival, where the concept of retro 
is tied to consumable objects/products—an object orientation that renders 
recent history as objects possessing discernable style and function markers. In 
this view, the New Aesthetic may be seen as doing nothing more than using 
the nostalgia of the recent past (leveraging the style and function markers of 
engineered technological devices) to distance itself from the immediacy of 
yesterday. For Vartanian, this retro-present approach is a short-term-memory 
fix to a short-term-memory problem, all of which takes place at the expense of 
long-term-memory (historical) sensibilities. Although I return to a longer his-
torical trajectory later in this work, as Vartanian does raise a matter of some 
consideration, I want to first respond to two critical issues looming in the 
short-term-memory challenge, as they have increasing value in contemporary 
rhetorical arts: the danger/value of the retro-present and the potential impact 
of the compression of memory/history.
Retro-present
For Vartanian, the idea of the retro-present appears to be a negative thing, at 
least in terms of is potential for understanding New Aestheticism as a move-
ment. That is, the focus on the style and function markers of recent history 
comes, Vartanian suggests, at the expense of more richly historical narratives. 
But a retro-oriented practice, as articulated by Guffey, actually has much to 
offer current thinking about media engagement and representation in the dig-
ital age. For the art of remix, which has proliferated exponentially in/through 
computational media, is one contemporary practice that thrives on leveraging 
and reusing recent (and not-so-recent) style and function considerations. But 
more than that, repurposing, remaking, or reinventing (with) recent digital 
artifacts (and processes) is both central to digital/cultural participation and 
valuable to rhetorical forms of networked-based engagement.
To begin, while Lanham recognized more than twenty years ago that the 
tenets and tendencies of electronic media were offering something of a return, 
if not fulfillment, of classical rhetoric, he also foregrounded new sets of prac-
tices in computational media that were chock-full of rhetorical significance, 
like appropriation, replication, repetition, and juxtaposition (all vital to any 
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“retro-present” and all cornerstones of remix) (Electronic 39–43). Virginia 
Kuhn extended this idea further, showing not only how acts of appropria-
tion, for example, are central to the practices of the digital age but also how 
those acts (and actions) are themselves transformative (“Rhetoric”; “Web”). 
She argues that when one engages in these practices (ripping, editing, render-
ing a new artifact, leveraging the styles of a recent past for a contemporary 
representation, etc.), one transforms into a rhetor/artist capable of intervening 
in the truth claims of those artifacts as well as the truth claims of one’s own 
(“Rhetoric” par. 5.3). Therefore, something as superficial as appropriating 8-bit 
pixel aesthetics may operate as a nostalgic nod to a pre-to-early networked 
culture but it also allows rhetors to intervene in the truth claims of that aes-
thetic, in the meaning-making practices associated with it, and in the ways 
those practices can be leveraged to offer new insights, comments, or critique. 
The New Aesthetic, then, is not simply mired in a kind of retro-present; rather, 
the style and function markers of “recent history” are simply ripe with rhe-
torical potential, and practitioners of the New Aesthetic leverage that poten-
tial to great effect and affect—often directed at understanding or illuminating 
mediation itself.
Kuhn goes on to argue that one of the most interesting aspects of these 
practices, particularly as they manifest in relation to something like the art 
of remix, is their “tendency to subvert the dominant discursive field and its 
reified genres” (“Rhetoric” par. 5.4). Which means that the techniques associ-
ated with remix (and shared by the sensibilities of a “retro-present”) involve, 
as artist Paul Miller contends in Rhythm Science, identifying what something 
is or means (or how it means) and then flipping the script, pushing the mean-
ings in different directions, and/or subverting the very structures from which 
the sample emerges. On the one hand, the New Aesthetic itself reflects these 
tendencies: in other words, subverting the “reified genre” of aesthetic move-
ments. On the other hand, this suggests that the retro-present that Vartanian 
associates with New Aestheticism is actually a positive value, gesturing not 
toward what the New Aesthetic lacks but toward the rhetorical manner in 
which the borrowing of aesthetic markers can be transformative, participa-
tory, immediate.
However, while the retro-present conditionality includes gestures to a 
range of cultural objects in and of the New Aesthetic—like Bruno Pasquini’s 
Coin Block (Plate D), which materializes the coin block (and its function) 
from Nintendo’s Super Mario Bros. videogame series—the primary retro-pres-
ent among Bridle’s collection is, as mainstream treatments suggest, the use of 
8-bit graphics (particularly forms of pixelation) in contemporary mediations. 
With many New Aesthetic artifacts deploying a pixel aesthetic (intentionally 
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or otherwise), the pixel becomes one retro-present marker by which objects 
get included in the archive. Interestingly, however, what makes the aesthetic 
aspects of pixelation retro in the first place is not the passage of time (often 
the case with retro conditionalities), as pixels remain at the root of contem-
porary screen representations. Rather, the retro condition manifests because 
hardware and software improvements have essentially effaced the pixel—ren-
dering pixelation as either the result of a technical failure (human and non-
human alike) or, increasingly, an intentional aesthetic choice. Therefore, the 
function of any pixel aesthetic in New Aestheticism is as much about calling 
attention to a medial conditionality (and what it reflects) as it is a nostalgic 
nod to a retro-present.
Thus, the attentiveness to the pixel as an example of retro-present is as 
much a matter of its being a material condition as an aesthetic choice. This 
includes, as I argued in chapter 1, the pixel serving as the lowest common 
denominator for most in a digitally saturated (and often screen-mediated) 
culture; for even the ever-watchful computational eye is oriented around pix-
els—seeing and sensing the world via a pixel-based grid (the world rendered 
as pixels as data). All of which suggests an accretion of pixels and, in turn, a 
pixel orientation functioning as the second contour among the circulating 
intensities of the New Aesthetic.
Now, I use the phrase pixel orientation here rather than pixel aesthetic 
because, as I further demonstrate in chapter 4, the ever-present dynamic of 
the pixel (as naturalized element of screen mediation) has led to a condi-
tion in which the pixel not only exists as an aesthetic element that one can 
deploy rhetorically but also has become intertwined with a reconfigured way 
of seeing introduced by contemporary human–technology assemblages: pixels 
and pixelation offer a pattern of representation that shapes and reflects how 
techno-human assemblages make sense of the world—and do so to the point 
that many often see (or assume) pixels where they are not.
Memory Compression
The second critical dimension to Vartanian’s challenge (and the many who 
share this perspective) is a sense of holding on to the unquestioned (if not 
unchanging) value of long-term memory: the value of history, of archives, 
of the depth of records and traceable pasts. While this archive drive seems 
somewhat fundamental to Western human existence, the reality is that given 
the human–technology assemblages constructed by or as part of the current 
media-saturated world, long-term memory or traditional historical sensibili-
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ties may no longer apply—or at least not in the same way. As Paul Virilio 
argued in Open Sky, where he explores the cultural and individual impacts 
of global electronic mediation, the electronic perspectives in today’s moment 
have dissolved the very “scale of the human environment” (40): the tradi-
tional intervals of time and space are now being infused by a third interval, 
the interval of light (the light of the pixel) via fiber optics and screen medi-
ation; and life itself has become computationally compacted (see also Lan-
ham, Economics 21). Simply put, today’s hybrid worlds operate at the speed of 
light—where the speed of light acts as the standard and not the limit (Virilio 
14)—and thus time and space get compressed to such a degree that connec-
tion and (near) instantaneity replace distance (space) and duration (time) as 
de facto, privileged values. While space/time retained a privileged position in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, where tele-technologies (radio, tele-
gram, television, telephone, etc.) allowed people to hear and see at a distance, 
the underlying values of duration and distance simply become destabilized in 
twenty-first-century assemblages operative at the speed of light. Thus, history, 
long-term memory, or more generally any sense of “past” oriented around the 
concept of duration (time), become suspect in the compressed moment of the 
digital now.
One way to think about this reconfiguration of time (and/or the sense/
experience of time) is in relation to the compression of production duration 
that occurs when making operates at the speed of light (and/or primarily 
through light-based, pixel representations). Meaning, it becomes increasingly 
important to be able to take stock of the crafting-time of an artifact as well as 
the duration associated with the depth and skill of the engagement, for these 
qualities influence how one understands or experiences a given creation. For 
example, the creations of post-digital artist Gehard Demetz, who uses small, 
rough-cut woodblocks and polished parts to craft wood sculptures of chil-
dren, capitalizes on the play between surface types and shapes.9 His amazing 
works could be produced using 3D-printing technologies and, in turn, com-
pleted in a fraction of the time—he says as much. But the extended produc-
tion time of hand-carving his sculptures is critical to the work. It creates an 
intimacy and identification with the work on his part by allowing his “mind 
to develop with the piece over time” (qtd. in Openshaw 76). What the view-
ing public experiences with Demetz’s work includes not just the finished wood 
artifacts but a kind of thickness of time (duration, labor, etc.) associated with 
the production of his sculptures.
 9. See http://www.geharddemetz.com.
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Of course, this thickness is not exclusive to wood sculpture, nor to the 
specific practices of cutting-edge artists today; it can be found in the mun-
dane as well, particularly in everyday digital photography. In this regard, not 
only do images provide visual culture with visual histories—one sense of 
time—but also they carry their own thickness (or thinness, more accurately) 
of time as well as their own sense of history (and a changing sense, at that). 
For example, if one thinks about the distance and duration between taking 
a photo and viewing it as captured image, one can readily grasp how the 
photographic process in digital culture is incredibly compressed: there is a 
near simultaneity between capture and view-ability. But if one backs up just a 
few years ago or turns to non-digital materialities (e.g., chemical, film-based 
photography), this process or sense of production (and its related duration) 
expands considerably by adding in other considerations of time, equipment, 
and even the labor needed to develop the film before artist/audience can view 
the photos.
Let me offer something of an extended example. In the mid 1980s, the pro-
cess of popular photography included first taking enough photos to complete 
the roll of film and then getting the film developed. If the everyday-photog-
rapher was using was a 24-exposure roll of film and only took five pictures 
at Jackson’s Party (photographic event A), then she would likely wait until 
all twenty-four pictures had been taken (often spread across multiple events, 
like Josie’s bridal shower [event B] or Jeremy getting a tattoo [event C], and 
so on) before going to get the film developed. Second, getting film developed 
involved traveling to a location/business that could develop the film (like the 
Fotomat kiosks spread throughout the country or the photo department at 
Wal-Mart stores) and then returning to pick up the pictures when they were 
done. Prior to 1-hour development options, which are still offered today, the 
duration between drop-off and pick-up was often a day or more. Thus, from 
the moment of the camera click (at event A) to the point where people were 
able to actually see what was captured in the photos (i.e., what was produced), 
there was already a distance, a real passage of time (“Oh, that’s Jackson’s party 
from last month. What a great time!”).
But today the mechanical and chemical processes that produce mate-
rial photographic artifacts have been subject to algorithmic replacement and 
rupture. Digital cameras capture and display in real time, whether on smart-
phones or LCD camera viewfinders. The “captured” is near instantaneous with 
the capturing. The distancing that existed as part of the production duration 
has been all but removed, and this renders the image as an element of both 
then and now because it is of a past moment yet located in the present: not 
something one will see, but something one is seeing. What once was the inher-
60 •  C H A P T E R 2 
ent nostalgia built into viewing photos, stemming from the distance created 
by the production duration between the capturing and viewing of the images, 
which naturally produced a kind of longing for the moment gone by, is now 
replaced by an uncanny simulation of nostalgia; it is an instantaneous simula-
crum of a nostalgia one will have had at some future moment. An individual 
takes a picture, views it, and thinks, “That’s going to be a great memory.”
What is more, in today’s speed-of-light, fiber-optic, networked world, a 
person’s friends, family, and even acquaintances now too share in the experi-
ence of the images nearly instantaneously with their capture. For example, I 
take a picture of my kids, post it to Facebook, and within seconds (sometimes, 
I swear, even before the upload is complete) people have “liked” the photo. 
The once-standard dynamic of getting together with friends and retelling sto-
ries of the “things we have done” has given way (to a noticeable degree) to 
the shared posting of the “things we are doing.” People participate in each 
other’s lives not by “getting caught up” (bringing personal histories forward in 
the form of narratives and artifacts) but by “following” along in the self- and 
machine-selected and crafted digital representations of the lives each of them 
lead. And while there is surely far more at work here than this brief treatment 
can account for, hopefully this illuminates, through considerations of digital 
production and production duration, some of the small tangents with how 
changes in human–technology relationships also change how people under-
stand, experience, or even privilege matters of history/time.
Although a richer sense of history could be helpful in locating New Aes-
theticism in a particular trajectory of art practice and/or technological devel-
opment, the fact that it is coming-to-be in a world with perspectives and 
sensibilities compressed from always operating at the speed of light might 
give pause, once again, to positioning it in the expectations of previous aes-
thetic movements. Further, if one key element of New Aestheticism is con-
nected to creating an awareness of McLuhan’s numbness, then whether New 
Aestheticism works with the mediations of yesterday (short-term memory) 
or the established practices of yore (long-term memory) only matters insofar 
as the degree to which those positions help draw attention to the perspectives 
needed to make sense of particular acts and artifacts of mediation.
Championing the short-term-memory approach allows for grounding 
the New Aesthetic in a future-now, where the “retro-present” is a significant 
practice for playing with a culture compressed by and saturated with digital 
artifacts. Championing the long-term-memory approach, in contrast, neces-
sitates a fuller sense of the movements and practices and technologies from 
a medial past to see whether they might inform the tenets and tendencies of 
New Aesthetic ideologies. The former is aligned with a trajectory of the New 
Aesthetic being of a different kind of aesthetic and taking shape in a different 
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kind of cultural moment; the latter establishes threads and touch points for 
the myriad practices at play in New Aesthetic artifacts and objects. As such, 
both approaches are needed, and ignoring one is not necessarily a shortcom-
ing of the other. To this end, I more notably return to long-term consider-
ations as part of chapter 4, but before moving to the contour chapters more 
fully, I want to address one additional challenge to the New Aesthetic, which 
emerges as much from the seeming popularity of object-oriented ontology 
(OOO) as it does from any New Aesthetic connection to machinic agency. 
Moreover, this challenge, when considered in relation to the larger maneuvers 
of this chapter, will help put into relief the remaining contours, which is where 
this chapter concludes.
Object-Oriented Aestheticism
The more the New Aesthetic gets situated in terms of objects and/or object-
relations, the more there is a wanting connection between it and recent trends 
in rhetoric scholarship tied to OOO (and/or to the larger theoretical frame 
of speculative philosophy). As part of the posthuman and nonhuman turns, 
some rhetoric scholars have turned to OOO because it offers a metaphysi-
cal perspective that suspends the privileging of the human at the expense of 
objects—beginning from a position in which (a) both humans and nonhu-
mans are understood as coming to bear on objects in equal magnitude, and 
(b) objects are understood as existing independently of human perception, 
with an existence that can never be fully exhausted (or accounted for) by an 
object’s relations to humans, nor to other objects. Rhetorical trajectories that 
pick up with OOO do so because it allows rhetors to envision new human–
nonhuman and nonhuman–nonhuman relations (many of which were closed 
off by the philosophies of Immanuel Kant).
Given the New Aesthetic’s ties to an object-oriented archive, it is not sur-
prising that one would find (or want to find) resonance between New Aesthet-
icism and OOO. As artist and author Greg Borenstein has argued in “What 
It’s Like to Be a 21st Century Thing,” both “strive toward a fundamentally new 
way of imagining the relations between things in the world” (n. pag.). But one 
must move cautiously with folding them together, for, as Bogost contends in 
“The New Aesthetic Needs to Get Weirder,” the New Aesthetic is simply too 
concerned with human ways of relating to and experiencing objects in the 
world to genuinely fit with (or within) an OOO paradigm. It is, as Berry et 
al. have suggested, a “profoundly human problem,” which prevents it from 
becoming any kind of “aesthetic agenda grounded in the specific material 
workings” (and desires?) of the technologies themselves (19).
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For the two to be reconciled, Bogost writes, the New Aesthetic must “get 
weirder” and become a kind of object-oriented aesthetic (OOA): that is, rather 
than asking how humans might see/situate their worlds differently as they 
work with computational technologies “that themselves ‘see’ the world in vari-
ous ways,” what one should be asking, according to Bogost, is how (and to 
what extent) “computers [and other objects] .  .  . develop their own aesthet-
ics” (“New” n. pag.). To use Bogost’s example, one might speculate about the 
aesthetic preferences of a pastry toaster and about how it understands itself 
in the world. While the pastry toaster may seem like an unusual example, this 
kind of speculating stems from the primary view that all objects exist equally 
and that there is always a withdraw present in the ways in which individu-
als engage, understand, and think with any object: an object is never fully 
present to humans, particularly not in how it (the object) might understand 
that presence. Nor is it ever fully absent from humans. Meaning, the pastry 
toaster is always more than just a pastry toaster but never less than the gather-
ing of human relations with it. It includes a multitude of possibilities—those 
relations one can readily imagine (as toaster, as paperweight, as projectile-
weapon, etc.) and those one cannot (where some future-to-come is needed to 
create conditions that might help reveal new engagements or relationships). 
Further, individuals can never understand the object (pastry toaster, com-
puter, other) in the ways in which it understands itself. This is simply a posi-
tion the human cannot occupy. All one can do, as Borenstein suggests, is to 
speculate about the “secret inner lives” of objects—how they imagine them-
selves as objects, what aesthetic values they privilege, how they understand 
their own relations, and so on (n. pag.).
But like many of the other perspectives operating in this chapter, one 
should hesitate in using OOO to understand (and/or situate) the New Aes-
thetic. For, on the one hand, this approach fetishizes the New Aesthetic object 
and makes it all too convenient, as Cloninger suggests, to “ignore the ethical 
ways” that humans are “implicit” in the very production of the New Aesthetic 
object as well as in the production of the machinic agents that often produce 
New Aesthetic images (n.  pag.). On the other hand, this lens colonizes the 
New Aesthetic in particular ways and shifts (if not dismisses) what appears 
central to its endeavor: the human–technology assemblage. The OOO frame 
applied here, as Bogost does, would pursue a nonhuman aesthetic, speculating 
with regard to objects (e.g., pastry toasters), and, intentionally or not, would 
end up removing, as Bassett argues, all too important distinctions among 
humans from the equation in exacting ways.10 This is not to imply that OOO 
 10. Bassett argues that “the priorities” of OOO or even OOA “render irrelevant a series of 
questions concerning ‘humans,’ their relationships with each other and with technologies, and 
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is explicitly dismissive of the human condition but rather that the rhetorical 
dimension it has contributed to the New Aesthetic ecology has, to this point, 
largely marginalized the human element.
Whereas OOO is concerned with objects and their materiality (and, partic-
ularly, their withdraw), the New Aesthetic is concerned with representational 
moments that suggest practices, procedures, and preferences of which people 
are often unaware (or to which they are numbed). OOO introduces a differ-
ent ontological stance/space, while New Aestheticism introduces an awareness 
of the mediations operating upon (and with) individuals at any given point. 
OOO is a philosophical issue, tied to speculation and phenomenological con-
cerns; the New Aesthetic is a media studies and art issue, tied to the aesthetics 
of a human–technology assemblage and the degrees of awareness present in 
mediating acts (which also mediate human beings). The two are not of, nor 
after, the same things. However, the two might be brought together in interest-
ing ways, as each is attuned to particular frequencies emitted by things “born 
of contemporary technological culture” (Borenstein n. pag.). For example, the 
visual cues of New Aestheticism might serve as markers for where to specu-
late about the secret inner lives of objects. Or the tenets of OOO might help 
facilitate an inquiry into the wants, desires, and preferences of the technologi-
cal devices that make New Aesthetic artifacts possible: What does the digital 
camera find beautiful? What does the pixel desire? What does my iPhone want 
from me? Even McLuhan went so far as to suggest that humans were the sex 
organs of technology, which asks for a certain degree of speculative conceptu-
alization on behalf of the object. The point is that there is still much to explore 
in understanding technology, in human relationships with technology, and in 
the emergent understandings of those relationships.
But in considering the gestures of OOA (and/or its OOO parent) in rela-
tion to the New Aesthetic, what specifically gets put into relief is that the 
New Aesthetic is (and remains) overtly concerned with the human–object 
or human–nonhuman collaborations—particularly those, as filmmaker and 
speculative fictionist Jonathan Minard argues, that provide “access [to] new 
experiences and augment our creative capacities” (n.  pag.). In this regard, 
what is at stake is not a condition of being more or less human (or more or 
less a thing) but rather, as anthropologist Daniel Miller has put it in “Technol-
ogy and Human Attainment,” the emergence of a “form of humanity that co-
exists with [the] collusion of digital and analogue forms” (199). What the New 
how each of these is articulated and mediated by the other” (142). This means that the “divisions 
between humans, founded in bodies, and elaborated over 2,000 years as a sex/gender system” 
(142) simply become inconsequential. Thus, if the New Aesthetic deals with human experience 
in any meaningful way, then retaining attentiveness to and a perspective that allows for the 
experiences (and understandings) of differently abled and differently immersed bodies is vital.
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Aesthetic highlights is not “the destruction of everything that was authen-
tic and integral to being human” (199) but rather an opening of a previously 
unattainable humanity—one where there is a ready acknowledgment that 
the world around humans changed and that the human condition itself has 
been reconfigured (including shifts in how we understand things in the world 
and their relations to us). And a key part of this transformation involves an 
increased attentiveness to the ways in which human and nonhuman entities 
come together as symbiotic components that create unprecedented capaci-
ties for engagement and imagination, expression and invention. What mat-
ters among the New Aesthetic ecology, then, is not the objects, nor humans 
themselves, but rather the collusions, collaborations, and cooperations that 
lead to the advent of new techno-human sensibilities—with the larger New 
Aesthetic ecology drawing these sensibilities to the attention of working cre-
atives, including those of the rhetorical persuasion, in and of everyday culture.
Here one begins to grasp something of the third contour of the New Aes-
thetic, which is tied to human–technology relationships that allow for a new 
kind of vision, a new kind of expression, and a new kind of writing/mak-
ing that results from this collaboration. For not only do human–technology 
assemblages provide an ability to sense (and make sense of) that which resides 
beyond the human sensorium alone (gesturing toward one necessity of the 
human–technology assemblage in today’s media-saturated moment) but also, 
in contemporary acts of making, the technologies involved invite collabora-
tion: the act of production (discursive or otherwise) is not simply an oppor-
tunity for a rhetor to dump her mind onto a neutral screen but rather involves 
playful cooperation between human and technological agencies. And this is 
not merely an extension of the axiom that “one is only as good as one’s tools” 
but rather prompts consideration of what happens when the “tool” or even 
Bogost’s “object” makes its own design decisions or makes assumptions about 
what it thinks its collaborators want.
Part of what the New Aesthetic offers, then, is a collection of artifacts 
that offer moments of intervention into the seamlessness (and assumed rela-
tionships) of this partnership. Thus, contour 3 focuses on the varying accre-
tions that give depth to human–technology making, with chapter 5 more fully 
extending its implications into contemporary rhetorical practices.
CONTOURS AND CONCLUSIONS
While contours 1, 2, and 3 have emerged relatively organically, contour 4 is 
more subtle, lingering within a multitude of circulating intensities in the New 
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Aesthetic ecology. It begins with the New Aesthetic being something of a net-
work aesthetic that is enacted in its own medium and calling attention to its 
own medial conditionality. By residing on a Tumblr account, its archive exists 
in/on/of the very substrate that much of its collection draws to attention. 
Second, the New Aesthetic features artifacts, like glitch works, that regularly 
destabilize the illusion of the seamlessness of mediation; in so doing, these 
interruptions expose both the material conditions of screen mediation and the 
underlying ailments of computationality. Third, there are many New Aesthetic 
elements that intervene in the forms and function of media—offering com-
mentary precisely because they create dissonance in one’s medial expectation: 
from the increasing sense that our devices and screen media are aware of us 
(taking stock of one’s presence and actions) to moments in which artifacts 
overtly demonstrate shifts in human perspective itself. Take artist Aram Bar-
tholl’s Map project (Plate C) for example, which has a kind of cultural/critical 
value because it locates the “digitally ethereal” Google Maps balloons outside 
the screen, leveraging what the balloon represents as a way to call attention to 
a contemporary, global positioning system (GPS)11 constructed sense of space 
and place.12
Together, these three gestures result in a kind of hyperawareness that does 
not simply exist as a default condition of New Aestheticism but is rather part 
of the very reconfigurations being introduced by today’s assemblages—that 
a hyperawareness of mediation can be/should be a fundamental part of how 
artifacts create meaning and communicate value in the digitally saturated, 
overtly mediated twenty-first century. While something like a pixel aesthetic 
may seem innocuous on its own, when manifesting in a culture that is past 
the pixel moment, it operates hyperrhetorically—creating an overt attentive-
ness to the mediation (and its meanings) and calling attention to one’s rela-
tionship to the mediation as well as to the pixel itself. Thus, enacting works in 
their own paradigm creates one layer of awareness, while aesthetic elements 
that call attention to mediation and the mediating act (and its underlying 
substrate) create another layer of awareness. Together, along with other con-
siderations that will manifest throughout this work, they result in what I am 
offering as contour 4, a hyperawareness of mediation.
With the four contours now identified, the remainder of this work picks 
up with these contours, more fully grasping their shape, developing their 
implications, and then situating their value for rhetorical studies. Chapter 3 
 11. GPS is a global navigation satellite system that provides geo-based location and time 
information. It is owned by the US government and made freely available to anyone with a 
device that has a GPS receiver.
 12. Bartholl’s installation is more fully addressed in chapter 3.
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focuses on eversion as/of design, looking specifically at how its dual drives 
(making digital real, making the real digital) expand the capacities of expres-
sion and explanation for rhetoricians. Chapter 4 picks up with pixel orien-
tations, exploring what makes the pixel rhetorical and critically examining 
the implications of the pixel aesthetic becoming a human aesthetic as part of 
contemporary techno-human conditionalities. Chapter 5 focuses on human–
technology making, looking at how human–technology assemblages lead to 
the production of new kinds of artifacts and creations and invite a completely 
different orientation to the writing/making situation: a shift from a will to 
mastery toward a willingness to play. And chapter 6 examines hyperawareness 
of mediation, demonstrating how this contour works in the New Aesthetic 
and/or connects to new media considerations as well as how it helps rhetors 
better understand a fundamental shift in the medial expectations of contem-
porary audiences.
PLATE A. Pixel Pour, by Kello AKA Leyla Daze (@leylaDaze, kelloworld.com). 
Photo by Benjamin Norman. Used with permission from Kello Goeller.
(A) (B)
PLATE B. Heydar Aliyev Center, in Baku, Azerbaijan, designed by Zaha Hadid and 
Patrick Shumacher. Photo by Iwan Baan. Used with permission from Iwan Baan.
PLATE C. MAP, ‘Hello World!’ Kasseler Kunstverein, by Aram Bartholl. Photo by Nils Klinger.  
2013 © Aram Bartholl. Used with permission from Aram Bartholl.
PLATE D. Real Life Coin Block, by Bruno Pasquini.  
Used with permission from Bruno Pasquini.
PLATE E. Walden, by Russell Kirsch. Public Domain.
PLATE F. Orange River Irrigation (border between Namibia 
and South Africa). Photo by NASA ALI/EO-1.
PLATE G. Telehouse West Data Center (London Location). Photo by 
James Bridle. Used with permission from James Bridle.
PLATE H. Street Eraser (Brick Lane, London), 
by Guus ter Beek and Tayfun Sarier. Used with 
permission from Guus ter Beek and Tayfun Sarier.
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Eversion as/of Design and the 
Blurring of Rhetorical Binaries
IN “A MANIFESTO  for a Theory of the New Aesthetic,” Curt Cloninger sug-
gests that New Aestheticism thrives in documenting the residue of the digital 
in everyday life (n. pag.). It does this by capturing (and calling to attention) 
digital irruptions in the physical world and physical irruptions in the digital 
realm. In so doing, the New Aesthetic not only helps one attune to marked 
intensities and irruptions (sites for critical and creative inquiry) but also, 
more significantly, highlights a differently distributed sense of the digital—
one where digital mediation and computational possibilities have, as artists 
Jamie Zigelbaum and Marcelo Coelho indicate in “The Rasterized Snake Eats 
Its Analog Tail,” broken free from the confines of traditional devices (e.g., lap-
tops and mobile phones) and “seep[ed] chaotically into every corner of the 
world” (n.  pag.). But this “seep” involves far more than just the overt infu-
sions of algorithmic media, mobile computing, data sensors, and the like into 
everyday life (unequally distributed as they may be); it also includes the slow 
boil of a human–technology perspective that routinely imagines the materiali-
ties of the world as being/becoming digitally responsive and that increasingly 
situates human activity (and human bodies) as things to be tracked, targeted, 
and tabulated (data streams subject to computational manipulation). Which 
is to say, while the “seep” most assuredly creates new assemblages, it also, as I 
expressed in chapters 1 and 2, introduces new configurations for attending to 
things in the world.
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Among these reconfigured attention structures is a far tighter coupling 
between digital processes/operations and human/nonhuman materiality. Bri-
dle referred to this as the blurring of the digital/real divide, but its larger ges-
ture is that the digital/nondigital dynamic is being reconstituted: the reductive 
digital–real coupling is understood no longer as a contentious dichotomy but 
rather, as the rhetorical ecology of the New Aesthetic demonstrates, as com-
peting and complementary orientations for post-digital making practices.
To understand this reconfigured attention structure—and the irruptions 
and intensities to which it is drawn—one must begin from the premise that 
the digital is not as separate from the real as popular imaginations might have 
it. Rather, as many scholars have suggested, the digital and real are increas-
ingly integrated, leading to a kind of hybrid, mediated world. What matters in 
this kind of hybrid orientation, as N. Katherine Hayles explains in “Cybernet-
ics,” is the emergence of a view of the world as composed of digital and physi-
cal “realms [that] merge in fluid and seamless ways” (148)1—the seamlessness 
of which stems from a combination of any number of elements: the pervasive-
ness of networked technology, the insertion of sensors into everyday objects, 
the ubiquity of screen media, and the depth to which all have seeped into daily 
human activities (among other considerations). For people now wear “Fit” 
watches to track steps, monitor heart rates, and measure sleep patterns (turn-
ing themselves into data); they take technological devices to bed with them (as 
alarm clocks, as white-noise makers, even as sexual-fetish objects). In short, 
they live in an everted world (a concept to which I will return) and have, in 
turn, adapted their lifestyles (and tastes) in accordance with the affordances 
and experiences of this eversion.
What is important to understand, then, is that everyday reality is not 
inherently distinct from the digital. Instead, as digital media scholar Jason 
Farman has argued in “When Geolocation Meets Visualization,” everyday 
reality may be no more and no less than pervasive computing space, add-
ing the thickness of the digital (an expansive representational dimension) to 
the physical world. The result of this pervasive condition, as Farman posi-
tions it, is that the ways in which one moves through (and makes sense of) 
the physiological world (including the aesthetic dimension) are beholden to 
a “constant interplay and permeability” between digital mediations and mate-
rial reality (and digital realities and material mediations) (180). Therefore, 
 1. Hayles employs the term mixed reality to designate this hybrid digital/physical real-
ity, but many other scholars have made similar gestures—see Nathan Jurgenson’s notions of 
“enmeshing,” Beth Coleman’s “x-reality,” and Adam Greenfield’s “everyware,” to name a few. 
There are, of course, important nuances within these different terms, but what matters is their 
collective gesture, which positions the world as fundamentally composed of a blend of digital 
and nondigital materialities.
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what emerges is not simply a digital/real mixed reality but altogether different 
modes of embodiment, as the aforementioned “thickness” is only perceptible 
and accessible to particular human–technology assemblages. Moreover, mak-
ing sense of and enacting change within these hybrid mediascapes requires 
certain techno-enhanced or techno-altered sensibilities (including the very 
impulse toward understanding life as being routinely lived in and through 
digitally layered realities). Thus, in a way that extends Hayles’s thinking, what 
the New Aesthetic brings into view are the remnants and residues of the dif-
ferently oriented aesthetic sensibilities and attention structures that take shape 
in and through the different modes of embodiment—with these sensibilities 
and structures being in no way exclusively (nor exclusive to the) human.
To put this in more expansive terms: if the ways in which one approaches 
the aesthetic dimension are tied to an everyday, lived conditionality—as sug-
gested in chapter 1 in relation to Dewey’s pragmatic aestheticism—then any 
lived experience linked to a human–technology mode of embodiment also 
points toward an increasingly human-technology-infused aesthetic (seeing 
and sensing patterns of perception germane to the assemblage itself). Con-
sequently, new assemblages do not simply extend the human sensorium and 
introduce new ratios (and related attention structures), as Marshall McLuhan 
might have it, but rather invite, in the context of this chapter, new concatena-
tions in and across the illusory construction of something like the digital/
real divide. And what is of critical interest here is not simply that new link-
ages emerge as part of new assemblages but rather, in a kind of post-digital 
Lyotardian2 condition, that new human–technology configurations introduce 
an altogether new capacity for linking, for forming different kinds of connec-
tions, and for exposing different rhetorical ecologies.
Thus, when the New Aesthetic directs attention to moments, events, and 
artifacts that reside both between and beyond the digital/real divide, it is call-
ing attention to these different registers (as well as their different linking prac-
tices)—not to reinforce the digital or the real as governing conditions, but 
rather to offer an attunement to the movements and manifestations across 
these categorical orders. And this movement is the critical focus of this chap-
ter, for it designates what I referred to earlier as eversion: the digital everting 
into the real and the real everting into the digital.
 2. In The Differend, philosopher Jean-François Lyotard makes the case for paralogical 
thinking where what matters is not how one links but that one links—or, in more expansive 
terms, “It is necessary to link, but the mode of linkage is never necessary” (29). This is central 
to his response to what might be seen as differends, competing positions in need of a third for 
adjudication; or, in the context here, paralogy readily moves one beyond dichotomous imposi-
tions (digital/real binary).
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Eversion, as I am using it here, comes from William Gibson, who offered it 
as a corrective, of sorts, to his better-known concept of cyberspace. In 1984, in 
his book Neuromancer, Gibson introduced the notion of cyberspace to denote 
the notional spaces or environments that take shape in and through digital 
mediation and computer networks. The concept (and Gibson’s work) was so 
popular that cyberspace became cultural dogma—understood, in a general 
sense, as designating something “out there,” something removed from physical 
reality. This orientation had such impact, according to digital humanist Steven 
E. Jones, that Gibson’s cyberspace served for nearly twenty years as the domi-
nant metaphor shaping Western understandings of human relationships with 
networked technologies (27). But as Jones details, between 2004 and 2008 
there was a “cumulative effect of a variety of changes in technology and cul-
ture” that “converged and culminated in a new consensual imagination” (25; 
emphasis added)—that is, a set of perspectives in which Gibson’s cyberspace 
ceased to be separate from everyday reality and instead was taking shape 
through the engineered devices built into the material fabric of the world (22). 
Gibson himself picked up on these shifts in his novel Spook Country, written 
during that same four-year window, and offered eversion (more specifically, 
the eversion of cyberspace) as an alternative that understands people as being 
immersed in digital technologies, as living in, among, and through medial 
experiences. For example, while many individuals may still be inclined to use 
a metaphor like “cloud” to refer to online technologies and digital media stor-
age (understanding the network as a kind of ethereal-other rather than the 
brick-and-mortar monstrosities that are server farms), in an everted culture 
the network no longer floats in the sky. Instead, it exists down in the muck of 
everyday life, with people living among Wi-Fi, airplays, Bluetooth connectiv-
ity, and so on. In an everted world, the “network” penetrates floors, walls, and 
bodies; and individuals use handheld devices and dynamic eyewear to access 
and interact with digitally layered and digitally altered material spaces. What 
matters with this shift is not any digital/real divide but rather the myriad ways 
in which people experience different configurations (and saturations) of medi-
ation. Moreover, how individuals make sense of these experiences includes 
the very reconfigured perspectives and sensibilities that make those things 
possible in the first place. What the New Aesthetic provides, then, is not some 
further implication of a digital-other, nor an extension of the effects of the 
digital/real divide, but rather a different set of orientations that take shape part 
and parcel with contemporary human–technology assemblages.
Beyond these new modes of embodiment and the different rhetorical ori-
entations they introduce, what is at stake is a fundamental shift in the core 
metaphor by which human relationships with technology are understood (as 
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well as the kinds of inquiries which that core metaphor facilitates). For the 
grounding metaphor carries with it a host of assumptions about how indi-
viduals envision, engage, and embrace technologies (from methodological 
practices to artifacts for analyses). Therefore, in shifting from something like 
cyberspace (and its corollary of a digital/real divide) to eversion (which cham-
pions movements across this illusory coupling), what takes center stage is 
not any categorical division but rather the new consensual imagination that 
emerges from the circulating intensities manifested within the flows permeat-
ing the multiple registers and materialities of post-digital culture.
Jones, of course, turns to the digital humanities as a vehicle for think-
ing about this new consensual imagination. He begins by remarking how the 
period 2004–8 included more than just Gibson’s eversion; it also marked the 
critical period in which digital humanities transformed from being primarily 
oriented around digitization (the digital conversion imperative and the archive 
drive) toward a perspective of “putting the digital into reciprocal conversation 
with an array of cultural artifacts” (26). This helped usher in a wave of schol-
ars who sought not to just create additional archives but to link the rhetorical 
capacities of digital mediation to traditional humanistic objects and modes of 
inquiry, establishing new, digital-born methods, artifacts, and epistemologies. 
The collective result was the development of a host of new perspectives that 
would link humanities’ scholarship going forward to digital practices, to being 
realized in and through digital spaces, and to being uniquely possible because 
of the affordances of digital mediations. For example, an undertaking like Jas-
mine Mulliken’s The Mapping Dubliners Project,3 which creates a digital map 
that layers information from James Joyce’s Dubliners over representations of 
the geographical space of Dublin, Ireland, engages new methods and modes of 
representation but also quickly makes digital humanities work public-facing 
and publicly available. The same is true, though in different ways, of Janelle 
Jenstad’s “Agas Map” project (The Map of Early Modern London)4 and the 
Folger Digital Text initiatives,5 as well as the postcritical engagements coming 
out of Gregory L. Ulmer’s EmerAgency Konsult creations.6 This is not to sug-
gest that earlier formations of digital humanities were not also public-facing 




 6. See, as two examples, John Craig Freeman’s “Minute Man Monument” (https://
johncraigfreeman.wordpress.com/2013/10/20/fre-emeragency-konsult-minute-man- 
monument/) and Sean Morey’s “Deepwater Horizon Roadkill Tollbooth (A MEmorial)” (http://
kairos.technorhetoric.net/21.2/topoi/morey/index.html).
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tied to the “seep” have paralleled an academic and culture movement in which 
participation begins with production: with to make now sitting slightly before 
to make sense. And where the things people produce (whether in progress 
or finished product, whether popular or academic) are instantly available for 
others to see, critique, repurpose, and remix—which means to make not only 
comes before to make sense but includes the dimension of to make available, 
with that availability increasingly facilitated through digital means and digital 
representation (if not digital compression).
As such, the dimension of making available includes not only the obvi-
ous ways in which digital works are disseminated via digital means but also 
(increasingly so) how nondigital artifacts are digitized, represented through 
digital means, or (re)made/(re)imagined for digital platforms. This is part 
of the impact of eversion and part of the reason why Jones sees eversion as 
offering a “useful master trope” for contemporary digital humanities (and 
its rhetorical ecologies)—as it provides a conceptual metaphor that accounts 
for digital-to-real and real-to-digital transformations, better reflects people’s 
everyday experiences (14), “calls attention to the messy and uneven status” 
by which cyberspace is now deployed into the world (through networks con-
nected to and constructed by everyday objects) (29), and helps create “a set of 
shared perceptions about the world” (the new consensual imagination) (9). It 
is through eversion that Jones himself touches on the New Aesthetic—show-
ing how readily New Aestheticism maps onto eversion and his own grand 
narrative of the digital humanities. But for all his efforts to extol the virtues of 
the New Aesthetic, Jones ultimately limits New Aestheticism to eversion—no 
more and no less than being demonstrative of eversion—which ignores the 
fuller complexities at play, including the nuances among the competing dis-
courses in and around the rhetorical ecology of the New Aesthetic. Although 
Jones was focused on the metaphor of eversion and the perspectives it offers 
for digital humanities practices (with New Aestheticism situated firmly within 
that metaphor), the New Aesthetic, particularly when considered on its own 
terms, is actually better understood as offering perspectives and practices for 
the making of things in a culture of eversion. It is not that the New Aesthetic 
is part of Gibson’s eversion, as Jones might have it, but rather that New Aes-
theticism offers an attunement to the making of things in an everted world. As 
Jonathan Openshaw puts it, in post-digital cultures “the digital world leeches 
on the physical . . . [and] the physical draw[s] on the language of the digital” 
(7). What we are dealing with, then, is a differently configured perspective—
where human–technology assemblages are equally attuned to the making real 
of the digital and the making digital of the real, a dualism at the core of the 
first contour of the New Aesthetic: Eversion as/of Design.
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The rest of this chapter explores more fully this contour and its competing 
trajectories for making things in the world. I first introduce and unpack the 
considerations of making real and making digital, respectively, before situat-
ing the value of each (as well as the implications of eversion overall) for post-
digital rhetorical practice.
MAKING REAL
In Bridle’s articulation, the “making real of a digital artifact” deals with cre-
ating “in the real” things that previously existed only “in the digital” (“Wav-
ing”). For example, instructables.com member Bruno Pasquini (brunoip) 
created a “real life coin block”—a real, working version of a Super Mario Bros. 
Question Block (Plate D). Using 3mm cardboard, an MP3 player, two springs, 
an old servomechanism (a device used to control operations through feed-
back), plastic, coins, and select electronic items (circuit boards, amplifiers, 
wires, etc.), Pasquini constructed a functioning replication of the coin block 
in Super Mario Bros. Striking the bottom of the coin block, much like Mario 
in the game, triggers both a sound effect (looped on the MP3 player) and the 
mechanism that tosses out a coin (launched by one of the springs). This is a 
colorful example, to be sure, but it readily demonstrates the principle here: 
Pasquini moved a born-digital artifact—a completely digital object—into the 
physical world.
Another example of this eversion can be found in the unique creations 
coming out of the parametric school of architecture—computer-assisted 
building designs that seem impossible as structures but are quite architec-
turally sound (see Plate B, as one example). What parametric architecture 
illuminates, among other considerations, is the various ways in which digital 
forms transfer into analog design—often doing so, as curator Glenn Adamson 
demonstrates in “Craft in the Digital Age,” in seemingly unconscious ways 
(288). Further, as Bridle implies in his own commentary, parametric prac-
tices, which manipulate algorithms and materialities to create complex struc-
tures, have in recent years leveraged digital aesthetics and/or computational 
sensibilities as part of their geometries of design. But parametricism is not 
inherently digital; it has been around for well over a century—starting with 
Antoni Gaudi’s Church of Colònia Güell in 1898. What digital technologies 
have done, however, is open the practice of parametricism to the play space 
of computer-aided design (CAD) programs, creating an emergent possibility 
for parametric design and digital aesthetic patterns/values (particularly with 
things like computer-generated geometrical shapes). With parametric math-
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ematics extended into CAD programs like Autodesk Revit or Catia, architect-
plus-CAD assemblages can now work through a series of input parameters, 
equations, and outputs to model, analyze, test, and optimize even the most 
unusual of designs. This, in turn, allows for the production of buildings that 
are unique, imposing, and possessing great presence because they employ 
computational geometry, multi-angled surfaces, paraboloid perimeters with 
unexpected curves and bends, and so on. But while parametric architecture is 
interesting, the question is what it helps one understand about the New Aes-
thetic and/or rhetoric’s interest in New Aestheticism. The answer is that (a) it 
introduces structural designs and physical artifacts that employ computational 
aesthetics in such a way and to such a degree that people look at parametric 
buildings as much as move through them, and (b) it introduces structures that 
are rendered digital long before becoming physical, material manifestations.
Surface Tensions
The first raises considerations of artifacts (in this case, buildings) that draw 
attention to themselves as mediated entities (and to the mediation itself). 
While Bridle has cautioned against looking only at the surface of New Aes-
thetic artifacts, parametric architectures seem to exude a kind of self-con-
scious awareness of their own design—an awareness that passersby (and 
passers-through) must wrestle with as they experience the structures. And 
this awareness (or even attentiveness) emerges precisely because the buildings’ 
design features violate expectations: they do not fit with what buildings should 
look like, nor do they employ shapes/patterns readily located in the natural 
environment. Thus, to experience parametric architectures, particularly those 
that manifest uniquely digital aesthetics and computational geometries, can 
be destabilizing because they invite looking at a building—at its design and 
component parts (inside and out)—as much as moving through or inhabiting 
its architecture.
While I pick up with this self-conscious awareness more fully in chapter 
6 and, to a certain extent, in chapter 4, I want to briefly situate this digital-to-
real destabilization in something of rhetorical parlance (particularly as per-
taining to matters of mediation and/or the experiences of media). One way 
to do that is to suggest that the digital aesthetics employed by parametric 
architecture and other New Aesthetic artifacts toggle what Richard Lanham 
denoted as the at/through switch.
In his 1993 The Electronic Word, Lanham offers this coupling as a way of 
highlighting a shift in expectations (and experiences) of print-centric media-
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tions to those of an electronic variety. He argued that print media, the pri-
mary (if not exclusive) focus for rhetoric and literary studies up until at least 
the late 1980s, seemed, minus a few anomalies, to be locked into the mode 
of through—“print wants the gaze to remain through and unselfconscious all 
the time” (43), putting readers into direct relation to the author’s ideas and 
removing all barriers to that immediacy. Appropriately, then, much writing 
instruction (rhetorical or otherwise) focused on the C-B-S system (clarity, 
brevity, and sincerity), which was designed to reduce the impediments to 
accessing/understanding an author’s ideas. Much like the master oil paint-
ers of the Renaissance, good writing effaced itself. It got out of the way. But 
computational mediation introduced so much more, allowing every element 
to not only include a self-conscious aesthetic but to also serve as a marker, 
concept, or function (hypertext). For Lanham, computational mediation (as 
rhetorical entity) required a kind of perpetual “oscillation between unselfcon-
scious expression and self-conscious design,” which, in his view, was “the most 
powerful aesthetic attribute” of any digital artifact (43). In so doing, computa-
tional mediation extended decades of avant-garde art practices and served as 
the optimal medium for a kind of recovery of rhetoric.
Further, as rhetoric scholar Collin Brooke indicated in Lingua Fracta: 
Toward a Rhetoric of New Media, rhetoric more or less has always concerned 
itself with “situated responses” to general “cultural imperatives” (43); as such, 
its practices and purposes have taken shape over the years in relation not only 
to culture forces but also, as Brooke suggests, to the available representational 
technologies (and techniques) that were part of those situational affordances 
(35). Therefore, when a culture experiences shifts in representational technolo-
gies, what occurs is not merely the advent of new modes of expression (which 
alter the parameters of rhetoric) but rather a fundamental transformation in 
human–technology assemblages, which, in turn, usher in new practices and/
or transform the very understandings of what counts as / constitutes a discur-
sive and/or rhetorical act (see also Haas7). This is why Lanham argued that 
the digital was bringing the marrow of rhetoric firmly back into the conversa-
tion—not merely expanding the available means but opening up entirely new 
 7. Christina Haas offered an examination of the relations between writing, computer 
technologies, and the practices of literacy in her 1996 work Writing Technology: Studies on the 
Materiality of Literacy. One of Haas’s key considerations, in counterdistinction to many of her 
contemporary writing scholars, was that technology was anything but an independent agent, 
for shifts in technology and/or material tools introduced shifts in writing processes. Therefore, 
it was up to scholars, particularly humanists, to “take an active role in designing and imple-
menting technology” (199), as the technologies were integral to the kinds of writing taking 
shape and to what would count as writing.
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assemblages and perspectives for discursive representations in/of/through 
computational spaces (Electronic 43).
That said, what makes the New Aesthetic of interest to rhetoric—at least in 
this framework—is that most of its representational artifacts, like parametric 
architecture, thrive in the liminal space between unselfconscious expression 
and self-conscious design. They call attention to themselves as representa-
tional artifacts and to the very nuances of their own representational practices; 
and in most cases that attention pushes quickly beyond surface-level consid-
erations to matters of context, computationality, and culture. What the New 
Aesthetic is doing, then, is not just collecting examples of materialized digi-
tal artifacts that flourish in the threshold of an at/through divide, but rather 
subtly emphasizing the rhetorical significance of maintaining a level of atten-
tiveness to both the what and the how of particular representations. As the 
New Aesthetic features artifacts and practices that thrive in the play between 
unselfconscious expression and self-conscious design, it demonstrates how 
that kind of play can offer critical value to the rhetorical capacities of different 
media and materialities.
Born Digital
The second element I want to focus on is the preproduction dimension, as 
there are clear connections between the “making real of the digital” and the 
production of everyday things. For CAD is not exclusive to architecture; it 
is the industry standard for (nearly all) manufacturing. Most products and 
objects today are born digital and, only later, if ever, are they rendered “in the 
real.” But the making of everyday entities like car bumpers or custom-designed 
T-shirts is not quite what Bridle’s New Aesthetic is pointing to (though, to be 
sure, these things are related). Rather, Bridle prefers more exotic examples like 
parametric architecture and Pasquini’s Question Block because these objects 
(1) reflect aesthetics that have previously only seemed possible in digital envi-
ronments, and (2) call to attention both their unusual aesthetics and the very 
systems and structures by which people make sense of them as objects (func-
tional or aesthetic).8 Meaning, unlike the more mundane, everyday objects 
that use digital design practices to mimic established or expected aesthetics 
 8. In many ways we can see similar gestures in Hayles’s works on Electronic Literature, 
which presents all writing as being electronic in the sense that it bears the mark of digital 
processes; also in the examples of electronic literature accompanying the book, one can see 
literary-like productions that bear the unmistakable aesthetic and function of digital mediation.
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(e.g., using Microsoft Word to write this text), the more exotic materializa-
tions give “the real world the grain of the virtual” (Bridle, “Waving” n. pag.). 
In so doing, they occasion a reconsidering of the thickness between the digital 
and the real.
Of course, in analyzing the New Aesthetic collection itself, there seems a 
danger (or at least a necessary hesitation) with Bridle’s moving of digital-ori-
ented, materially rendered artifacts back into digital spaces. In New Aesthetic, 
New Anxieties, David M. Berry et al. assert that material-based experiences 
designed explicitly to call to attention digital ways of seeing or digital ways of 
representing the world have the potential to be undercut precisely where they 
matter most when they are re-presented in/through digital platforms. Mean-
ing, showcasing artifacts that have “manifest in the real” on the New Aesthetic 
tumblr relocates these “in the real” creations back into the very digital appara-
tuses to which they call attention. For Berry et al., this kind of movement—a 
form of digital relocation—can be problematic. To further explore these con-
siderations, they focus on Aram Bartholl’s Map project (Plate C), which was 
posted to the New Aesthetic tumblr on June 2, 2011.
From 2006 to 2010, Bartholl created a number of life-sized Google Maps 
balloons and placed them in public places. Bartholl was “making real” a digi-
tal artifact, and so it should seem obvious why Bridle would include it in his 
collection. But Berry et al. interpreted Bartholl’s larger-than-human balloons 
(placed “in the real”) as being primarily about drawing attention to the “awk-
ward relative measurements of digital artefacts” that are “accept[ed] without 
question in the digital realm” (35). Meaning, for them, what was primarily at 
stake was the issue of scale that the red balloon on Google Maps seemed to 
violate. Put simply, Google Maps balloons were (and continue to be) grossly 
out of proportion with the other elements in/of any Google Maps.
As a point of critique toward New Aestheticism, Berry et al. argued that 
Bridle’s reintroducing Map to the digital arena (via the New Aesthetic tumblr) 
causes Bartholl’s project to lose some of its impact because of its being show-
cased in the very space where issues of scale (or being out of scale) are readily 
accepted (if not naturalized). But while there may be some cause for hesitation 
with how digital re-presentation influences the ways in which Bartholl’s work 
is received, Berry et al.’s critique, first and foremost, seems suspiciously devoid 
of other forms of re-presentation. That is, Bartholl’s material-based, experi-
ence-oriented artworks, like many artists’ works, have been documented and 
reproduced in any number of venues and event promotions, both print and 
digital, which manipulate scale in interesting ways as well. While there is a 
need to consider how being part of a Tumblr collection affects the project’s 
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implications, it seems problematic to limit the critique to only one kind of 
format—particularly when art of all kinds, commissioned and non, gets regu-
larly presented across different materialities and platforms, circulating among 
various representational and rhetorical registers.
But the real problem of Berry et al.’s critique is that the authors rely on 
(if not reinforce) a necessary distinction between the digital and the real—
between physical and digital realms. The simple reality is that the very move-
ment of the Google Maps balloon from the screen to something like the White 
House lawn back to the screen changes the balloon marker. As it circulates 
across ecologies and materialities, it accretes meaning and signification, which 
necessitate a different understanding as it moves back into the digital/Tumblr 
mediaverse. This is precisely why Edbauer’s rhetorical ecologies orientation 
is critical to this work, for to privilege the experience of the artifact in any 
single iteration seems to bear less fruit than tracking (and/or attuning to) how 
entities and artifacts like Bartholl’s balloons flow into, out of, and across the 
rhetorical ecologies in which they participate.
Thus, in letting go of the very language of the digital/real divide and attun-
ing to the circulating intensities of something like Map, one can focus less 
on Bartholl’s and Google’s balloon-size considerations and more on think-
ing about what something like Map suggests about how one might come to 
understand oneself and one’s practices in the mediated (and mediating) world. 
Therefore, when tracking the movement of Bartholl’s Map in relation to the 
New Aesthetic rhetorical ecology, what matters is not its commentary on bal-
loon size or scale, as Berry et al. might have it, but rather more making real 
(or manifesting “in the real”) what is otherwise a digital orientation to space, 
place, and information. What makes Map so interesting is not that it offers 
an awareness of any particular cartographic practice (scale) but rather that in 
moving a digital artifact onto a physical landscape, it makes visible the layer-
ing of information that gets placed on top of the GPS-constructed world—a 
different kind of attentiveness. For no matter what the scale of the representa-
tion in a Google Map (and scalability, of course, is one of the defining features 
of digital maps in general), the balloon is always an extra layer of information. 
It is a way of bringing noncartographic data into play with cartographic repre-
sentation. The balloons on the map have “awkwardly relevant measurements” 
no matter the scale of representation because the balloons are not native to 
the map itself. Much like in videogames, the balloons serve in a heads-up dis-
play (HUD) capacity. And many in today’s culture have, to a certain extent, 
internalized HUDs as somewhat natural to digital environments, particularly 
those that offer representations of a world (or worlds) in digital spaces. To be 
fair to Berry et al., Bartholl’s project does call attention to the balloons’ relative 
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size issues in Google Maps, but when understood in relation to the New Aes-
thetic rhetorical ecology, it more profoundly calls to attention an internalized 
Google Maps (human–technology assemblage) understanding of the world. 
From smartphone apps to in-car navigational systems to Google Earth, nearly 
every sense of traversing space and place is now tied to these representational 
practices. Thus, while the larger-than-human balloons may draw attention to 
scale issues, they also significantly locate the wider culture’s own sense of size, 
involvement, and engagement in a GPS-coordinated world. And most impor-
tantly in this ecology, Map serves as yet another example of work designed 
explicitly around bringing digital representational practices and their aesthet-
ics into “real” spaces.
What this project demonstrates is an eversion-attuned approach for giving 
“the real” the grain of the digital and for calling attention to that granular-
ity—showing how New Aesthetic considerations can be extended to provoke 
further ideas and thinking. The New Aesthetic is, therefore, far more than just 
its Tumblr beginning and Tumblr holdings; it introduces a rhetorical ecology 
that moves away from the digital/real divide toward a focus on the practices 
of making in which digital objects and aesthetics move into material land-
scapes and/or physiological reality. But it also includes, as kind of a third 
consideration, manifestations that fold these two registers (digital and non-
digital) together. For example, something like interactive print texts (e.g., the 
very augmented reality of Sean Morey and John Tinnell’s edited collection on 
augmented reality) are situated somewhere between making real and making 
digital because they augment the materiality of the page with the expanse 
and playability of digital mediation. That is to say, augmented reality apps 
like LAYAR (created by the Dutch company of the same name) and Aura-
sma (created by the British company Autonomy) give the flat, printed world 
the thickness and interactivity of the digital. Thus, rhetors can now design 
rich mediated experiences that combine static and dynamic representation 
and expression—bringing the affordances of multimedia composition to bear, 
quite overtly, on traditional textual practices by embedding a “fingerprint” (a 
particular icon or visual representation) on the page. When app users scan 
the printed document/object with their phone, the “fingerprint” triggers the 
associated augmented reality experience. In so doing, LAYAR, Aurasma, and 
other similar applications imbue nondigital materials with layers of digital 
mediation. This practice/process is neither fully digital, nor fully material but 
vibrates across the representational materialities of post-digital practices to 
bring the qualities of the digital into the realm of the real, and vice versa. 
But more than that, unlike something like Bartholl’s Map, which is limited to 
its own expressive potentiality, augmented reality systems like LAYAR open 
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an entirely new spectrum of possibilities for the tradition (and trajectory) of 
print, which includes not only the institutions of writing but design as well. 
Company logos can be the “fingerprint” that triggers promotional videos. 
Presidential campaign posters can become interactive position statements or 
be overlaid by a live Twitter feed. And dissertations—the staple of the nine-
teenth- and twentieth-century academic tradition—can offer an interactive 
media experience (perhaps foreshadowing what twenty-first-century dis-
sertations should be). The point is that bringing elements, experiences, and 
even expectations of the digital into the real calls into question the digital/
real divide and expands the rhetorical capacities available to everyday people 
doing everyday things.
MAKING DIGITAL
If the first approach is about giving “the real world the grain of the [digital],” 
then the second consideration at play is the inverse: preparing “something in 
the physical world for its entry into the [digital]” (Bridle, “Waving” n. pag.). 
For more and more of our run-of-the-mill material artifacts are being digi-
tized—both as part of regular life activities (as entities in the background) 
and as objects unto themselves. From “foodies” who photograph their meals 
and distribute those visuals via Snapchat, Instagram, or the larger twitter-
verse, to everyday items, objects, and elements being embedded with various 
sensors that stream real-time information, what we are undergoing, cultur-
ally, is a transformation in which everything is susceptible to participating 
in/with the digital. The impact of this conditionality is that working creatives 
now have to design as much for digital representation as for user experience. 
It is that moment when the designers of pastry toasters begin considering 
how their products will look on Facebook. Or, to use Bridle’s example, when 
Access Agency based their pitch to Virgin Atlantic on designing planes (par-
ticularly plane interiors) that people want to take pictures of and share on the 
web (“Waving”). The agency was attempting to craft real-world things with 
the express intent of digital (particularly social media) showcasing—meaning 
form and function has given way to additional rhetorical considerations in 
post-digital representation.
But commercial enterprise is not the only arena in which this is occurring. 
Professional artists are dealing with this conditionality perhaps more explicitly 
than most. As Openshaw argued in Postdigital Artisans: Craftsmanship with 
a New Aesthetic in Fashion, Art, Design, and Architecture, “some of the most 
successful exhibitions of recent years provide ‘Instagram moments,’ mean-
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ing photo-friendly opportunities for the viewers to insert themselves into the 
installation, and share the resulting imagery online” (7). This material-to-dig-
ital conversion is changing “the way art is now commissioned, conceived, and 
installed” (138). Artists Rachel De Joode and Michael Staniak have echoed 
(if not extended) these considerations. In an interview with Openshaw, De 
Joode tells us that “the look” of the installation, the artifact, the art piece is 
only “half of the success of art nowadays; it [also] has to look good on a 
blog” (in Openshaw 138); and Staniak suggests that the importance/impact 
of having one’s work traversing the network in addition to living in studios, 
galleries, and the like has led to artists “consciously, or even subconsciously” 
using “materials and colours that will look good online” (in Openshaw 135). 
The reality is that designed artifacts meant for public consumption or display 
need to work aesthetically in both digital and nondigital realms (as well as 
hybrid manifestations). This is a relatively new consideration, one highlighted 
by the New Aesthetic, but while artists can play somewhat freely with these 
matters, owing to the different contexts and affordances available to artworks, 
rhetors and working creatives in industry or the civic sphere have the added 
rhetorical dimension of ensuring that the explicit and implicit values of the 
object(s) created also readily transfer with digitization (i.e., do different digi-
tal representations of the object carry with them recognizable [and positive] 
company/product values?). This suggests that the making of material artifacts 
is no longer just about functional design, or even design theorist Donald A. 
Norman’s emotional design,9 but also must include critical considerations of 
other aesthetic dimensions: sound, touch, taste, smell, and so forth—all of 
which contribute rhetorically, intentionally or otherwise, to how an object or 
artifact is understood. But perhaps chief among these other considerations is 
that of image design—and here I do not mean the visual design of the object 
or artifact itself, but rather what that entity will look like as a flattened, digi-
tal image captured in a selfie or as a revisualized Prisma10 image. Meaning, 
does it provide the kind of saturated values that become vibrant screen repre-
sentations or that allow for dynamic algorithmic and/or artificial intelligence 
manipulations? And here what is most interesting to me is not the algorithmic 
 9. In Emotional Design: Why We Love (or Hate) Everyday Things, Norman makes the case 
that emotions have a critical value to human capacities for understanding the world. In particu-
lar, he argues that objects designed to be aesthetically pleasing were often perceived, in turn, to 
be more effective at the task (whether that was the case or not). For Norman, designers must 
attune to the emotional dimension of their designs, as better emotional design leads to greater 
affinity between the user and the design/object, which leads to increased valuation of the object.
 10. Prisma is a photo-editing application that augments images by applying algorithms to 
transform a photo into an artistic effect. It transforms the image not through application of a 
standard filter but rather by rebuilding the image through algorithmized layers.
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affliction but rather the potentiality of visual vibrancy, which is far more sug-
gestive of the flows across ecologies. Vibrancy matters in screen mediation, 
and as more and more of everyday life becomes facilitated in and through 
screens, the physical world is adapting itself to the saturated-color expecta-
tions of screens (and/or screen-based augmentations). Or, to put it another 
way, “the real” is being recolored and recast by the affordances (and sensibili-
ties) of “the digital’s” visual values, preferences, and available manipulations.
There is, then, more at work here than just an increased degree of visual 
vibrancy needed for everyday objects. As Sean Morey suggests in “Digi-
tal Ecologies,” what is being introduced is a new metaphysics not only for 
digital entities, artifacts, and practices but also for the ways in which digital 
capacities reshape everyday thinking with, understanding of, and representa-
tion through nondigital materialities (112). What begins to manifest, as I have 
suggested throughout, are differently configured sensibilities that no longer 
perceive the world as beholden to the silos of the divide, but rather that oper-
ate among varying flows and intensities across rhetorical ecologies. And one 
mode of taking stock of the flows includes, as per the focus of this work, an 
attunement to how things like the aesthetic affordances and constraints of 
screen mediation can come to bear quite overtly on the aesthetic dimension of 
nondigital objects and events. But to glean this movement conditionality—to 
take stock of the impact of digital ecologies on nondigital manifestations—one 
need not go to cutting-edge art installations or blockbuster design agencies 
and Fortune 500 companies. Rather, academics are increasingly exposed to 
this dynamic. For as the bulk of our work is meant for public consumption 
(from teaching to giving talks, publishing to giving performances), our words 
and works are routinely recorded, uploaded, and published (shared publicly) 
in and through digital venues. What is interesting, however, is not that public 
intellectuals of all varieties create blogs, make podcasts, or record lectures, but 
rather that the fluidity with which things move across ecologies is beginning 
to influence the practices and products produced by these individuals.
Take, as a more tangible example, the relatively stable genre and activity 
of the conference presentation. Thanks to social media networks and partici-
pants who augment conference experiences by tweeting during sessions and 
talks, presenters are now aware of the value and importance of embedding 
“tweetables”11 in their presentations/papers. This is because live-tweeting pre-
sentations has become integral to the conference experience—whether dealing 
with an idiosyncratic academic event or a widely popular program like South-
by-Southwest (SXSW), the very forum that helped mainstream the New Aes-
 11. Tweetables: key images, clips, or 280-character sound bites that audiences can readily 
reproduce and share via Twitter.
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thetic. The live-tweeting aspect of a presentation, panel discussion, presser, 
and the like allows for a different kind of engagement on the part of presenters 
as well as audiences (those present and those tele-present); it also alters/aug-
ments the presentation itself.
For example, at the 2014 Computers and Writing Conference (C&W14) 
held at Washington State University, roughly 400 conference participants 
generated nearly 9,000 “#cwcon” tweets, which collectively populated nearly 
3.5 million Twitter timelines.12 This, of course, is a far cry from SXSW, but 
it demonstrates the potential reach of event live-tweeting. Speakers, in turn, 
take stock of this tweetable conditionality and craft/perform talks accordingly. 
Not only have apps been built that automate tweetables, pushing out precon-
structed tweets in a timed fashion (see Hootsuite and Later as two examples), 
but many speakers (scholarly and non) have figured out ways to orchestrate 
the tweetables via other avenues. Some go low-tech and provide handouts with 
tweetables instead of talking points. Others manage to manually tweet dur-
ing their talk. This is decidedly easier, of course, when one’s talk is primarily 
composed of playing a video creation (like my own presentation at C&W14), 
but the intent remains the same: to add a digital dimension to an otherwise 
real-world occurrence, bounded by the limits of embodied materiality.
In my own case, I live-tweeted my tweetables at C&W14 to allow audience 
members to focus on the video artifact that was my presentation (minimiz-
ing the chances of their missing visual/aural elements because of tweeting 
and/or reading the tweet-stream). Knowing this tweetable condition going 
in, I thought about my presentation in different terms: crafting key phrases 
or takeaways that could be readily reproduced in a tweet and structuring key 
visuals that would reproduce well as an image online. Similar to Openshaw’s 
claims about the conditions of post-digital art (7), the feedback loop provided 
by digital documentation resulted in a need, or at least a preference on my 
end, to account for that digitization as part of the crafting process. This neces-
sitated that I envision my work in relation to the larger conference audience—
the twitterati who might “experience” my project as part of the conference but 
not as part of the live audience. Thus, I tried approaching the tweetables as a 
microcosm of my video project, hoping that conference-wide Twitter readers 
would be able to take away the larger conceptual arc in addition to key sound 
bites and visual snippets.
Now, this may seem like a simple thing or an obvious (maybe even obnox-
ious) kind of practice, but thinking of a presentation as both a live, in-the-real 
kind of performance and as something meant for digital deployment changes 
 12. Data from http://www.tweetarchivist.com/cgbrooke/2.
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how one approaches issues of design and/or revision. What used to be gov-
erned by insightful passages and clearly developed arguments has given way, 
at least in part, to 280-character snippets meant to intrigue, be retweetable, 
and serve as signposts for the talk, performance, argument, and so on. It is 
a metonymic rather than synthetic kind of approach. Of course, designing 
tweetables in an academic paper/talk is not of the same magnitude as Access’s 
design for Virgin, or, for example, Random International’s widely successful 
Rain Room installation,13 which has been excessively reproduced in digital-
visual artifacts, but it nonetheless reflects the same conditionality. What is 
more, it is not necessarily the big corporate projects or highly acclaimed art-
works that best demonstrate the increasingly intertwined digital and real but 
perhaps the simpler, subtler everyday practices of unknown academics, toiling 
away over three 30-second passages of a ten-minute talk.
However magnificent or mundane, this is an important shift for rhetori-
cians and designers alike because one must account for one’s creations being/
becoming readily available for appropriation and/or serving as “ready-made 
digital artefacts” (Bridle, “Waving” n. pag.). It is a kind of twenty-first-century 
inversion of Marcel Duchamp; whereas Duchamp used readily found objects 
and artifacts to make art and to call attention to particular practices and ide-
ologies of art, museums, and culture, designers now explicitly design artifacts 
to also act as readymades (as sound bites, objects, and backdrops), which help 
facilitate the varieties of digital life: tweets and tweet pics, Facebook posts, 
web design, Instagram images, GIFs, and the like. In fact, Bridle’s concept of 
render ghosts, which denotes those people, or representations of people, who 
live “in the liminal space between . . . the physical and the digital” (n. pag.)—
those manifestations that urban architects use to populate their visions with 
people—are also part of this conditionality: demonstrating how individual 
humans are just as digitally representable as any other object (digital and non-
digital) and just as available to being a readymade, inserted unknowingly into 
someone else’s design/representation.
This idea of critical and creative works as well as a person’s own likeness 
existing as an always-already-made artifact for representational practice is of 
slightly more interest than the materialization of Mario’s Question Block. The 
reason is that, from a rhetorical perspective, the more objects and artifacts 
(assets) one has at one’s disposal to create digital representations, the greater 
potential one has for rhetorical mobility in digital expression. As such, unlike 
 13. I revisit this project more fully later in this work, but for a complete overview of the 
project, visit https://www.random-international.com/rain-room-2012.
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the Question Block example, which calls attention to a very particular kind 
of digital-to-real movement in relation to a particular cultural phenomenon, 
material artifacts designed for digital representation do more than just lend 
themselves to general digital activity; they also serve as metaphors, as ambi-
ent signals, and as socio-politico-cultural markers readily leveraged in digital 
creations. For example, traveling on a Virgin plane, taking pictures of that 
activity, and uploading images to the web (all while in-flight), says quite a lot 
about one’s status, class, privilege, access, and the like. Making a video and 
live-tweeting the tweetables points to a different set of markers and ability. In 
both cases, once these things are uploaded to the network, the rest of the net-
worked world can appropriate them in and out of context and can build from 
or subvert what the elements of each may signify—much in the way that Jenny 
Edbauer mapped the mobility of the “Keep Austin Weird” slogan, tracking its 
intensities across different local, civic, and commercial ecologies; except here 
the movement in and across ecologies occurs at the speed of light, manifesting 
and moving in the blink of a fiber-optic moment, with its rhetorical fluidity 
shaped as much by sociocultural affordances and constraints as by the flow 
and function of computational networks.
Consequently, in making digital what are otherwise nondigital material 
artifacts, the fuller residues of those artifacts convey with (and within) their 
digital residencies. The same, of course, is true of the digital-to-real ever-
sion. Which means that there is perpetually an excess with eversion: an array 
of capacities and intentions, meanings and implications, beyond the given 
everted creation—an excess in which an original intentionality and an arti-
fact’s newfound availability as readymade (to be remixed, remade, repurposed, 
and the like) are equally present and irreducible to one another. There is, then, 
not only a rhetorical dimension to eversion as a kind of twenty-first-century 
maker’s guide (critically thinking about how meaning can be made to con-
vey across representational manifestations) but also a question of how one 
attunes rhetorically to the flows across registers and materialities where differ-
ent intensities form differently within the excess and often in excess of human 
sensibilities. Of course, while both of the aforementioned considerations are 
crucial to this scholarly inquiry—with the latter essentially being this book’s 
performative gesture as it offers one set of attunements to the circulating 
intensities among the New Aesthetic—it is the former that may have the most 
practical value for rhetorical studies. For what this text presents is not just a 
kind of rhetorical analysis of a cultural phenomenon but rather a set of ori-
entations for post-digital rhetorical engagements: the making of rhetoric in a 
post-digital world.
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MAKING RHETORIC
At a very pragmatic level, then, what contour 1 does is introduce a reconfig-
ured sensibility to how the leveraging of a digital artifact “in the real” or a 
material artifact “in the digital” allows for invoking the aesthetic sensibilities, 
structures, and explanatory values of the one in the other. This further blurs 
the divide, to be sure, but it also opens a wider array of meaning-making prac-
tices. And one way to situate the potential of these practices for rhetoric and 
composition is to look at the work of multimodal writing scholar Jody Shipka, 
who has attempted to ground material (and materiality) as a key part of con-
temporary composition.
In Toward a Composition Made Whole, Shipka argues that the field of writ-
ing studies needs to revisit how it thinks about technology (and process) to 
include both real and digital artifacts and activities. This counters the larger 
trajectory, which has been to move further and further inside the digital since 
the early 1980s marriage of computers and composition. But Shipka pushed 
back against the computer-centric orientations that composition studies had 
adopted (particularly following the rise of new media). Instead, she picked up 
with the process orientation of Paul Prior, Geoffrey Sirc’s “Happenings” rheto-
ric, and the intertextuality suggested by Kathleen Blake Yancey to embrace 
both digital and nondigital materiality and embodiment in rhetorically sig-
nificant ways and to frame writing as a complex, mediated activity (not just 
something one does on a computer). This, in turn, created opportunities in 
the composition classroom for including everything from gesture and move-
ment to object-oriented activities and expression (with scholars like Jentery 
Sayers and James Brown Jr., among others, extending Shipka’s work, at least 
pedagogically, to advocate for arduino boards and 3D printers falling within 
the purview of composition classroom and writing labs).
Outside of returning composition to a focus on materiality, Shipka’s work 
also highlights how writing is something done in direct relation to the con-
straints and affordances of the platform(s) involved (some algorithmic, oth-
ers material). Thus, whether it means inscribing words on a ballet slipper or 
typing them in a Word document, writing revolves around a person learning 
to leverage the complex relations between material and representational affor-
dances toward a particular rhetorical (or at least expressive) end. In short, 
Shipka’s work allows for a fluidity of writing across digital and real materiali-
ties, situating writing not in a particular medium but as emergent with dif-
ferent cultural and material registers. She not only calls for a nondigital turn 
in current perspectives on multimodal composition but also openly embraces 
Yancey’s perspective that (1) “a composition is an expression of relationships 
 E v E R S I O N A S/O F D E S I G N •  87
.  .  . between human beings” and (2) digital compositions “bring us together 
in new ways” (“Looking” 100). Given the implications in Shipka’s work, along 
with those of the New Aesthetic, I would argue that scholars and teachers 
need not divide composition between the digital and nondigital but should 
rather attune to individuals interacting with mediation, letting the relation-
ships among representational systems and actants take center stage in terms 
of invention and interpretation. Thus, contour 1 of the New Aesthetic has the 
potential to thrive as a compositional guide—allowing writers (multimodal or 
otherwise) to operate with a tint toward eversion (engaging in a practice that 
intentionally moves across different digital and nondigital materialities) or to 
simply be more attentive to the particular human–technology assemblages in 
which they participate (as part of any expressive ecology).
Now, extending this slightly beyond the frame of writing studies, there are 
also interesting resonances between Shipka’s work and that of Maiko Takeda, 
a post-digital artist, who employs analog processes to create works that could 
be (or project like) digital artifacts. At the core of Takeda’s art is an intention 
to “undermine a viewer’s expectations,” which are predominantly screen-cen-
tric, and to force viewers to wrestle with digitalesque qualities manifested by 
material components and analog processes (in Openshaw 92). In her Atmo-
spheric Reentry collection, for example, Takeda combines her expertise as a 
jewelry designer with her interest in ethereality (digital and non) to create 
body adornments that are suggestive of an extrahuman dimension. There is, 
simply put, both wonder and disjunction present in her works. And there is 
something similar in what Shipka is doing: creating artifacts (and designing 
assignments) that suspend the screen-centric privilege of composition, ask-
ing students to write / write with (or at least think critically about) the rhe-
torical significance of different materialities. These materialities may project 
something digital or even be taken up in the digital, but the works themselves 
destabilize the assumptions of what it means to compose and have the poten-
tial to point to that which is in excess of the human condition alone. Thus, 
in both Takeda’s and Shipka’s cases, much as in the New Aesthetic, what is at 
stake is creating an awareness of how mediated artifacts sit “in relation to the 
complex processes” by which they are “produced, circulated, and consumed” 
(Shipka 40).
Therefore, if rhetors operate in relation to the fluidity of materialities rather 
than to any disciplined practice within a categorical order, they (whether com-
position student or industry professional) may be better prepared to create 
artifacts and utterances that circulate within and move across ecologies and 
do so with greater rhetoricity. What emerges is less a focus on the technicity 
of things and more an attentiveness to expanding one’s rhetorical capacities by 
88 •  C H A P T E R 3 
bringing together and working across digital aesthetics and material expres-
sions and digital expressions and material aesthetics. In so doing, much as can 
be seen in both Takeda’s and Shipka’s works, one can give tangibility to or cre-
ate authentic mediated experiences for those objects and entities, feelings and 
forces that reside beyond the human sensorium alone. In this regard, eversion 
as a guiding orientation is, in short, one manner by which everyday writing 
and making practices can call forth things from an extrahuman dimension.
C H A P T E R  4
Pixel Orientation and the 
Technologized Human Sensorium
IN 1957 engineer Russell Kirsch and his team at the National Bureau of Stan-
dards created the first digital scan of an image, a square-pixel rendering of 
a picture of Kirsch’s son Walden (Plate E), which paved the way for today’s 
pixel-oriented world. But Kirsch’s digital scan represents more than just a pixel 
aesthetic; it, like Joseph Nicéphore Niépce’s balcony photograph or Wilhelm 
Conrad Röntgen’s X-ray image, also denotes a significant moment in human 
history. As Kirsch tells it, that project came in response to the question “What 
would happen if computers could see the world the way . . . [people] see it?” 
(qtd. in Ehrenberg). While that initial digital scan was not perfect by any 
means, nor did it offer a high fidelity to that of human sight, it nonetheless 
gave computationality access to the visible world.
Sixty years removed from its inception—and unprecedented exponential 
development since—much of culture now finds itself beholden to the pixel 
tendencies of the computational eye (an amalgamation of technologies by 
which humans have attuned computers to pay attention for them in particu-
lar ways). From network voyeurism to institutional surveillance, from smart 
gaming systems like Xbox One (and its Kinect device) to smartphones like 
the iPhone X, everyday reality is now routinely reduced to pixel-oriented data 
values subject to the processes and procedures of computationality. These sys-
tems—attention structures created by a combination of digital cameras, com-
puter hardware, software algorithms, and human interest—track and react to 
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human presence but do so by rendering people (their faces and facial gestures) 
and their surroundings as visual data streams. In this configuration, people 
are less bodies-in-space than mobile and motile pixel values, fluctuating in 
front of a computational eye that flattens them into a visual grid (as visual 
data)—no more and no less significant than cars in the crosswalk caught on 
a traffic camera.
This sense of computer vision (and its imposition) lingers at the root of 
the New Aesthetic, as one of the first creations Bridle included in his archive 
was artist Adam Harvey’s CV Dazzle, an art project that responds to (and 
actively resists) computational vision.1 Harvey used makeup to create con-
toured shapes (in contrastive colors) on human faces and/or crafted differ-
ent hairstyles (often with strands of hair interrupting the facial plane) as a 
means to camouflage individuals from the pixel-vision-plus-facial-recogni-
tion-software assemblage that constitutes the computational eye. As such, what 
CV Dazzle offered was both an art exhibit that commented on a particular 
technologized condition and a set of tips / guides for bodily aesthetic aug-
mentations that could allow one to resist the digital algorithmic gaze. This, 
of course, may seem an issue quite removed from everyday reality for many 
readers, but for those who live in heavy surveillance cityscapes—metropoli-
tan areas like Beijing, London, or Chicago—Harvey’s project provides a set of 
rhetorical and representational practices that can be adopted to resist (if not 
reject) the underlying sense of pixelism at the core of computer vision and, 
in turn, to move relatively unencumbered through an increasingly surveilled 
environment.
Now, while Harvey’s work is meant to subvert computer vision itself, what 
it does as part of the New Aesthetic is point to a more general shift in human 
sensibilities. In a fascinating turn of events, part of what the New Aesthetic 
ecology draws to attention is a cultural moment in which there has been an 
inversion of Kirsch’s team’s guiding frame. As the human dimension is increas-
ingly shaped by the flows and functions among its medial ecologies, what is at 
stake is no longer what it would mean for the computer to see the world the 
way humans do but rather what it means that humans are beginning to see the 
world from the perspective (and in the aesthetic) of computational mediation.
It is not simply that computer vision (and the people attached to it) rou-
tinely reduces human subjectivities to pixel-based data values, but rather that 
there is a developing cultural propensity of seeing or sensing pixel aesthetics 
in all manner of representations in the world, even in those of a nonpixelated 
variety. For the sheer ubiquity of pixel-based media coupled with something 
 1. For a more complete look at CV Dazzle, visit https://cvdazzle.com.
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like the increasing presence of computer vision has led to a condition in which 
people recognize certain patterns and/or representational aesthetics as being 
either of the pixel or as inherently pixel-like. This suggests that while the 
pixel may exist as a technical thing in the world—as part of a technological 
assemblage that “sees” the world in a particular way and, in turn, represents 
it back to viewers and voyeurs in the same interpretive values—what matters 
in a work like this is the magnitude by which something like a pixel aesthetic 
moves into human capacities for making sense of things in the world.
To this end, the historical link to Kirsch is important, as is the clear 
connection to computational vision, but what is critical in the pixel orien-
tation of the New Aesthetic is that it puts into relief certain movements of 
the pixel across human and nonhuman dimensions. And perhaps the best 
way this gets demonstrated is in those moments or representative artifacts 
where people have a tendency to see-pixels-where-they-are-not. Bridle points 
to this condition with a satellite image of farmland on the border of Namibia 
and South Africa (Plate F). This New Aesthetic artifact visually captures a 
series of irrigated fields (all in the shape of a square, all different shades of 
green—corresponding to different stages of growth) surrounded by rocky ter-
rain and curved waterways. The square fields in the image seem less the result 
of agricultural practice and more that of monochromatic pixels taking form 
as part of something like a computer glitch. In New Aesthetic, New Anxieties, 
David M. Berry et al. argue that Bridle selected this image precisely “because 
its graphics suggest a pixillated [sic] version of a landscape” (28). They go on 
to say that this example is “pure surface image” (29) with no real-world cor-
respondent: it could not be “seen” without digital (satellite) technology. But 
while Berry et al. are willing to write off this image because “its referent in 
the real is of no consequence for our aesthetic appreciation of it” (29), they 
skip by the very underlying technologized condition needed for people to see 
(or even be inclined to see) pixels there in the first place—a condition Berry 
would later, in “The Postdigital Constellation,” refer to as digital pareidolia: 
“seeing digital causes for things that happen in everyday life” (56). What is 
valuable in this image, then, is not that it suggests pixels but rather, as Bridle 
indicates, that people find it difficult not to sense a pixel aesthetic in its mono-
chromatic squares in the first place. There is something recognizably “digital” 
in the image, and that quality is present not because the land has been culti-
vated in that way but because post-digital culture has grown accustomed to 
perceiving (if not expecting) digital-pixel patterns of representation, particu-
larly in screen-mediated forms.
In “The Genius and the Algorithm: Reflection on the New Aesthetic as 
a Computer’s Vision,” digital culture philosopher Stamatia Portanova refers 
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to this condition of seeing or sensing digital, pixel patterns in the images 
of the world as “obsessive digital,” which she indicates marks “a qualitative 
rather than simply quantitative modification of the visual style of our age” 
(97). She argues that the problem is not that “digital images are everywhere 
all the time,” nor that we are inundated with computer vision, but that people 
now understand visual representations everywhere (especially photographic 
images) as digital by default, as reflecting digital aesthetics, as being available 
to digital manipulation, as constructing meaning within the representational 
affordances of the digital. What has changed is not necessarily the aesthetic 
patterns/values themselves2 but rather, as Katja Kwastek suggests in “How to 
Be Theorized: A Tediously Academic Essay on the New Aesthetic,” the contexts 
and ecologies in which people find themselves (the contexts and ecologies that 
shape human perception) (78). Which is to say, as to be becomes to be medi-
ated, human perception itself attunes to, reflects, and becomes constituted by 
the base affordances and constraints of its highest forms of mediation—in this 
case, the pixel-based, representational qualities of screen mediation and their 
conditional availability to computational machination.
Now, while Portanova and Berry situate these reconfigured sensibilities 
in negative terms—with Portanova’s “obsessive digital” being linked to a kind 
of neurosis and Berry turning to pareidolia as well as apophenia to frame the 
matter in terms of human error (e.g., the “mistake” of seeing meaningful pat-
terns where there are none)—Kwastek takes a more positive approach. She 
aligns this pixel orientation with what art historian Michael Baxandall refers 
to as “period eye.” In his book Painting and Experience in 15th Century Italy: 
A Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style, Baxandall offers “period eye” 
as a way to describe how a particular confluence of factors configures how 
individuals and cultures look at, understand, and experience different works 
and objects in a particular epoch, in a particular culture. This confluence not 
only includes the social relationships that produce particular paintings but, 
as Baxandall notes, is also composed of commercial, religious, and percep-
tual institutions and conventions (1). Visual studies scholar Malcolm Barnard 
allows one to push this further, arguing in Approaches to Understanding Visual 
Culture that media, particularly visual media, depend on the life-worlds of 
both the general interpretive public and the inventive artist (43). These life-
worlds (an echo of Dewey’s aesthetics in/of the everyday, discussed in chapter 
1) include not only Baxandall’s confluence but also the beliefs and knowl-
 2. The aesthetics being ascribed to computation and screen representation existed long 
before computational media came into the mix (see, for example, the 1940s work of Swiss artist 
Richard Paul Lohse or the early work with voxel aesthetics of LEGO Company product designer 
Dagny Holm Jenson).
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edges (and assumptions) that audiences bring to an interpretive act as well as 
the culturally situated forms and practices that constitute the mediation itself 
(including everyday expectations of particular medial experiences). Together, 
then, Baxandall’s confluence and Barnard’s life-worlds point toward a perspec-
tive in which human perception is intertwined with its socially, culturally, and 
individually situated forms and function of mediation. Or, as Kwastek more 
pointedly suggests, human perception reflects the medial patterns to which 
people give primacy (patterns that take shape as part of the ecologies in which 
people find themselves).
Of course, for those who work at the intersections of rhetoric and tech-
nology, this idea is anything but new. Marshall McLuhan, in his collabora-
tive with Quentin Fiore, The Medium Is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects, 
contended that different types of mediation alter both the available repre-
sentational means and the very ways in which “we perceive the world” (41). 
Moreover, these shifts in perception transform the core of human sense ratios 
(the means by which people make sense of the world), and, in so doing, alter 
what (and how) it means to be human. Thus, while something like the pixel 
orientation of the New Aesthetic may indicate a general pixel ubiquity and 
may draw attention to the computational eye, what it more fundamentally puts 
into relief are the underlying patterns of perceptual understanding—patterns 
that not only reflect a digital, pixel aesthetic, but which have become intrinsic 
to a twenty-first-century human manner of making sense of the world.
Working more directly in relation to rhetoric and the technology of lit-
eracy, Walter J. Ong has made similar claims. In his Orality and Literacy: The 
Technologizing of the Word, Ong offers an extended treatise on the shifts in the 
human condition that accompany a cultural transition from being of a pri-
mary oral culture to one of literacy. To this end, he offers many claims about 
both oral and literate practices of invention, memory/history, reasoning, and 
the like—all of great value to how one understands the complexities of rhetor-
ical engagement. But one of the critical (and perhaps underlying) implications 
in Ong’s work is that Western culture has been so saturated with the technol-
ogy of literacy (and its corresponding seep into human ways of being) that 
even nonliterates in a Western world develop literate habits of mind, literate 
ways of reasoning, and literate modes of seeing and making sense of the world 
(76–116). While Ong is focused on technologies of the word in a way that this 
work is not, what he presents is a view toward understanding the depth and 
degree to which the infusion of literacy (a technology) has introduced alto-
gether different sensibilities (perceptual and intellectual alike).
In an interesting kind of dynamic, Jonathan Openshaw has essentially 
recast Ong’s position to fit the current post-digital milieu. In Postdigital Arti-
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sans: Craftsmanship with a New Aesthetic in Fashion, Art, Design and Archi-
tecture, Openshaw swaps out Ong’s “literacy” for a contemporary sense of 
“the digital”—writing that the world “has been [so] reformulated by the digi-
tal moment” that people have developed a “digital mindset,” one “inextrica-
bly entangled with existence, whether or not the digital technology is actually 
present” (5; emphasis original). What Openshaw is saying, much like Ong, is 
that current ways of perceiving, conceiving, and even receiving the world (and 
things in worlds) have become colored by the premises and practices of per-
vasive technologies. In a contemporary context, this includes both the pixel 
as representational unit of computational systems and the pixel as aesthetic 
entity of ubiquitous screen mediation (in visual and haptic interactions alike).
Therefore, as changes in technological capacities set upon the human–
technology assemblage, what manifests in addition to new ecologies and new 
practices are altogether new sensibilities (and sense ratios) that attune people 
to different attention structures as part of their making (and understanding) 
practices. For, as rhetoric scholar Kenneth Burke famously claimed in Perma-
nence and Change, a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing (49); to which 
might be added that a way of seeing also heightens one’s attentiveness to (if 
not preference for) particular patterns, practices, performances, and prod-
ucts. Take, for example, how visual design specialists or graphic artists view 
magazine covers: these individuals cannot help but see things like kerning, 
color, stroke effects, drop shadows, and font choice, as well as quick correc-
tions, layering, masking, layout, and so on. In this regard, both the techniques 
of design and the logics and practices of technological components (specifi-
cally computer software like Adobe’s triumvirate of InDesign, Illustrator, and 
Photoshop) have permeated the designers’ and artists’ worldviews. As Richard 
Lanham puts it in The Economics of Attention: Style and Substance in the Age 
of Information, individuals develop “stored-up impulse[s] to pay attention to 
certain kinds of things in certain kinds of ways” (9), and once conditioned to 
these impulses (like visual designers and the technicity of design), they find 
it difficult not to do so.
But while “expert” ways of seeing, listening, and/or being attentive are 
developed in relation to training and exposure—which render elements dis-
cernible in certain ways and which can be leveraged for rhetorical purposes 
(see Ceraso3)—the same “storing up” of attention structures happens at dif-
 3. While this section focuses on the pixel and leans inherently toward the visual as a 
way of thinking through its critical issues, the kind of attentiveness at stake here is available 
to all sensory modes. Steph Ceraso demonstrates this beautifully in her work, where she turns 
to the multimodal listening practices of deaf percussionist Dame Evelyn Glennie to demon-
strate how an expert way of listening invites certain types of attentiveness, which can then be 
extrapolated to students to develop more embodied ways of experiencing mediation.
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ferent depths, scales, and intensities with a more general condition like being 
saturated by digital screens and digital scans (all of which bear the mark of 
the pixel). Hence, the pixel attentiveness operative in the New Aesthetic takes 
form not as the result of the trained eye of a professional assemblage but rather 
from an everyday citizenry awash in ubiquitous modes and means of media-
tion. The situation is far more akin to Baxandall’s “period eye”—perhaps here 
a kind of “post-digital period eye”—than to any gaze of the master class. Thus, 
the more that everyday producers and consumers experience the artifacts and 
practices of their primary medial forms, the more they become accustomed 
to (if not expectant of) those representational affordances and their overt and 
underlying aesthetic elements—which, in the case of screen media, include an 
attentiveness to pixelation itself (and its implications).
What matters here is not simply that people have become accustomed 
to pixelated media, but rather that contemporary human–technology assem-
blages have made it possible for something like the pixel (as representational 
unit and aesthetic entity) to transition from the realm of technical mediation 
into an embodied mode of human understanding. Or, to put it another way, 
human–technology assemblages seem to intertwine the technicity of digital 
mediation with human sensibilities—and the New Aesthetic is one entity tak-
ing stock of these flows across human and nonhuman registers: capturing 
(and capitulating on) the ways and means by which mediations (and medial 
elements, like the pixel) evert into the human condition.
One particular apparatus that might help better situate this dynamic for 
rhetorical studies comes out of new media studies: specifically, Jay David 
Bolter and Richard Grusin’s concept of remediation.4 In their now iconic work, 
Remediation: Understanding New Media, Bolter and Grusin initially define 
 4. As new media studies has drifted widely across art, aesthetics, and architecture, dipped 
into and maneuvered through considerations of computational processes, code, culture and 
convergence, and, in more recent years, ventured across materiality, new materiality, media 
ecologies, and even actor-network theory, there may be something of a grand narrative wanting 
as a guiding orientation here—with an extended overview of new media opening its own lines 
of inquiry as well as providing something of a history against which the New Aesthetic might 
be set. But I hesitate to turn toward such actions, as attempting to reductively suture together 
the varied tensions and perspectives that fall under the banner of new media would prove 
troublesome at best. Rather, this chapter heeds philosopher Jean-François Lyotard’s charge for 
petit récit: the call for little narratives. While little narratives may cover less ground than the 
synthetic perspectives operative at the level of any grand narrative, little narratives do allow one 
to work in far finer granularities. To this end, I turn to Bolter and Grusin’s work because they 
situate their concept of remediation as the “defining characteristic of new digital media” (45), 
they offer a trio of concepts that account for media-to-media and human-to-media relations, 
and Grusin himself has gone so far as to claim (via tweet) that the New Aesthetic is nothing 
more than “just the latest name for remediation” (qtd. in Kwastek 75). As such, there is perhaps 
not a better petit récit available.
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remediation somewhat generically as the “representation of one medium in 
another” (45). In so doing, they extend McLuhan’s foundational principle of 
media: the content of any medium is always another medium (Understanding 
8). But they press remediation further—doing so with an eye toward particular 
experiences of media (described in their subterms of immediacy and hyper-
mediacy) and the specific manipulations by which media come to borrow 
from other media to create meaning or to have cultural value. They eventually 
set upon remediation as being the set of practices by which media “appropri-
ate the techniques, forms, and social significance of other media” (65). It is 
from this more pragmatic orientation that N. Katherine Hayles, in Writing 
Machines, recasts remediation as media-to-media parasitism, with media con-
tent and media techné cycling through different types, forms, and materiali-
ties of mediation (5)—with mediation itself being of the flows and circulating 
intensities. And it is here, with Hayles’s introduction of parasitism as a way 
of thinking about remediation, that one begins to see an advantageous crack 
in the more rigid media-to-media veneer of Bolter and Grusin’s remediation. 
For, being parasitic, the appropriative practices of remediation are, like viruses 
and infections, of a pathogen not beholden to sequence or system, nor pat-
tern or predictability, but rather are opportunistic and transmittable via var-
ied points of contact. With the screen serving as the primary point of contact 
between humans and technology, and with the pixel operating as the smallest 
available unit of interaction and representation within screens, it should not 
seem so outlandish that screen mediation (and its medial elements) has the 
capacity to move into and across biological materialities, essentially remediat-
ing (infecting) the human condition.
What the pixel orientation of New Aestheticism calls to attention, then, 
is not simply a kind of rampant pixelism, nor merely the presence of compu-
tational vision, but rather the manner by which different assemblages adapt, 
adopt, and acclimate to different medial affordances and cultures at differently 
situated moments. By focusing on the New Aesthetic’s pixel orientation, one 
not only begins to glimpse the media-to-human infusion operative in post-
digital culture but also begins to understand contemporary rhetorical prac-
tices in terms of a general shift in human–technology assemblages.
Beyond offering a theoretical orientation to human–technology relation-
ships, however, what the pixel orientation also illuminates is something of a 
pragmatic threefold: first, it demonstrates, in intentional and unintentional 
ways, how technological shifts (particularly in relation to remediation) ren-
der previous media aesthetics salient; second, it points toward the manner by 
which those media aesthetics can be made to function rhetorically (a kind 
of rhetorical hypermediacy); and third, it hints at how the very affordances 
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and constraints of a particular mediation can be brought into alignment with 
(and flow across) perspectives in other registers (like those of methodology or 
technique). Thus, in the second half of this chapter I turn toward these more 
pragmatic dimensions, situating them as germane to this pixel orientation con-
tour and as part of its contributory value to rhetoric.
MAKING SALIENT
One key element to understand with human–technology assemblages is that 
the highest form of media available in any age establishes the individual as well 
as cultural expectations for mediation. As such, any remediation of that “high-
est” form also remediates human expectations. But among the multiplicity 
operating in this human-to-media dynamic is a lesser, yet equally significant, 
development: each evolution in media also shifts the available perspectives by 
which one is able to discern the previously indiscernible.
Take, for example, what happens when something like a VHS-based 
audio/visual culture comes into contact with DVD audio/visual media. The 
DVD representational affordances offer improved picture clarity, improved 
sound quality, deeper blacks, faster frame rates, and the like. Yet even with a 
marketing strategy designed to call attention to these qualities, what begins to 
manifest among a general viewing public is not a direct attentiveness to the 
qualities themselves (which remain somewhat invisible as part of the default 
immediacy of the initial DVD experience) but rather a hypermediate aware-
ness of the representational impurities of VHS cassette media. Meaning, when 
moving from DVD back to VHS one becomes aware, near instantaneously, 
of the light “fuzz” that lingers in the visual plane of VHS media or the fact 
that the screenic-blacks are really just shades of darker and darker gray. Such 
“shortcomings,” as Hrag Vartanian suggests in “A Not-So-New Aesthetic, 
or Another Attempt at Technological Triumphalism,” begin to more readily 
appear in “some machines [and mediations] now that we have better ones” 
(n. pag.). Of course, the qualitative assessment here should include a degree of 
hesitation, as the transition to improved forms of mediation does not always 
mean better,5 but each iteration does provide a new position from which to 
critique or create with the representational aesthetics of previous mediations. 
 5. For example, the shift from vinyl music records to magnetic tape to digital music files 
demonstrates, with each transition, the limits to fidelity of the previous mediation (with clearer, 
cleaner, and crisper productions exposing, by comparison, the snaps, pops, and hiss of previous 
iterations). But in terms of the listening experience provided, each new material and medial 
form does not inherently point to a better kind of experience.
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And the way it does this is by making hypermediate that which was previously 
immediate—giving saliency to both certain medial qualities and particular 
cultural expectations, but doing so only in relation to other (contemporary) 
mediascapes.
But before I more fully explore the implications of what it means to make 
a media aesthetic salient, let me turn briefly to Bolter and Grusin’s concepts 
of immediacy and hypermediacy, as they will be helpful in understanding this 
kind of saliency as well as the rhetorical gestures it opens.
As a quick overview, immediacy and hypermediacy are the two “logics” 
or competing drives/desires of remediation, and what they describe are the 
ways in which humans experience media (Bolter and Grusin 71). For example, 
immediacy is aligned with transparency—the “transparent presentation of the 
real” (22)—and the experiences to which it gestures are those in which “the 
medium itself ” seems to disappear, leaving an audience “in the presence of 
the thing represented” (6). Hypermediacy, in contrast, is aligned with “the 
enjoyment of the opacity of media” (22) and, in all cases, is tied to an experi-
ence in which users/viewers are (made) “aware of the medium or media” (34). 
Bolter and Grusin write, “If the logic of immediacy leads one either to erase 
or to render automatic the act of representation, the logic of hypermediacy 
acknowledges multiple acts of representation and makes them visible” (33–34). 
Immediacy is governed (at least primarily) by a logic of effacement, whereas 
hypermediacy “multiplies the signs of mediation” (34). But despite their con-
trastive natures, both are beholden to how media offer claims to (and repre-
sentations of) an authentic experience (65). It is just that one (immediacy) 
is associated with an authenticity generated through an increased fidelity of 
representation, while the other (hypermediacy) employs a saturation of media 
(and an attentiveness to that mediation) to offer its own rich sensory experi-
ence (34).
In borrowing these concepts, one might see an absent awareness of media-
tion as (by default) immediate and any overt awareness of mediation as hyper-
mediate. Thus, when the DVD representational qualities put into comparative 
relief those of VHS mediation, what happens is not that one becomes aware 
of the medial aesthetic of the DVD but rather that the previously immediate 
qualities of VHS playback become impossibly hypermediate. On its own this 
is a fairly inconsequential kind of issue. But when this kind of medial saliency 
gets coupled with algorithmic techniques, what manifests is something like 
Rarevision’s VHS Camcorder app, which allows iPhone users to render digital 
video with a VHS aesthetic. In so doing, it capitalizes on the “impurities” of 
VHS not as failures of representation but rather as aesthetic markers of a par-
ticular moment, era, culture, technology, practice, ecology, and the like. Once 
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the aesthetic qualities of VHS media have been made salient (become hyper-
mediate), they can be subject to algorithmization and, in turn, be available for 
creative manipulation by an entire generation of iPhone users.
While this VHS aesthetic may be somewhat at a remove for an everyday 
post-digital citizenry, the same condition applies to something like black-and-
white photography. What was once the pinnacle of photographic creation—
owing to material and technological limitations of its time—has become a 
standard filter in nearly all digital photography practices (from digital camera 
features to smartphone applications). The result is that black-and-white imag-
ery is a design choice, not a default feature. In making black-and-white images 
(via taps and clicks and such), one employs the technical elements of black-
and-white imagery and, in so doing, leverages the “classic” feel that has come 
to be associated with black-and-white photography (an aesthetic designation 
owing to the decades of distance between the formative moments of photog-
raphy and its contemporary digital practices).
In an interesting sort of parallel, this is what is happening to the pixel. 
In the formative days of 8-bit and 16-bit video games, the pixel was part of 
a fairly immediate experience, but over the years there has been a concerted 
effort by industry to obfuscate the pixel: continued evolutions in screen tech-
nologies, software, and computational hardware have made pixels smaller and 
have generated algorithms to dissolve their edges. What was once a clear aes-
thetic designation between digital video games and broadcast television has 
given way because (a) broadcast television is now also digital, and (b) the pixel 
has seemingly been hidden from the vast majority of screen-mediated cul-
tural practices and products—echoing, as Bolter and Grusin might put it, the 
effacement logic of Renaissance oil painters. Thus, when pixels now appear, 
they stand out (function as hypermediate); pixelated images are increasingly 
an exception, not the rule. And much like Generations X and Y, who grew 
up in a world where black-and-white photography was an aesthetic choice 
and not a mechanical/chemical limitation, the tablet generations of today will 
essentially have little to no understanding of pixelated aesthetics (and related 
8-bit graphics) outside of their retro (and/or disruptive) sensibilities—the 
pixel aesthetic will increasingly exist as a design aesthetic and/or available 
rhetorical choice.
But unlike black-and-white imagery, which is achieved in digital represen-
tation by taking away particular values (color saturation), and unlike some-
thing like VHS Camcorder, which applies a series of algorithms to a video 
data file, the pixel of the pixel aesthetic remains materially at the root of all 
screen-based representation. The pixel is not just hypermediate marker and 
carrier of a particular aesthetic value; it is a natural marker for computational 
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mediating technologies (even if manifesting in glitches, broken signals, sys-
temic misfires, etc.). Thus, when pixels occur in contemporary mediascapes, 
they call attention not only to their surface mediations but also to the under-
lying materialities and assemblages (human and nonhuman) in which they 
operate and through which they acquire meaning. In so doing, the pixel dem-
onstrates the fluidity with which representational elements circulate among 
mediating practices, aesthetic values, and human expectations, further affirm-
ing the need for new rhetorical ecologies. For what this dynamic underscores 
is the troubling limits of a categorical order, and what the New Aesthetic is 
capturing, in turn, is something of the different configurations and sensibili-
ties emergent within post-digital ecologies. In the context of this chapter, this 
includes the degree to which pixels make themselves available to the rhetorical 
practices (and implications) of hypermediacy.
PIXELLING RHETORIC
To begin to glean something of the pixel as rhetorical hypermediacy, let me 
return to a familiarity from chapter 3—the digital irruptions that proliferate 
the New Aesthetic. But unlike with eversion, where these irruptions func-
tioned to draw attention to flows across digital and real ecologies, the pixel 
orientation here homes in on those moments and materializations where pixel 
aesthetics destabilize (if not altogether disrupt) medial expectations across 
practices and platforms. Take, for example, Bridle’s own muse, the Telehouse 
West building (Plate G) in London. What makes this artifact of value to New 
Aestheticism is not simply that it captures a digital, pixel aesthetic rendered 
in material, architectural space, but rather that the pseudo-camouflaged, pix-
elated exterior of the building’s design—what architects refer to as a disruptive 
pattern—operates as hypermediate. The hypermediacy occurs from (a) the 
pixel itself being of a hypermediate quality in contemporary culture (again, 
the result of the technological improvements that have seemingly moved 
screens beyond pixel aesthetics), and (b) its employment as an exterior build-
ing design, which, as suggested in chapter 1, destabilizes aesthetic expectations 
for those still operating with sensibilities that reflect the digital/real divide. 
But no matter how the hypermediacy occurs, what it accomplishes is to direct 
attention to Telehouse West as a particular kind of building (what it is, what 
it does, what it houses, what it represents, etc.). To understand the implica-
tions of this awareness, it helps to know that Telehouse West is a major data/
server storehouse for Telehouse Europe, one of the largest global data-cen-
ter providers in the world, and the employment of a disruptive, pixel pattern 
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renders the building visibly distinct from its surroundings—directing atten-
tion in one kind of way. But this exterior aesthetic also separates Telehouse 
West from most other buildings of its kind as data centers or server farms 
tend to be nondescript, large sheds—having more in common, appearance-
wise, with livestock confinement buildings or shipping warehouses than with 
any technological avant-garde—directing attention in another kind of way. 
Therefore, the pixel-camouflaged quality of Telehouse West not only fails to 
obscure the building but has the exact opposite effect: creating a hyperme-
diacy in which the building’s aesthetic works counter to its representational 
expectations (geographically, categorically, and the like), and, at a very base 
level, calls attention to its own mediation.
Now, Bridle goes so far as to claim that the mediation of Telehouse West 
involves the building wearing “the skin of the network”—with its exterior ges-
turing toward both the building’s own digitality and its participation in some 
larger, more significant cultural complexity (“Waving” n. pag.). But not every-
one agrees with Bridle’s reading. Kyle McDonald, whose own works involve 
the manipulation of code and algorithms to subvert network culture and com-
munication, has countered in “Personifying Machines, Machining Persons” 
that examples like Telehouse West are nothing more than just another itera-
tion of functional design (in the sense of hardware/software modularity and 
in terms of the applied arts). The pixel aesthetic that marks Telehouse West 
is, in McDonald’s view, just another leveraging of an aesthetic pattern from 
a functional (in this case, computational) system. And, if true, this position 
could be applied to most artifacts and objects that employ a pixel aesthetic—
just more and more adaptations of the principles of functional design. But 
even if McDonald’s reductive assessment holds, the leveraging at stake here is 
not the same old “form follows function” of modernism, nor the postmodern 
rejection of such. Rather, what makes the exterior design of Telehouse West 
of interest, particularly in this work, is that its hypermediate aesthetic quality 
operates rhetorically—capitalizing on the tropes connected to (and slightly 
adjacent to) its function: it employs the pixel as its primary aesthetic element 
rather than the 1s and 0s that reside at the core of a data center or server farm; 
or, as another example, it features a pixel-patterned exterior rather than being 
shaped like actual servers (perhaps too obvious a gesture). Given, then, that 
Telehouse West primarily deals in the storing and transmitting of data or the 
archiving and relaying of information, not pixels, its exterior design is far 
more metonymic than a reflection of its function. Pixels are simply part of the 
technological as well as ideological and ontological world that Telehouse West 
inhabits, and in leveraging a pixel aesthetic the building’s design participates 
in the identity of the company itself (and, in many ways, enacts something of 
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its own paradigm). In this regard, the pixelated exterior is not simply a mat-
ter of function, nor of disruptive architecture, but rather is meant to serve as 
a relay across the rhetorical ecologies in which the building and passersby 
participate.
One can see a similar rhetorical capacity at work in the Street Eraser proj-
ect of artists Tayfun Sarier and Guus ter Beek, who use stickers to create the 
appearance of real-world images and artifacts being “erased” in Adobe Pho-
toshop (Plate H). Initially the “sticker erasures” (which leverage the empty 
background layer in Photoshop as visual aesthetic) targeted print advertise-
ments, which are frequently created via some combination of Adobe products 
(InDesign and Photoshop, for example). The pixel aesthetic of the background 
layer was meant, therefore, to call attention to the fabricated quality of the 
advertisements themselves. But Street Eraser extended these considerations 
beyond the print advertisement world to graffiti art, road signs, business mar-
quees, and the like, bringing the metaphors, methods, and models of digital 
production (encapsulated in a hypermediate, pixel aesthetic) to bear on the 
artifice of everyday reality (harking back to the near ubiquitous “born digital” 
quality of all manufacturing discussed in chapter 3).
But more than this, the “erased portion” (the sticker itself) created the illu-
sion of layers, which adds what digital compositionists Daniel Anderson and 
Jentery Sayers would call a sense of verticality to mediation itself (80). Street 
Eraser artifacts deploy the rhetoricity of layers and, in so doing, ask viewers 
to be attentive to the production processes that proliferate digital culture as 
well as to the vertical thickness of mediation associated with digital mak-
ing. Sarier and ter Beek distribute the techné of digital layering into spaces 
(and onto objects) of general public activity.6 In so doing, they leverage the 
pixelated representation that underlies the Photoshop “canvas” as a means to 
capitalize on the verticality of layers (a core digital affordance7) and to expose 
the overlapping layers among digital and real ecologies. Simply put, the pixel 
aesthetic of Street Eraser forces viewers into a hypermediate position, one 
where they have to reconcile the dissonance that emerges when the vertical 
thickness of the digital is put into a mediascape governed by the thinness of 
material reality.
The pixel elements of Street Eraser’s stickers vibrate, then, between being 
an aesthetic value and a systemic marker. It is not that one is unable to make 
sense of these works in digital and nondigital ways; rather, it is that the mean-
ings available perpetually migrate across the different registers. This suggests 
 6. See http://streeteraser.com for more images.
 7. See Manovich, The Language of New Media 229.
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that the pixel aesthetic of the Street Eraser project operates as a rhetorical 
multitude—calling attention to the very ecologies in which these artifacts and 
their audiences participate. Understanding the pixel’s value, then, as a single 
piece; its relation to a larger set of pixels (as visual and haptic formations, like 
the background layer); the underlying systems and structures to which pixels 
are connected (technically, socially, politically); and the possibilities of their 
perpetual manipulations (via algorithmization, hardware changes, and even 
flows across ecologies) is critical for the ways in which post-digital rhetoricians 
might augment, alter, or even authenticate digital and nondigital artifacts.
That said, in the next section I want to shift the scale at which this exami-
nation operates. For while the considerations to this point have focused on a 
fairly granular engagement of the pixel—with particular attention to how it 
manifests across key New Aesthetic examples—the next section is designed 
to maneuver somewhat abstractly with the implications of a pixel orientation 
(leveraging the very affordances of seeing the pixel as a way to think about 
rhetorical inquiry itself).
ANAMORPHOSIS
With this last gesture within this pixel orientation, I want to return (at least 
somewhat adjacently) to the earlier consideration of seeing-pixels-where-they-
are-not. This is not to rehash a tendency among a twenty-first-century reme-
diated condition—such as noticing pixel aesthetics in nonpixel patterns—but 
to point to a technique and/or representational affordance that allows the pix-
els (and related representations) to participate in yet other registers as well. 
Thus, the movement being illuminated by this section is not of a surface mat-
ter but is rather more attuned to the potential rhetorical ecologies in which 
pixel aspects can be understood to participate.
Let me begin, then, by turning to a nondigital, nonsatellite example 
demonstrative of the pixel orientation: Salvador Dali’s Gala contemplating the 
Mediterranean Sea which at a distance of 20 meters is transformed into the por-
trait of Abraham Lincoln (Homage to Rothko) (Second Version).8 Aside from 
its unusually long title (which became Lincoln in Dalivision as a lithograph), 
this 1977 painting plays with perception itself, as up close it is a portrait of a 
nude female staring at a sunset over the ocean, surrounded by a series of mul-
ticolored squares (a technique of photomosaic art) that bear the style mark-
 8. This image can be viewed online at the website for the Dali Museum (http://archive.
thedali.org/mwebcgi/mweb.exe?request=record;id=152;type=101) or on Wikipedia: Lincoln in 
Dalivision (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lincoln_in_Dalivision).
104 •  C H A P T E R 4 
ers now commonly associated with pixels. But as one moves away from the 
image, what comes into view (in an abstracted way) is a portrait of Abraham 
Lincoln. What is interesting here, in addition to the brilliant play of perspec-
tive, is that even when one is aware that the techniques employed are not that 
of a pixel aesthetic, one still wrestles with the pixel allusions of the aesthetic. 
Even the slightest sense of Dali’s squares being pixelesque hints at this remedi-
ated human condition.
But perhaps more interesting to this conversation is how Dali’s Lincoln 
taps into a fundamental representational technique associated with the efface-
ment of the pixel. That is, when one views the work from the twenty-meter 
perspective (as suggested in the original title), the square aesthetic elements 
seem to fade away and an abstracted representation of Abraham Lincoln 
comes to presence. What is happening is that the aesthetic elements of the 
painting, much like the pixel, are subject to anamorphic play. Anamorphosis 
is an art technique in which a work (painting, sculpture, etc.) is rendered so 
as to need either a specific device (reflective cone, cylindrical mirror, etc.) or 
a specific vantage point (e.g., twenty meters) to reconstitute the image as it is 
intended. Absent device or vantage point, what one sees is a distorted projec-
tion—just a series of pixel squares—and not the larger representation in which 
the elements, marks, or materials participate.
One of the better-known works to include anamorphosis as representa-
tional technique is Hans Holbein the Younger’s painting The Ambassadors.9 
The skull in the foreground of the painting is skewed to such a degree as 
to introduce the necessity for two (if not more) perspectives for viewing 
the work: the front view, which allows patrons to visibly engage most of the 
details in the painting, and the skewed perspective, which allows them to see 
the skull. There are any number of theories about why Holbein the Younger 
painted the skull in this work, and why he did so with an anamorphic tech-
nique, but one in particular suggests that this work was meant to be hung in 
a stairway so that viewers approaching or descending from the work could be 
startled by the sudden visibility and presence of the skull—a kind of painter’s 
attention to viewers’ experiencing the work.
But anamorphic perspective with regard to this pixel orientation is more 
than just a practice of distorted representation; it has multiple layers of sig-
nificance because screen representations are themselves inherently anamor-
 9. This painting features two male figures, presumably travelers, from the 1530s who are 
standing against a tall desk or shelving upon which several objects reside (from a globe to a 
polyhedral sundial). In the foreground, however, is a skewed figure of white and gray, which, 
upon closer inspection, reveals a skull notably out of perspective with the rest of the painting. 
To see the image, visit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Ambassadors_(Holbein).
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phic. Take this text as example, which was written using Microsoft Word. 
The anti-aliasing of alphabetic text is fundamentally a kind of perspective (or 
oblique) anamorphosis. Zooming in to the pixel level would reveal the jagged 
and multi-shaded squares that compose each letter. But at the right level of 
scale: nothing but smooth-edged letters. Meaning, that with the proper play 
of perspective (e.g., the zoom-in/zoom-out affordances of screen media), one 
can see past (or perhaps through) the pixels to the larger representation(s) in 
which they participate—essentially rendering the pixel tree invisible in order 
to see the visual forest. But screen-mediating technologies have improved to 
such a degree that they have essentially placed the viewing public perpetually 
in front of the visual forest. Thus, there is often a need to manipulate scale and 
perspective to see pixels in the first place—one must “zoom in” closer to the 
visual forest to see the pixel trees.
Of course, this particular pixel/screen orientation is perhaps not the exact 
use to which anamorphic perspective normally applies, but it nonetheless 
remains true: pixels, much like the dots in pointillism, operate at multiple 
levels of scale, requiring different perspectives for them to function as part of 
a larger graphical representation. But what the zoom-in/zoom-out capacity 
points to at a more fundamental level is the rhetorical value of scalability itself, 
with manipulations of scale allowing one to both defamiliarize an audience 
and construct altogether different ecologies. Lanham went so far as to suggest 
that manipulating scale was “one of the truly enzymatic powers of electronic 
text”—foregrounding the capacity of digital and computational mediations to 
allow one to decide upon “the central decorum of a human event” by estab-
lishing “the boundary-conditions [set by perspective] within which that event 
is to be staged” (Electronic 41). So, while the play of perspective operative at 
the level of the pixel may seem innocuous enough, it points to a larger set of 
rhetorical concerns for a post-digital era.
As Elizabeth Losh argued in “Nowcasting/Futurecasting: Big Data, Prog-
nostication, and the Rhetorics of Scale,” the play of perspective (via scalability) 
operates not only as rhetorical and representational tool but also as a method 
for inquiry and analysis: changing the scale sets the “boundary-conditions” of 
an engagement and determines, in many ways, the granularity of the inquiry 
as well as the available manipulations. For example, digital humanist Franco 
Moretti’s well-known practice of “distant reading” demonstrates this rhetorical 
capacity, situating critics (particularly literary critics) at an altogether different 
distance from their usual relationship with texts in order to illuminate (and/or 
manipulate) different considerations. For changing the scale (and perspective) 
by which one approaches an artifact (or data set) changes the very depths and 
degree of the engagement as well as the very manner in which (and language 
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in which) the artifact is understood. In Moretti’s case, this includes a rhe-
torical shift in which the words of a book come to be understood as “data” as 
much as elements of a literary narrative. Granted, this kind of rhetorical shift 
is not specific to digital ecologies, for Freudian psychology long transformed 
what a word or absence of a word could signify (introducing a different kind 
of multiplicity), but what Moretti demonstrates is that the play of perspective 
and scalability afforded by digital ecologies necessitates, as Losh suggests, that 
one “adapt to making sense of content at new orders of magnitude” (286). 
However, it is not just that new orders of magnitude are being introduced; 
rather, it is that different orders of magnitude move more and less fluidly 
among different rhetorical registers. This suggests that whether the pixel is 
situated as computer-vision data point, representational unit, retro-present 
aesthetic marker, or other, its scalability and hypermediacy qualities allow for 
altogether different configurations by which to make meaning, manipulate 
representations, move across registers, and maneuver among a given ecology.
Thus, whether considering Dali’s Lincoln, the general play of perspective 
and perception central to all screen representations, or the possibility of ana-
morphosis informing critical inquiry practices, the pixel orientation (like with 
most aesthetic movements) is an attempt by the New Aesthetic, as Bruce Ster-
ling might put it, to acknowledge “a new way of perceiving reality” (n. pag.). 
In this case, the New Aesthetic taps into the temporality of a cultural moment 
(e.g., a “post-digital period eye”), but does so with attentiveness to the rela-
tionships between humans and mediation and how artifacts call to attention 
different ways of experiencing and understanding mediation. The more one 
becomes involved with technologies, the easier it is to naturalize the prac-
tices, preferences, materialities, and operative logics of those technologies as 
part of a worldview. What makes the New Aesthetic of value, then, is that it 
makes salient some potential naturalizations (and their underlying artificial-
ity)—helping people attune to the proclivities of living in, with, and through 
digital devices (and the pixel markers they bear).
THE PIXEL RHETORICIAN
The issue for rhetoric, then, is not “why” people adapt to technological ways 
of seeing and sensing the world, nor how to better delineate between categori-
cal orders like the digital, the mechanical, the real, and so on, but rather how 
to adjust the practices of rhetoric to account for the ripples of a remediated 
human condition and the medial, material, and methodological capacities it 
exposes. Meaning, if the pixel functions as a representational unit, a hyperme-
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diate aesthetic, a model of scalable affordances, and a meaning-making pat-
tern routinely employed by post-digital audiences, then rhetoricians crafting 
artifacts in/for a post-digital culture need to consider these matters. To this 
end, I want to conclude this chapter with a few implications of the quartet of 
considerations raised above, as they provide pragmatic avenues by which this 
New Aesthetic contour may be brought into rhetoric.
First, what this contour allows post-digital rhetoricians to grasp is that the 
pixel is the smallest available unit of rhetorical engagement and representation 
in screen mediation. While screen essentialism is problematic in its own right, 
to ignore the fundamental role that screens play in today’s digital mediascapes 
would be foolhardy. Further, if one is attempting to craft a digital artifact to be 
distributed by computational networks and displayed on screens, then failing 
to recognize the representative potential of the pixel would be disadvanta-
geous as well. For the individual pixel, and/or its mutability to be grouped and 
perpetually regrouped with other pixels, establishes the very point of contact 
between human participants and screen media. Even in a fairly simple con-
struction such as turning The Ambassadors painting into a webtext where the 
skewed skull is rendered as a clickable sprite,10 pixels would still be that which 
displays and marks the sprite as a trigger point for users. Of course, in scroll-
ing settings, the trigger function itself would flow across pixels as the cor-
responding sprite relocates on the pixel grid, but whether that sprite links to 
the Wikipedia page on anamorphosis or launches a video overlay of dancing 
sharks, the unit of value (and functionality) of the pixel remains rhetorically 
stable. Thus, while rhetoricians would be well served to attune to a variety of 
representational scales in digital mediation, they should never lose site of the 
pixel level and the granularity it offers.
Second, because the pixel functions as hypermediate, it can be deployed 
rhetorically in a multitude of ways. On the surface, it can be used to signal 
the aesthetics of error—computational misfires and glitch practices—in order 
to draw attention to particular technical shortcomings (or to reflect a com-
putational shortcoming in a noncomputational representation). It can also 
be employed to leverage retro-present sensibilities (harking back to the 8-bit 
graphics of yore)—using cultural icons and entities from the dominant media 
artifacts of that era (e.g., Pasquini’s coin block). But neither of these move the 
needle in terms of the fuller set of rhetorical complexities occasioned by the 
pixel aesthetic. Rather, what is the more significant value in this consideration 
 10. Sprite is a term used in computer graphics, particularly in video game design and 
construction. It designates two-dimensional bitmaps that are integrated into a larger scene (a 
composite of digital artifacts). Thus, a composite image created in Photoshop that places a bas-
ketball, a buffalo, and a bugle all on a white background would be composed of three sprites.
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is that by using a pixel aesthetic, one can seemingly fold together different 
registers of meaning and mediation—bringing the metaphors, models, and 
metonymic dimensions of the digital to bear on the nondigital, and vice versa.
This “coming to bear” is relatively easy to see in the key examples in this 
chapter—Telehouse West and Street Eraser—as both leverage a digital aes-
thetic and deploy it in a material space. But in so doing, they simultaneously 
point toward the fundamental relationality between the material, physi-
ological world and that of the digital. And this relational dynamic is often 
overlooked. After all, the visual metaphors employed in the dominant compu-
tational operating systems come from the physical world (computer “desktop,” 
“trashcan” for deleting “files,” “folders” for holding “files,” “files,” and so on). 
What this suggests, to return to the new media vocabulary introduced earlier, 
is that what can be remediated is not just media and human conditions but 
the metaphorical functions and capacities of everyday objects—understood 
in particular ways, in relation to particular cultures. Thus, when folding these 
competing and complementary registers together, the elements and artifacts 
and rhetorics and aesthetics of each become suspect to drifting in and out of 
one another—circulating among the ecologies in which they participate and 
which they help constitute. In terms of the hypermediate qualities of the pixel, 
this allows one to call attention to mediation in particular ways. But in terms 
of the remediation of visual and operative metaphors from the material world 
into that of pixel-based representation, what manifests is the ability to both 
expand and delimit digital and nondigital rhetorical capacities.
Third, what the anamorphic quality of the pixel provides is a model of 
scalable affordances. By changing the perspective at which one operates, one 
can fundamentally change one’s relationship with the object of inquiry. In 
some cases, this allows one to see patterns and predilections otherwise blurred 
(much like Lincoln in Dali’s Lincoln). In others, it allows one to work either 
with a finer granularity or with a greater degree of abstraction. In either case, 
what something like the pixel orientation demonstrates is the value in shift-
ing perspective—a necessity, in most cases, to even be able to see pixels in the 
first place. This strangely parallels the objectivist impulse, which sought to 
efface the researcher/rhetorician from critical inquiry and the production of 
knowledge: the appeal to objectivity, much like industry’s drive to obfuscate 
the pixel, essentially moved us past the intimate considerations of an indi-
vidual’s relation to an object of inquiry—projecting (in both language and 
practice) the necessity of distance. But, as so many works have shown—par-
ticularly those pulling from the feminist perspectives of Luce Irigaray and the 
call to write one’s body, or the work of Gregory L. Ulmer and his rhetorical 
play of the mystory—moving closer to an object of inquiry and acknowledging 
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one’s closeness can reveal new considerations and capacities as well. To echo 
a line from Sean Morey’s “Digital Ecologies,” individuals both participate in 
and help constitute the ecologies themselves (119). Which is to point out that 
people are shapers of and beings shaped by the ecologies in which they par-
ticipate. Thus, while there is a value in zooming out to “big data” levels so as 
to discern forest-level patterns and practices, there is equal capacity and value 
to zoom in and dance among the trees. The pixel orientation of the New Aes-
thetic, then, should push rhetoricians to at least be attentive to the distance 
they adopt in their engagements and to consider what playing with the orders 
of magnitude might yield.
Fourth, if the primary gesture of the pixel orientation includes a remedi-
ated condition by which something of a digital, pixel aesthetic has moved 
into human sensibilities (and is understood as being somewhat natural to the 
world), then what is taking shape is the emergence of rhetoricians and rhetori-
cal audiences that are of a techno-human hybridity—and a hybridity that takes 
form in the confluence of mechanical equipment / materiality, digital software 
/ algorithmization, and human actants, all situated in a particular environ-
ment, of a particular moment, and in relation to other human and nonhuman 
entities. While I more fully explore the implications of this dynamic in chap-
ter 5—focusing explicitly on human–technology making—what the hybridity 
(and its corresponding pixel orientation) allow for are digital ways of seeing, 
sensing, and selecting, while maintaining human ways of feeling, forming, and 
fathoming—with both sets of sensibilities emergent from life as it is lived and 
transformative of one another. What matters for post-digital rhetoricians is 
not that there is a tendency to see pixel patterns in the world but that as part 
of a techno-human assemblage, technological aesthetics evoke new orienta-
tions to rhetorical constructs, including things like pathos, logos, and ethos.
Now, while I would like to have ended this chapter “George Costanza” 
style—walking out following the mention of the classical rhetorical appeals—
I would be remiss to not include one additional consideration in adopting 
a pixel focus as a way of exploring a technological condition: the seeming 
impartiality of the pixel. As Carla Gannis argues, the tint toward the pixel as 
orienting marker suggests that there may be “something more humanizing 
than dehumanizing in the endeavors of the New Aesthetic” (n. pag.). For pix-
els are “ubiquitous and functional patterns embedded in the operations” of 
people’s everyday lives, and yet they are, in many ways, relatively “dislocated 
from culture, gender, and race” (n.  pag.). This means, according to Gannis, 
that pixels offer a kind of neutrality—being somewhat removed from a pre-
supposition toward a particular subjectivity. For what the pixel offers is less a 
matter of subjectivity and more that of a technical consideration—a technic-
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ity to which all people are exposed and to which all screen mediations are 
subject. Further, what the New Aesthetic points to, even in its most pixelated 
of examples, is not any particular human subjectivity over another, nor even 
the human over the technological, nor any particular technology (or material-
technological element, pixels included) over the human condition, but rather 
that human relationships with technologies come to color the very ways in 
which individuals see, act, and understand their worlds (and vice versa)—
not only seeing pixels in places they are not, but designing programs, proce-
dures, and even policies based on the (inventive/interpretive) possibilities of 
the world rendered through a pixel grid (the post-digital equivalent of Plato’s 
liknon).
Interestingly enough, one of the few subjectivity concerns to emerge with 
the pixel stem from the practices and preferences of the computational eye—a 
practice in which a computational voyeur/viewer interprets the visual world 
through a pixel-as-data orientation. With most facial recognition software 
operating on contrast values and disparities between recognizable features, 
those who possess darker skin tones and/or more uniformity in their key 
points of analysis (cheekbones, eyes, lip form/color) are less likely to be “rec-
ognized” by the computational-machinic assemblage. In operations where this 
computational eye is linked to policing practices, there are instances in which 
many people of color may (finally) hold advantage, as their faces can be harder 
to decipher when “understood” (rendered) as pixel-data values. This is by no 
means to suggest that they are less likely to be tracked or targeted by these 
systems—as the systemic assemblage is increasingly tied to policies and polic-
ing institutions that have historically been linked to a variety of racial bias. But 
when operating at the level of pixels and using the “pixel-captured” points of 
human faces as patterns for recognition, those faces that offer less contrast 
reduce the success rate of recognition by the computational eye. To be sure, 
this opens far greater cultural considerations than can adequately be explored 
in this text, particularly given the undercurrent with policing practices and 
people of color, but what this points to is that despite there being some valid-
ity to Gannis’s claim that the pixel (in a technical sense) remains somewhat 
“dislocated” from these matters, there are, nonetheless, layered concerns of 
subjectivity. For any system using a pixel attunement is doing so inherently 
as part of an assemblage that includes humans, and the “neutral” pixel func-
tions, by default, as the very representational value upon which human-built 
programs and assemblages act or to which they respond.
Thus, while the pixel remains somewhat dislocated from issues of subjec-
tivity on its own, it nonetheless is part of an increasingly subjective set of prac-
tices—and matters of subjectivity that swing in multiple directions. For when 
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individuals bring computational-eye devices into their homes, the potential 
recognition/nonrecognition advantage reaffirms the sense that computational 
technologies have been increasingly built for audiences of a particular race 
and/or class. But the success or failure of recognition when deploying one’s 
Xbox One-plus-Kinect device or home security system seems to pale dramati-
cally compared with the larger surveillance-plus-policy issues operating in 
this country. Although I do agree with Gannis that the pixel is far more neu-
tral than many other technological entities (and/or the related perspectives 
they introduce), it seems important to also recognize that the pixel is rarely 
deployed on its own. Meaning, the pixel is not immune to the intrusions (and 
potentially even atrocities) of identity politics and computationality, because 
it always functions as part of an ongoing human–technology assemblage. It 
possesses the potential of representational neutrality but in practice becomes 
ensconced in all manner of bias that lingers within human perspectives and 
procedures.
What this pixel focus gestures toward, then, across the quartet of con-
siderations indicated above as well as this subjectivity/neutrality dynamic, is 
that what resides in the undergirding of this pixel orientation contour remains 
fundamentally a matter of assemblages—with those assemblages themselves 
taking shape via an unevenly distributed reciprocity: with humans (in vary-
ing depths and degrees) setting upon the technological, and with technol-
ogies (of varying capacities and kinds) setting upon the human condition. 
Therefore, though the pixel is a medial and material element distinct from 
human physiology, it is increasingly (if not intrinsically) located at the base of 
contemporary understandings of human–technology dynamics. It operates as 
the smallest available unit of most post-digital rhetoric, reflects the techno-
infused human sensibilities by which individuals see and (make) sense of their 
worlds, and captures, in one and the same moment, the technicity and the 
rhetoricity of screen-based technologies.
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C H A P T E R  5
Human–Technology Making 
and a Willingness to Play
WHILE THE NE W AESTHE TIC may have emerged (conceptually, at least) with 
a small group of artists (the digital futurists) operating out of London, its 
manifestations pervade a much wider range of commercial and creative prac-
tices—finding “voice” through architectural structures, art installations, and 
techno-accidents alike. For the reality is that a far larger collective of work-
ing creatives have attuned their own design practices to the manner in which 
technologies set upon the human condition—with evidence of this disper-
sion manifest throughout the New Aesthetic archive. Consequently, New Aes-
theticism seems less a matter of an avant-garde imposing a new perspective 
on reality and more a matter of a collective attunement to a perspective that 
has been in play for some time (for one generation at least). That attunement 
involves an awareness of representation, an orientation toward screen-media 
aesthetics, and an attempt to call attention to the already present (and often 
hidden) techno-human practices, preferences, and protocols that produce par-
ticular artifacts.
Thus, while the New Aesthetic may seem, on the surface, somewhat 
removed from the field of rhetoric, what it does at its core is direct attention to 
matters critical to the knowing, doing, and making of rhetoric in the twenty-
first century. This includes demonstrations of pragmatic considerations like 
techno-aesthetic values and/or how different representational aspects move 
across different registers (digital and real alike) as well as matters more aligned 
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with epistemological and ontological implications. In other words, as Bridle 
suggests, the root of New Aestheticism is not a pixel aesthetic but rather a fun-
damental attempt to “explore, catalogue, categorise, connect and interrogate” 
the underlying systems and interactions between humans and networked tech-
nologies—exposing, as part of its plight, the socio-culturo-politico-rhetori-
cal implications of these interactions (“New Aesthetic” n. pag.). Key among 
New Aesthetic considerations, then, are the manner in which (and degree to 
which) technologies accommodate and respond to human habits, methods, 
procedures, schemas, and so on for being in the world, and, of equal magni-
tude, how humans accommodate and respond to technologies (and accom-
modate and respond to the habits that technologies form in relation to specific 
individual human engagements). Which is to suggest that at the base of New 
Aestheticism resides critical attunements to both technological and human 
agency—with the coming together of the two allowing for new kinds of vision, 
new means of expression, and new capacities for writing and representation 
otherwise not possible.
With this in mind, in this chapter I focus on both the pragmatic and the 
theoretical implications of New Aestheticism, with specific attention focused 
on how the New Aesthetic ecology illuminates relations (and rhetorical con-
siderations) central to human–technology making. I do so through three pri-
mary frames of inquiry, with the first dealing with the formations of new 
subjectivities, the second taking up with the development of new capacities 
for (rhetorical) action, and the third attuning to the underlying manner of 
engagement in human–technology making practices.
EMERGENT SUBJECTIVE CONFIGURATIONS
Joanne McNeil, editor of Rhizome and one of the four panelists Bridle put 
together for the 2012 South-by-Southwest (SXSW) New Aesthetic catalyst 
event, argued that while the New Aesthetic may offer new ways of seeing and 
perceiving the world, it does so not in relation to any particular machinic 
vision but rather as the result of collaborations between humans and tech-
nologies (“New Aesthetic” n. pag.). To demonstrate her point, McNeil draws 
an analogy with photographer Dziga Vertov, who famously claimed that his 
camera did the seeing for him and he for his camera. Through the analogy, 
what McNeil suggests is that the coming together of the two (human and 
technology / Vertov and camera) allows for some vision, some representation, 
some “thing” otherwise not possible. One can hear echoes of this dynamic 
from rhetoric scholar Victor J. Vitanza, who, in a remixed (and animated) 
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conversation with filmmaker and media studies scholar Anthony Collamati, 
says, “Now, you know, you’ve got a camera. You pick up the camera, you push 
the button. Who’s in control? For the most part, when I push the button, I 
find out the camera is in charge of me. I think I’m shooting something, and 
something else comes out. The camera has produced something else” (Hodg-
son et al., Act VIII, 1:24). Similarly, artist Eno Henze, whose work regularly 
translates the digital into the physical, says, “I approach a computer with a 
certain idea, [but] what I get back from the machine is something else” (in 
Openshaw 43). What Vertov, Vitanza, and Henze all point to is an awareness 
of the ways in which their technologies (camera or computer) set upon them 
and upon their acts of making. In so doing, they gesture toward a hybrid way 
of seeing/making, where the results, as Henze says, are of both “human and 
machine origin” (43). This reflects emergent representational practices, where 
locating the agency of the action (human vs. machine) is secondary to the 
mediation itself. For, to pull a thread from Bridle, no amount of machinic 
vision can exclude the human viewpoints necessary for making sense of those 
representational practices (and vice versa). The point here is not that technol-
ogies “see” and “capture” in ways that humans do not comprehend but rather, 
as Jamie Zigelbaum and Marcelo Coelho put it, that “humans and computers 
are combining agencies,” creating new artifacts, and dissolving the “dichotomy 
between human and machine, analog and digital” (n.  pag.). Therefore, part 
of what makes the New Aesthetic viable, visible, and valuable for rhetoric is 
that it attunes itself to the hybrid flows among these registers—situating its 
artifacts and arguments in a kind of third space (neither exclusively human 
nor exclusively technological). In more expansive terms: the New Aesthetic’s 
emergence out of a technological history and an overtechnologized present 
does not mean that it privileges the technological; rather, the New Aesthetic is 
concerned with how humans and technology come together to allow for new 
ways of making (and making sense of) mediations in the world.
One can hear echoes of these considerations in the scholarship of John 
Tinnell, whose “Post-Media Occupations for Writing Theory: From Aug-
mentation to Autopoiesis” argued that writing studies needed an altogether 
different orientation to the relationships between technologies and human 
subjectivities. He showed how writing studies has traditionally adapted itself 
to the language of technologies and digital mediation as tools, which, in turn, 
positions writers and rhetors as users—orienting the conversation, by default, 
toward matters of instrumentalism. But the instrumentalist perspective, as 
Tinnell argues, is “incapable of registering the dissolving border that (suppos-
edly) once separated humans and technology” (125), preventing one from tak-
ing up positions in which technologies and humans are parts (co-productive 
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parts) of the relational complexities that compose digital writing systems.1 
Instead, Tinnell advocates for an ecological orientation that situates the act of 
human–technology making as autopoietic—as being emergent not from any 
individual human subjectivity but through a distributed set of relations of 
human and nonhuman capacities of engagement. These capacities include the 
heuristic impulses and procedural proclivities of people (individual and col-
lective), computationality, and the mechanical—all setting upon one another 
in the very moments of making, which points not only to a new paradigm for 
human–computer considerations (each part of the complexity infecting the 
other in irreducible ways) but also to new kinds of writing and/or making that 
result from the merging (or hybridity) of agencies.
Of course, having an interest in the impact of technologies on writing 
clearly makes sense for those in rhetorical studies, but, interestingly enough, 
it was also very much a matter at the core of the New Aesthetic catalyst SXSW 
moment. For, in addition to McNeil raising concerns about the implications of 
the New Aesthetic leading to new considerations for writing (within a larger 
scope of digital making), the combining of human and technological agen-
cies as having major influence on the practices of writing (and reading) was 
also what was most exciting for author, creative director, and former com-
munication strategist Russell Davies. Specifically, Davies argued in his SXSW 
presentation that the New Aesthetic (and even the larger gestures of post-
digital art practices) necessitates a critical attentiveness to the non human and/
or technological third parties (machines, software, bots) that are routinely 
introduced into the reader/writer dynamic—as these assemblages point to a 
different kind of writerly subjectivity (or at least a shift in traditional under-
standings of such). To be fair, Davies himself would go on to focus on some-
thing more akin to human–robot writing collaborations, where programmed 
“bots” contributed snippets of bad prose to the writing mix (a kind of algo-
rithmic manifestation of William Burroughs), but I think the co-agential 
implications to which he calls attention can be seen more tangibly in the sub-
tleties of everyday writing/making engagements—via things like autocorrect 
or the variety of filters in video- and audio-editing platforms. That is, one 
need not go to cutting-edge creations like Davies did with Allison Parrish’s 
Autonomous Parapoetic Device (APxD mkII)—a self-contained, portable, 
poetry-generating device—or her more recently published Articulations (a 
book of computer-generated poetry) to highlight the importance (or future) 
of the human–technology writing collaboration, where a given technology is 
as prominent in the making/shaping of a rhetorical mediation as the human 
 1. For Tinnell, digital writing systems are the confluence of human and nonhuman mate-
rialities and mediations that make up the act of writing in and through digital technologies.
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rhetor. Of course, the more mundane, accessible engagements of daily writ-
ing/making activities may not possess the same kind of curb appeal as the 
APxD mkII or the “bad prose machine” described by Davies (a practice rou-
tinely displayed by any number of Twitter bots); they nonetheless point to this 
increasingly collaborative process (and do so in a way that helps to emphasize 
its ubiquity in post-digital culture).
At the core of all these considerations, then, is not simply an attunement 
to the rhetorical implications of something like autocorrect, but rather a fun-
damental shift in how one approaches the human–technology relationship. 
Meaning, what is at stake is, in many ways, a matter of prepositional concern: 
for people write not on computers but rather with computers—with compu-
tational technologies shaping the writing/making process as a kind of col-
laborative, co-agential entity, and doing so by taking on more and more of 
the labor burden of the actual writing/making practices (alphabetic, visual, 
interactive, etc.). Therefore, writers and working creatives alike have to learn 
to adjust to these shifts in labor and to how technologies set upon them dur-
ing the making process, developing new approaches for accommodating and 
responding to the contributions of the software-plus-hardware affordances 
and constraints of a technological co-agency.
Casey Boyle also picks up with this turn to with and to the ways in which 
rhetors learn to accommodate and respond to technology in his “Writing and 
Rhetoric and/as Posthuman Practice.” There Boyle uses the 2011 Framework 
for Success in Postsecondary Writing report2 as exigency for a posthumanist 
reorientation to rhetoric. The Framework encourages educators to focus on 
cultivating habits of mind that foster intellectual and practical ways of learn-
ing, which Boyle claims invites rhetoricians to move on from traditional hab-
its of practice and/or orientations to subjectivity and instead better connect 
“rhetoric to emerging appreciations for materiality and mediality” (533). Boyle 
furthers this position by following the work of composition scholar Laura R. 
Micciche, situating rhetorical practices as being intimately “codependent with 
things” (533)—a relational orientation that echoes Tinnell’s position, where 
any subjectivity to emerge necessarily does so through the relations between 
humans and technologies that are part of any given rhetorical complexity, not 
in spite of them.
To demonstrate his point, Boyle argues that by embracing the preposi-
tional orientation of with (rather than Lanham’s dichotomy of at/through, or 
even Collin G. Brooke’s from3), one can situate writing (and even the rhetor) as 
 2. The Council of Writing Program Administrators, National Council of Teachers of Eng-
lish, and the National Writing Project developed this report.
 3. In Lingua Fracta: Toward a Rhetoric of New Media, Brooke argues that Lanham’s at/
through distinction implies an all-important third prepositional orientation: from, which adds 
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something inherently more posthuman—as a practice that “unfolds . . . as an 
ongoing series of mediated encounters” (534). The value of this, in Boyle’s per-
spective, is that each encounter, each mediated iteration, each practice (and 
practical engagement) with a technological or nonhuman other establishes 
and re-establishes human–nonhuman relations (and the capacities one has to 
act within the ecologies in which those entities participate). For Boyle, writ-
ing with new media, networked expression, computationally infused rhetori-
cal practices, and the like necessarily transform an individual’s habits of mind 
(as well as the individual herself) and foreground the very interconnectedness 
between human and nonhuman entities—with any subjectivity that may take 
form doing so from a constellation of relations. What Boyle’s argument points 
toward (and what gets demonstrated through the New Aesthetic) is the man-
ner in which human–technology assemblages activate (through practice) new 
relations within the ecologies in which they reside.
At a pragmatic level, this points to technologies as being far more than 
inert objects or neutral tools to be mastered in any writing/making undertak-
ing; rather, as Tinnell and Boyle both suggest, and as implicated in the New 
Aesthetic, technologies should be situated as increasingly collaborative entities 
(with varying degrees of agency) that set upon people as much as people set 
upon them. And in the age of smart technologies, where technologies them-
selves have the power to learn and/or adapt to human collaborators as well as 
situations, this reciprocity of “setting upon” includes not only the cultivation 
of human habits of mind or practice but also considerations of technologies 
cultivating their own habits in relation to specific individual partners—which, 
in so doing, activate yet other relational configurations in the given ecologies 
of practice.
As a kind of quick example, one might look at the functions of most 
word-processing programs, which have a tremendous impact on how people 
produce traditional, alphabetic text. Microsoft Word, to target one specific 
example, does not just present a set of blank pages waiting to be filled with 
text.4 Rather, Word is a collaborative writing partner, one that increasingly 
assists with grammar and spelling issues—not only providing autocorrection 
features (e.g., transforming “teh” into “the” as one types) but also developing 
habits of practice in relation to its human interlocutor (from autofill func-
tions to adapting to linguistic and/or stylistic preferences). But more than that, 
Word makes default choices at the very outset about format and layout, and 
position or perspective to the set of considerations. That is, to look at or through is always an 
act done from a particular perspective and/or subject position.
 4. In fact, the “page” itself may be a bad metaphor, as (a) the screen is not the page, no 
matter how mimetic it may appear; and (b) the page limitation already orients working cre-
atives to Word in particularly reductive ways.
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includes autoformatting features that often have to be hacked to create nonde-
fault representations. Additionally, with the litany of templates available, Word 
also operates heuristically, co-shaping content through aesthetic and infor-
mational architectural choices. While this kind of techno-collaborator may 
not be the same as a human partner in the way that one traditionally thinks 
of collaboration, the program itself nonetheless influences the look, feel, and 
development of what gets created. Further, writing an essay with Google Docs 
or Scrivener in lieu of Microsoft Word may offer an uncanny familiarity, but 
each program will feel (and produce something) different. This is not simply 
because the default fonts and formats are different but because as collabora-
tors they possess different affordances and constraints, and accommodate and 
respond to human collaborators in different ways. It is correlative to some-
thing like co-writing with a psychologist versus an architect; they have differ-
ent expertise and experiences, different preferences, ideologies, and purposes, 
and so the collaborative process and idea development is simply different.
Of course, writing has always been grounded in this kind of relational 
ecology—as a collaborative act between humans and technologies, with paper 
quality, ink type, writing surface, and the like influencing and shaping for 
centuries the kinds of writing that people do. For example, holding a cal-
ligraphy pen or a writing quill both invokes a particular kind of feeling and 
invites one to write in particular ways (and to develop techniques of writing 
in relation to those material affordances). But the degree of agency associ-
ated with the materiality of writing changes dramatically when it includes the 
software-plus-hardware combination central to writing with computers and 
any/all digital media production, for “the machine” and its expanded media 
ecologies do something notably different from the pen.
To explore this condition further, I want to turn focus to the smartphone 
photography application Hipstamatic, which not only will pull this conver-
sation back toward matters of subjectivity but which also explicitly demon-
strates the collaborative dynamic under consideration here: where the coming 
together of the technological and the human produces something otherwise 
not possible and, in so doing, invites the cultivation of different habits of prac-
tice (for both).
Hipstamatic and Post-Digital Subjectivity
Photo apps like Hipstamatic are quite prolific for smartphone and tablet own-
ers. They not only allow for taking pictures that directly connect to social 
media networks but have added levels of sophistication to the camera-phone 
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assemblage by pairing the mechanical, camera eye with digital, algorithmic 
filters. These filters often work to mimic standard camera functions: on the 
production end, the algorithms allow users to adjust focus, alter exposure, 
manipulate shutter speed, and so forth; on the postproduction end, they offer 
a wide range of image effects, from creating black-and-white photos, sepia 
images, and pictures with vignettes, to altering saturation levels, augmenting 
hues and color tones, and adjusting contrast effects. Hipstamatic’s filters even 
offer nonstandard camera manipulations through effects like “x-ray” or “infra-
red,” among others. But what makes Hipstamatic different is that it essentially 
combines these activities into one productive moment. Hipstamatic uses algo-
rithms to mimic the visual production (and aesthetics) of several plastic/toy 
cameras of the 1980s. Users select different lenses, film, and flashes, and then 
push a “yellow button” (a group of pixels on the screen of the phone) to cap-
ture a picture. The app then renders a square photograph (an image with a 1:1 
aspect ratio as opposed to the 4:3 ratio of standard phone cameras), to which 
it applies a number of algorithmic filters to mimic the aesthetics that correlate 
with the particular lens, film, and flash choices. What gets produced through 
the Hipstamatic app is something different from what the human eye sees on 
the precapture screen and different from what the camera eye captures. It is 
the result of an entangled activity between mechanical camera device, soft-
ware application, and human.
What makes Hipstamatic of particular interest here, as opposed to any 
number of other human–technology assemblages (including the multitude of 
other smartphone photography applications), is a trio of considerations, really. 
First, Hipstamatic’s moment, like that of the New Aesthetic, has essentially 
come and gone—providing a kind of critical distance that allows one to bet-
ter understand the app as a relatively stable part of a techno-cultural history. 
Along these lines, it seems relevant to know that the app launched in 2009, 
won Apple’s first App of the Year award, in 2010, and, though it still oper-
ates successfully today, reached its peak popularity during the period 2011–12. 
Which suggests that although the New Aesthetic and Hipstamatic were not 
explicitly connected, they operated in the same media-saturated waters.
Second, Hipstamatic resides precisely in the tensions of the digital/real 
divide, with one of its co-founders, Ryan Dorshorst, claiming it to be “the 
app you use when you want your photos to feel less digital and more real” 
(in Downs, n. pag.). With mobile devices becoming more sophisticated every 
day and offering increasing levels of fidelity, Hipstamatic thrived by offering 
an aesthetic of the materialities of yore: as co-founder Lucas Buick suggested, 
Hipstamatic is “Kodak for the digital era” (in Downs, n. pag.). Further, as Dor-
shorst suggests, what made Hipstamatic a success and what continues to sus-
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tain it today is its focus on the experience of photography—“of taking a photo 
and having it turn out even more beautiful than your memory of the moment” 
(in Downs, n.  pag.). In short, Hipstamatic has always been more about the 
process of photography than about any algorithmic imperative. However, the 
result of this orientation meant that it was never well suited to be adapted to 
social media culture. But while it may have been left behind by more social-
media-friendly photography apps, Hipstamatic’s representational techniques 
did inspire a plethora of practices in many other apps, including more than a 
few elements in the now-behemoth, Instagram. In a historical sense, then, it 
functions as a kind of precursor to the more widespread, social media, pho-
tography apps today.
Third, in November 2010, a few months before Bridle would make the 
New Aesthetic recognizably a thing, four Hipstamatic images by photogra-
pher Damon Winter graced the front page of the New York Times.5 Winter 
had gone to Afghanistan that year to capture images of the First Battalion, 
87th Infantry of the 10th Mountain Division. He took all the normal bells 
and whistles needed for cutting-edge photojournalism—he was, after all, a 
photographer for the New York Times. But he also used Hipstamatic on his 
iPhone to capture a number of stills, and those pictures captured something 
unique—scenes of war as seen through a human–technology collaboration 
in which the technology had equal agency in the rendering. In one moment, 
the Winter–Hipstamatic assemblage had both captured and crafted reality. 
Thus, while considerations one and two above are of value in establishing the 
importance of Hipstamatic to this conversation, they pale in comparison to 
this third element, to Winter’s work with the app.
The reason for this distinction is that one of Winter’s Hipstamatic images 
went on to be awarded third place in the 2011 Pictures of the Year Interna-
tional. This put the photo purists in an uproar. The problem was not the subject 
of the photo but rather the technology used to create it. What had occurred, 
as Collamati argued in his dissertation, Camera Creatures: Rhetorics of Light 
and Emerging Media, is that the Hipstamatic photos “unsettle[d] the cam-
era’s journalist credentials as a fact-based observer” (99). It replaced the ideol-
ogy of “mechanical objectivity”—an “ideology that maintains that machines, 
when unimpeded, yield direct evidence of the material world” (100)—with 
an emerging “machine subjectivity,” which forces a recognition of the collab-
 5. These images were part of a series by Winter called A Grunt’s Life, with selec-
tions from that series being featured, initially, in James Dao’s “Firefights, Jokes, Sweat, and 
Tedium” article. However, a more targeted engagement can be found in James Estrin’s “Find-
ing the Right Tool to Tell a War Story” article (https://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/
finding-the-right-tool-to-tell-a-war-story/?ref=asia).
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orative nature of the human–technology relationship. But Collamati’s idea of 
machine subjectivity emphasizes the agency of the camera, remaining inex-
plicably tied to the mechanical, to the nonhuman. This is not to suggest that 
the camera does not have a degree of agency but rather that the focus should 
be on the with—the particular set of relations by which the mechanical equip-
ment (iPhone and camera), digital software (algorithmic processes and cul-
ture), and human being (Winter) play with one another in the act of making. 
It is not just that Winter took the photo or that the phone’s camera produced 
the image or that the software rendered/recolored the mechanical eye anew, 
but that any subjectivity to emerge in that situation results explicitly from the 
relations among the assemblage.
What is taking shape in this ecology of practice, then, is an increased 
attentiveness to the fact that the mechanism (camera) and software (Hipsta-
matic) alone could not produce what their partnering with each other and 
with Winter allowed. And the human component is vital, for it was not just 
anyone taking those pictures and playing with Hipstamatic. Winter is a trained 
professional, possessing expert knowledge: understanding things like shading 
and contrast, angles and framing, not to mention the likely aesthetic outputs 
of the simulated lenses, film types, and toy cameras. He is, in short, an expert 
in writing/making with light (for photography is an art of capturing and/or 
manipulating different exposures of light). Therefore, what he produces with 
his engagement is not just happenstance, nor just the result of playful clicking 
and toggling through effects/option; rather, it is an informed, crafted engage-
ment. And this is crucial in understanding the rhetorical capacities available 
in any post-digital making: for producing a text, video, image, and the like 
today involves both the affordances and constraints of particular technologies 
and, as with Winter, the affordances and constraints of the specific human 
collaborator(s) involved. As such, any subjectivity to emerge (posthuman or 
otherwise), while not fully accountable in this example to Winter alone, is in 
no way absent of Winter and/or his capacities through the assemblage.
What was produced in Winter’s images, then, was not an objective cap-
ture of the world as it was (“mechanical objectivity”) but a subjective pro-
duction of the world as it was wanting to be envisioned by the confluence of 
human, machine, and software. And what emerged in the images was only 
possible through the function of the device plus the artistic/mechanical fil-
ters of Hipstamatic plus the photographer’s knowledge and ability—in other 
words, through what might be situated as a post-digital subjectivity. While 
the images may not be New Aesthetic proper, as they predate the launch of 
Bridle’s Tumblr archive, the reaction to the images more than aligns them with 
New Aestheticism. That is, Winter’s images revealed an increasing sense of 
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technology as an agential mediator, ushering in an awareness of the mediating 
act and its intrinsic human–technology partnership.
Of course, this sense of individualism tied to Winter may seem too easy. 
For what Winter creates with something like Hipstamatic is bound to be dif-
ferent from what the average Jasmine or Jalen produces. But in the formation 
of any post-digital subjectivity—the subjectivity that emerges from the con-
fluence of mechanical equipment plus digital software (algorithmic processes 
and culture) plus human being—one cannot elide the human dimension any 
more than one should privilege the technological at the expense of the human, 
as humans are, to spin a phrase from Marshall McLuhan, the life source of 
established and emerging mediating technologies. Now, I recognize that any 
movement toward the recovery of the human triggers Cartesian antibodies 
and imbalances the scale of what is often (mistakenly) situated as a zero-sum 
game with humans and technologies (i.e., focusing more on one comes at 
the expense of the other), but this work is operating in a different ecology, 
drawing attention not to humans and technologies as isolated dimensions but 
rather to the very flows by which they set upon one another, accommodate 
and respond to one another, and come together to produce new platforms, 
perspectives, and preferences for making sense of the world.
Further, I would argue that what the photo purists were most upset about 
with Winter’s Hipstamatic images was not the technology itself—for photog-
raphy as a practice does not exist without technological equipment. Rather, 
most disconcerting was the fact that the digital-camera-plus-application had 
automated not just mechanical reproduction but the techniques (and techné) 
of the master class. Saturation values, contrast, exposure, cropping, focus. All 
done inside the box. All before the digital/mechanical blink. In short, what 
Hipstamatic had done (like most contemporary photo apps currently do, 
with Prisma being a prime example) was remediate the techniques and artis-
tic capacities of the master class—reducing sophisticated techné to filters and 
effects subject to the production whims of anyone who can tap, toggle, swipe, 
and send.
Now, the point in all of this for rhetoric is not to champion any particular 
humanistic or computational agency but to draw attention to flows among the 
assemblages and the corresponding shifts in labor (and the rhetorical dimen-
sions to which they grant access). For what is emerging in the post-digital 
moment (as demonstrated through the New Aesthetic) is that the labor-inten-
sive efforts of any master artisan or technological evolution are, in their very 
moment of coming-to-be, subject to the impulses of algorithmization; and, in 
turn, made available to the play space of today’s click-and-pick or drag-and-
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drop post-digital rhetoricians. Moreover, everyday people have a correspond-
ing sense of how easy it is to manipulate these filters in order to apply the 
stylistic qualities of the master artisans and to generate, in turn, multiple itera-
tions of the same artifact featuring distinct aesthetic markers. Spending even 
two minutes with a photo-plus-social-network app like Prisma or Instagram 
allows most users the opportunity to toggle through all the filters for a single 
image creation. Which is to suggest that if technologies like these make it pos-
sible for any Jeff or Janice to create artistically savvy photographs using pro-
fessional-level techniques, then the artist can be (perhaps has been) replaced 
by the novice, and the trained gaze and technical abilities of the master class 
are giving way to the frivolous glance and (playful) finger tapping of the noob.
What this points to, then, is not only the emergence of what I see as a 
post-digital subjectivity (with human and technological and material agen-
cies all setting upon one another in a moment of creation) but also, as Boyle 
suggested, the cultivation of different habits of practice, distributed across dif-
ferent rhetorical abilities and/or levels of technological access/acumen. The 
challenge, however, is in figuring out the actual habits being formed and/or 
engagements being undertaken when the novice taps through seven filters and 
adjusts the saturation values four times before deciding on the right fit or look 
or appeal of an image artifact or when she plays with distortion and reverb 
filters in sound editing to produce the “right” sound or audial quality. And, 
just as importantly, what those practices or habits look like when being done 
by someone like Winter. Or, to go back to Steph Ceraso’s work, when done by 
someone like Glennie. Do the expert and novice engagements have affinities 
that not only are reflected in the New Aesthetic but that might be distilled into 
techno-rhetorical frameworks?
For his part, Boyle locates these pragmatic considerations under the con-
cept of serial practice, where one forms habits of practice not through the 
long-standing (and long-championed) practice of reflection (making some-
thing and then reflecting, often in writing, back upon that process) but rather 
through serial medial perceptions. Consequently, his serial practice indicates 
something more akin to the formation of styles of engagement (tied to spe-
cific medial perceptions), with each practice (whether a specific technical 
undertaking, like Winter’s, or an abstract value of engagement) activating the 
relations in a given ecology in new ways, offering new configurations, and 
contributing (in cumulative fashion) to the adopting of (or adapting to) a set 
of behaviors and orientations to different techno-rhetorical situations. On the 
one hand, then, Boyle’s serial practice has the ability “to produce greater capac-
ities within any given ecology” (547), as each iteration introduces difference by 
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adding another version of engagement, experience, or expression, which, in 
turn, reconfigures the intensities and connections among ecological relations. 
On the other hand, serial practice allows individuals to develop, in embodied 
capacities, certain tendencies and techniques in relation to a given ecology. 
But while Boyle uses these abstracted considerations to signal an ethic of post-
human practice—one in which a rhetor might “compose new capacities for 
conducting . . . [herself] within expanded media ecologies” (549)—what feels 
wanting is something of a description of the ways in which people—expert to 
novice—actually work with technologies to produce post-digital artifacts. To 
this end, while Boyle’s serial practice points the conversation in the right direc-
tion—attuning a rhetorical readership, much in the way the New Aesthetic 
ecology does a more general public, to how both humans and technologies 
develop habits of practice in relation to one another—I think there is still yet 
a dimension or two to be articulated.
One of these dimensions (picked up in the next section) includes the spe-
cific ways in which technologies and humans come together to make that 
which is otherwise not possible—focusing on the different magnitudes by 
which new configurations can be introduced, along with the particular rela-
tions that particular humans foster in particular ecologies. The particularity 
of the “comings together” is critical, as there are many rhetorical practices 
that take place in post-digital culture in ways regularly removed from human 
access and/or the human sensorium alone. Additionally, there are many rela-
tional considerations that particular humans bring to the assemblage—with 
the human particularity central to the rhetorical capacity of the assemblage as 
well. Therefore, the different assemblages open up access in particular ways: 
from breathing new life into established techné to making visible that which 
is otherwise non-sensible.
The second of these other dimensions deals with the underlying orienta-
tion that governs how everyday rhetors interact (in terms of making) with 
co-agential mediating technologies. To this end, in the final section of this 
chapter I focus on a condition of play (and a willingness to play) as the basis 
for the cultivation of ludic habits of practice in contemporary human–tech-
nology assemblages.
ENHANCEMENT OF POST-DIGITAL CAPACITIES
Human relations to mediating technologies run a bit of the conceptual gamut. 
There are, to put it mildly, a wide range of ways in which one relates to a given 
technology. But what I am concerned with in this section are the particular 
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ways in which specific technologies and humans come together to grant access 
to rhetorical capacities of expression and representation otherwise removed 
from the human sensorium alone. On one end of the spectrum resides some-
thing of a traditional perspective: technologies-as-prostheses—which I sit-
uate here not as an extension of a human subjectivity but rather as a form 
of human–technology symbiosis. For even if a technology is augmenting a 
bodily limitation, it is not making a human subject whole but rather introduc-
ing different potential relations among the ecologies in which both already 
participate. To this end, I will pick up with graphic designer and artist Hal 
Lasko as a representative figure, for his artworks (which possess a rich pixel 
aesthetic) result from this conditional sense of human–technology symbiosis.
On the other end of this spectrum are relational ecologies that allow 
humans to sense / make sense of all manner of entities otherwise invisible to 
the human sensorium. In a mechanical sense, the microscope stands as one 
example, which when partnered with individuals introduces altogether new 
configurations among the rhetorical ecologies in which both participate by 
making visible to human sensibilities a dimension of everyday reality that is 
otherwise impossible to know/access. But beyond the magnification mech-
anisms of the microscope, there are numerous considerations and configu-
rations in (and of) the technological realm that reside beyond the sensible 
limits of the human condition. From radio waves to Wi-Fi signals to algo-
rithmic processes operating at the speed of light, every day people are satu-
rated by information-rich, quasi-ethereal signals and intensities that are only 
discernible (and only decipherable) with corresponding (or enabled) techno-
logical devices. Once partnered with an enabled device, however, people are 
able to determine presence/absence conditions of these etherealities and, in 
some cases, render them visible, tangible, malleable—in other words, draw 
attention to their conditional presence and representational possibilities in 
exacting ways. To this end, design scholar Luis Hernan will serve as the pri-
mary figure, for his work demonstrates both how one can take stock of that 
which is beyond the human sensorium alone and how doing so introduces 
altogether different configurations to the rhetorical ecologies by which and 
through which one understands (and represents) the world.
Symbiotic Capacities
In the technology-as-prosthesis orientation, even in its most positive of ren-
ditions, there is a fundamental kind of tension, if not altogether resistance, 
that needs to be acknowledged. This tension, as Tinnell argued in his essay, 
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stems from prosthetic orientations situating technologies as extensions of 
some human condition or capacity. These perspectives traditionally end up 
privileging the human in specific ways or they assume the human (and/or 
any human subjectivity) to be a relatively stable category. But if posthuman-
ism and/or new materialism has taught us anything, it is that the categories 
of human and technology are anything but stable. This is why Tinnell argues 
for something more emergent—for an autopoietic quality in which subjectiv-
ity takes form in relation to and through mediation. Or why Boyle calls for 
an altogether posthuman reorientation, where technologies are situated not as 
prosthetic attachments to an individual human capacity but rather, along with 
the human, as a component among a complexity in which each assemblage, 
practice, or iteration reconfigures the relations within and among ecologies.
Of course, part of what amplifies the troublesome qualities of these pros-
thetic/extension orientations is that they reside at the foundations of media 
studies—stemming from McLuhan’s situating of all media as “extensions of 
man.” Further, they proliferate what Tinnell refers to as the various forma-
tions of “augmentation-oriented rhetorics,” which present technologies as aug-
menting human capabilities and, in so doing, serve to once again rhetorically 
“reaffirm the centrality of the .  .  . writing subject” (123). And while there is 
something of a wanting posthumanist rejection to these (and related) orienta-
tions to human–technology assemblages, the New Aesthetic (as part of a post-
digital conditionality) seems to be pointing toward something else. For even 
in these necessary “turnings-away” from any sense of a stable human subjec-
tivity, one cannot ignore the fact that in some assemblages technologies and 
humans do in fact function in prosthetic ways. The reality is that the condi-
tion of prosthesis itself is not the problem, but rather the ways in which it has 
been cast (rhetorically, among others) by previous relational ecologies. To this 
end, I turn to Lasko here because his work demonstrates a set of relations in 
which the prosthetic orientation is not only present but central to what might 
be understood as a human–technology symbiosis—highlighting a relational 
ecology in which any sense of subjectivity is tied to prosthetic symbiosis and 
yet taking form, as Tinnell would say, via a conditional autopoiesis.
Lasko, the representative figure of this section, spent his entire post–World 
War II working life as a graphic designer and dabbling artist. He had a fairly 
expansive career in which he produced a number of artifacts and designs for a 
multitude of corporations, with his work being used by major companies like 
Goodyear or the Cleveland Browns; he even finished his career as a typog-
rapher for American Greetings. But beyond his graphic design work, Lasko 
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also produced a number of noncommercial artworks that displayed a wide 
array of artistic techniques, from drip paintings to abstract designs. Although 
he continued to make creative pieces into his late nineties, his work never 
really garnered much commercial or noncommercial success. Given that lack 
of prominence, it may seem odd to include Lasko in this work (or any aca-
demic work on the aesthetic), as he does not carry the usual weight associated 
with an art (or aesthetic) figure. But what makes him of interest here is his 
specific relationship with the artistic medium (a kind of prosthetic symbiosis) 
and the style of artistic representation (pixelism-as-pointillism) featured in 
his final works.
With this in mind, it is important to know that Lasko suffered from wet 
macular degeneration. This condition creates an increasing blurriness (if not 
blind spot) in the center of a person’s vision, which can be completely debili-
tating for a practicing visual artist. But once his grandchildren introduced him 
to MS Paint, Lasko was once again able to create rich, visual works (see spe-
cifically his work Looking Up6). The partnership between Lasko and MS Paint 
was at least partially prosthetic—with the “zoom” affordances (i.e., manipu-
lation of scale) and square-by-square representation of MS Paint reanimat-
ing Lasko’s capacities of expression. But what matters here are not simply the 
technological affordances of MS Paint, nor the ways in which it (as part of the 
larger computational assemblage) compensated for Lasko’s differently abled 
sense of vision. Rather, much like in the Winter example above, what matters 
is that what was produced was emergent from the amalgamation of Lasko (his 
abilities/experiences), algorithmic processes (software), and computational 
materialities (hardware)—a post-digital subjectivity whose stability, if neces-
sary, results from the specific points of intersection, influence, and intensities 
among these multiple registers and their relations.
While Lasko’s Looking Up was created using MS Paint—and the program’s 
square-pixel style is prominent in the work—the artifact itself is not intention-
ally part of pixel art, nor even the arena of pixel aesthetics; rather, it is Lasko 
the artist, the human element of the assemblage, who reimagined pixels as 
the dots in the art technique of pointillism. The particular style of representa-
tion to emerge, of course, was always available in the aesthetic possibilities of 
pixel designs, but its manifestation in this context was not simply the result 
of the basic mediated unit of MS Paint—the square pixel (e.g., aliased visual 
 6. While one can find a series of Lasko’s art pieces at hallasko.com, Looking Up (https://
www.hallasko.com/products/looking-up) offers a forest-scene representation that is most 
demonstrative of the technique and engagement central to Lasko’s creations.
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data, presented on grid)—but was the result of Lasko’s specific artistic training 
and background coming into contact with the affordances and constraints of 
MS Paint. On the one hand, MS Paint operates as prosthesis; on the other, it 
operates as co-producer of these images. But while MS Paint certainly helps 
facilitate the emergence of this artisanesque expressivity, the style/practice 
itself of pixelism-as-pointillism is as much ensconced in Lasko’s individual 
engagement with the program (human element) as it is owing to any natu-
ral affordances of the program itself (technological element). For the reality 
is that the vast majority of people in today’s digitally saturated mediascapes 
would find the pixelism of MS Paint to leave much to be desired, aesthetically 
speaking at least. But Lasko saw and embraced the pixel as something else, 
with its expressive value corresponding not to a technological nostalgia but 
rather to its parallelism with an established representational technique. In this 
assemblage, then, part of what gets reconfigured among the relations in and 
around the participating ecologies is the pixel itself.
What Lasko’s work does is not just create attentiveness to a kind of poin-
tillism-cum-pixelism aesthetic style; it also functions as relay (as much New 
Aesthetic art does) to the particular ways in which human–technology assem-
blages enable different relations that allow for different capacities for action. 
The affordances of the technological apparatus may have allowed Lasko to 
once again see (and manipulate) the artist’s “canvas,” even if only at the periph-
ery of his vision, but it did not simply re-enable a previous subjectivity. Rather, 
in addition to its prosthetic qualities, MS Paint served as collaborative part-
ner, helping reconfigure the relations among the ecologies in which Lasko 
participated, allowing him to work, pixel by pixel, to inhabit a new space of 
representational possibilities.
Working pixel by pixel is, of course, not specific to MS Paint, nor is Lasko’s 
approach the singular result of an artistic imperative (Lasko-the-artist want-
ing to control the finer details of the representation). Rather, in this case, the 
pixel-by-pixel operations are an emergent possibility among the assemblage—
the result of a symbiotic dynamic. What takes form is not so much artwork 
that bears an intentional computational aesthetic but rather the creation of 
an object whose existence designates the folding together of human–technol-
ogy co-agencies: in other words, Looking Up reflects the condition in which 
humans (e.g., Lasko) and technologies (e.g., MS Paint) inform and influ-
ence the possibilities of one another in the act of making—coming together 
to allow for an expression/representation otherwise not possible and, in so 
doing, demonstratively point to the reconfigured intensities among the rela-
tional ecologies in which both participate.
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The Otherwise Indiscernible
On the other end of the spectrum resides the work of Luis Hernan, particu-
larly his Digital Ethereal project, which offers visual representations of Wi-Fi 
(Plate I). Although Hernan’s project may seem quite removed from Lasko’s 
MS Paint pixelism, they remain connected in that both offer visualizations 
through computational means that are simply not possible outside of their 
particular human–technology collaborations.
As a doctoral researcher at ArchaID, Newcastle University, Hernan devel-
oped a project of research through design, with the intent of offering a design 
discourse on digital technologies. The project began with his view that much 
in the digital realm, particularly less-tangible elements like a Wi-Fi signal, 
shares affinities with the figures of the ghost or spectre—each having, as Her-
nan puts it, this “untypical substance [that] allows them to be an invisible 
presence” (n.  pag.). Yet, unlike the ghost or spectre, through various forms 
of substantiation, particularly through the technological sensoria that people 
carry with them, the digital ethereal routinely “become[s] temporarily avail-
able to [human] perception” (n. pag.). But Hernan wanted to further translate 
this ethereality into a more tangible modality (e.g., visualization)—offering 
something beyond its mere acknowledgments of presence versus absence.
His project begins, then, with an understanding of digital signals as being 
part of Hertzian space, a concept that emerges in relation to the nineteenth-
century German physicist Heinrich Hertz. Hertz proved that electromagnetic 
waves existed and that everything that requires electricity emits these waves, 
which includes everything from radio and television signals to visible light. 
At the end of the twentieth century, design theorist Anthony Dunne argued 
in Hertzian Tales: Electronic Products, Aesthetic Experience, and Critical Design 
that understanding space as Hertzian space—as an electro-climate equally 
inhabited by humans and machines alike—would necessitate an increasing 
interest in the intersections of electromagnetic waves and human experience 
(how humans encounter/undergo mediated technologies). Moreover, operat-
ing with an awareness of Hertzian space would, in Dunne’s view, become cen-
tral for future design practices: that is, the future of design work would involve 
a critical attunement to electromagnetic devices and their cultural interac-
tions. Designers would necessarily need to operate with a critical understand-
ing of technologies, which includes an awareness of how practices, ideologies, 
and so on come to be encoded in technological objects as well as, more gen-
erally, an attentiveness to how electromagnetic waves, light values, digital 
impulses, and the like come to bear on human experience.
130 •  C H A P T E R 5 
Hernan picks up with Dunne’s orientation and advocates for a creative 
(rather than critical) approach that produces new artifacts “indexed to hertz-
ian space” and that captures “the cultural and social complexity imbued in the 
use of such [ethereal] technologies” (n. pag.). To do this, Hernan modeled his 
work on Timo Arnall, Jørn Knutsen, and Einar Sneve Martinussen’s method7 
of using “long-exposure photography and RSSI sensors to visualize and spa-
tialise WiFi networks” (Hernan n. pag.). He then built an Android app version 
of a Kirlian Device (KD Mobile), which gathers information from the Wi-Fi 
manager of the phone or tablet and turns the Wi-Fi signals into colors (based 
on strength of signal: reds for high intensity, blues for low intensity). What 
this allows, in Hernan’s view, is a mapping of the wireless spectre that inhabits 
Hertzian space. On the one hand, Hernan’s work acknowledges the material 
qualities of even the most ethereal of digital culture—Wi-Fi signals, like all 
other electronic entities, give off electromagnetic waves. On the other hand, 
his work begins from a position that recognizes that much in the digital world 
is simply un-sensible to the human sensorium alone. And to make those invis-
ible presences visible (and visual) requires a particular kind of human–tech-
nology assemblage. The smartphone detects a Wi-Fi signal, which humans 
then recognize as present/not-present through onscreen icons. But Hernan 
takes this one step further and translates the ethereality into its spatial quali-
ties. He uses technological processes, a techno-sensorium, and a color-trans-
lation algorithm to turn Wi-Fi into a photographic object.
While Lasko’s work demonstrates how individual technologies enhance 
human capacity for action by enabling new modes and means of practical 
engagement, Hernan’s work offers an enhancement of a different magnitude. 
What matters here is not simply that Hernan translates an invisible presence, 
nor that he color-captures something of Hertzian space, but rather that he 
plays with technologies (and produces technologies) that allow one to take up 
with (and make with) materialities that reside beyond the human sensorium 
alone—rendering the pseudo-etherealities of post-digital culture available to 
rhetorical practices and interpretations.
In truth, as I suggested above, there are many rhetorical practices that take 
place in post-digital culture in ways regularly removed from human (senso-
rial) access. This includes, of course, not only the experience of something 
like Wi-Fi but also the various levels of code and engagement intentionally 
hidden by corporate (and/or government) interests; and, more and more, the 
layers of digital representation and augmentation that reside among and on 
 7. See Arnall, Knutsen, and Martinussen’s Touch Research Project, particularly Light 
Painting WiFi.
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top of nondigital materialities (from QR codes on store windows to Aurasma’s 
augmented reality triggers in print books) as well as the technological signals 
and streams that saturate bodily existence. In this regard, Hernan is something 
of a metonymic figure, representing a creative orientation to thinking with 
and making in response to a digital realm that includes human bodies as data 
generators, as electromagnetic feeds and fields to be captured and cataloged 
by machines and devices designed toward different ends. While Hernan, like 
the other figures in this chapter, may not be part of the New Aesthetic proper 
(i.e., not featured in Bridle’s tumblr), his use of new techno-materialities to 
find ways to make machinic and algorithmic sensoriums available to human 
capacities for action and understanding situates his work firmly within the 
purview of New Aestheticism and aligns it with the impulses of rhetoric. For 
Hernan demonstrates the necessity of adopting alternative perspectives in a 
post-digital realm (attuning to something like a Hertzian view of the world) 
as a way of taking stock of a wider array of forces and figures that set upon 
the human condition. While his coloration of Wi-Fi spectres are themselves 
beautiful creations, they more importantly introduce new relations among dif-
ferent ecologies—from reshaping how individuals understand space in post-
digital culture (as inherently Hertzian) to the necessity of finding ways to 
access (and/or visualize) that which remains hidden from the capacities of 
everyday human practices.
WILLINGNESS TO PLAY
While Hernan, Lasko, and Winter serve as interesting figures for unpacking 
certain aspects of the human–technology assemblage, because they are expert 
practitioners their accomplishments seemingly elide a fundamental shift in 
how a more general post-digital public engages with new mediating technolo-
gies. That is, at this point in human history there has never been a greater sup-
ply of new mediating technologies—and what makes these “new” is not just 
their date of emergence but also their date of exposure, as various cultures and 
subcultures encounter different mediating technologies at different moments 
and in different orders. There is something of a general ubiquity of “new” 
mediating practices (facilitated by perpetually ever newer forms of media-
tion), which necessitates something of a shift in one’s primary orientation to 
making (and learning to make) with screen-mediated technologies. For the 
dynamic is no longer a matter of mastery (an impossible position in any initial 
[“new”] engagement) but rather is rooted in play: to play with the interface; 
to play with the affordances and constraints of the software; to play with the 
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forms, formats, and platforms; to play with, against, and across the aesthetics 
of a technological collaborator; to learn by playing in/with the unfamiliar, and 
so on. Moreover, as the techniques of the master class continually get algo-
rithmized—made available as part of the agential capacities of a technological 
playmate—it no longer takes mastery or the same kind of expertise to create 
with the aesthetics (and epistemes) of the master artisans; rather, the everyday 
Jeri and Julian can now playfully tap, swipe, click, type their way toward some-
thing of significance. Further, as suggested earlier, as more and more of the 
labor burden gets taken up by the “machine”—and taken up in increasingly 
obscure ways—one must be willing to engage in more (and deeper) forms of 
play to produce (or to learn to produce) just about anything. These deeper 
forms of play (sustained playful engagements) include both a willingness to 
play and an accompanying willingness to fail (with failure often being just as 
productive, and often leading to [mis]steps that expose the mediation itself—
including things like glitch). Consequently, contemporary human–technology 
relationships sit somewhat counter to the traditions of the paideia, champi-
oning play over mastery and embracing failure not as shortcoming but as 
rhetorical necessity in an orientation to play. Thus, turning to play as a criti-
cal dynamic in human–technology assemblages may help rhetors discover, 
uncover, or recover new capacities for expression, representation, action, and 
the like by leveraging play as mode of invention.
In many ways, the turning to play here is as much aligned with Vitanza’s 
second counterthesis to composition theory and pedagogy as it is with any 
technological imperative. For in the early 1990s, Vitanza’s “Three Counter-
theses: or, A Critical In(ter)vention into Composition Theories and Pedago-
gies” leveraged the critical structures and insights from both Jean-François 
Lyotard’s philosophies of the postmodern condition and sophist Gorgias’s 
negative trilemma to challenge long-standing approaches (or assumptions) 
in the field of rhetoric and composition. First, Vitanza pushed against the 
field’s definitional imperative (and what he situated as the will to systematize 
language); second, he called into question the role of mastery (and the will to 
be the authority of language); and third, he advocated for resisting the theory-
to-practice pedagogical impulse of the field and, in its stead, called for cre-
ating the conditions by which to rethink pedagogical desire (from a will to 
teach toward a willingness to learn). While this work shares resonances with 
all three, the second offers the clearest correlation with twenty-first-century 
human–technology making—a shift from the will to mastery (of a technologi-
cal logos) toward a willingness to play (with/in technology itself).
One of Vitanza’s favorite examples of this conditional play (and its impact 
on the knowing/doing/making of being) is the game Tegwar, which comes 
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from the 1973 film Bang the Drum.8 In the film, Bruce Pearson (played by 
Robert De Niro) engages in a card game where the players make up the rules 
to the game as they go, relying on a kind of aggregation of conventions (of 
play) they have learned across other registers and relational ecologies (sports, 
card games, school, etc.). The single driving play feature of Tegwar is that the 
rules cannot be determined in advance but rather must emerge with the game 
play. The game unfolds, then, not from any predetermined win-state but from 
the act of playing—an act in which players have immense capacity to shift 
the conditions of the game (and/or play) itself. In many ways, this is akin to 
the relational dynamic at play in human–technology making today. For how 
each plays with the other (in initial moments and in recurrent engagements) 
is based on habits of practices (conventions and rules of engagement) brought 
to the table in the moment of play. Further, what gets produced in the moment 
of creation, much like in the Winter example above, is not the result of any 
predetermined outcome (or win-state) but rather depends on the particular 
kinds (and depths) of play among the elements in the ecology. And, perhaps 
just as importantly, like Tegwar players, both humans and technologies have 
great capacities to shift the conditions of play (and the output likely to be 
produced).
Now, given the drifting that has occurred in this chapter, and specifically 
in this section, it seems that something of a recap may be in order to help pull 
the critical elements of this section back in focus. To this end, what has been 
suggested to this point is that once representational practices and emergent 
patterns of human experience undergo mediation, they cease to be obstacles to 
representation and become part of the base condition of mediated (and medi-
ating) beings. Which is to suggest that as more and more of life is subjected to 
1s-and-0s reductionism, and as more and more maneuvers of the master class 
get simulated via algorithmic practices, working creatives find themselves in 
an inventive space that allows them to play with all sorts of mediations and 
with all manner of life reconstituted as data, as emblem, as relay point to some 
other moment and mantra of mediation. But how one creates (and creates 
with) these new possibilities is tied up not with a will to mastery but rather 
with a fundamental willingness to play (and be played). This “willingness” 
necessitates not a better theory of rhetoric for New Aesthetic considerations 
 8. In the courses I completed with Vitanza at both Clemson University and the European 
Graduate School, he regularly used the Tegwar example to demonstrate this counterposition as 
well as what one might imagine as a type of play built on the very impulse of rhetorical inven-
tion. Additionally, this example has been deployed in Sarah Arroyo’s Participatory Composition: 
Video Culture, Writing, and Electracy, where she adapts Vitanza’s construction of the listening 
game (in relation to Tegwar) to apply to the theorization of and practices for video composing 
(chapter 4; specifically pp. 83–85).
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but a guiding theory of play for post-digital rhetorical making—a set of orien-
tations, habits, and perspectives by which to situate what a willingness to play 
looks like in current mediascapes and cultural configurations (New Aestheti-
cism included). To this end, in the remaining pages of this chapter I offer two 
potential frameworks for thinking about this “willingness to play”—moving 
it simply out of Vitanza’s counterimpulse to rhetoric and composition and 
extending it into a pragmatic orientation for rhetorical making at the inter-
sections of humans and technology. The first of these play orientations comes 
from Miguel Sicart’s Play Matters, which situates play as an ontological con-
dition; the second comes from Jan Holmevik’s Inter/vention: Free Play in the 
Age of Electracy, which uses play as an undergirding for all digital rhetorical 
activities (doing so in relation to Gregory L. Ulmer’s electracy).
Playing Sicart
To begin, Sicart argues that computation is “not a technology but a modality 
of being, a form of expression” (99); and the result of this computational con-
dition is that “there is more than the world to playfully take over now: there’s 
the world, the machines, and the way the machines make the world exist” 
(100). As such, in Sicart’s view, play and digital technologies “need to help 
each other imagine new ways of being in the world” (98), and it is the “help-
ing each other” that remains key in this passage because for Sicart computers 
“play with us—not for us, not against us, but together with us” (99; emphasis 
added). This echoes the symbiotic orientations of this work, where technolo-
gies are not things separate from or knowable in the absence of the human 
condition but rather are key figures in the human–technology assemblages 
central to mediated being. The way forward for imagining new ways of being 
in the world, then, as Sicart suggests (and as Vitanza implied), depends on the 
play between the human and the technological nonhuman (not on the mas-
tery of one over the other).
Sicart goes on to offer something of a rhetoric of play—situating play as a 
way of engaging with things in the world and, more fundamentally, as itself an 
act of creation and “a form of understanding” that allows individuals to make 
sense of themselves and that which surrounds them (1). In this regard, the 
New Aesthetic can be seen as a form of play (an expressive play), as it helps 
a post-digital public make sense of the conditions they have already under-
gone. For in playing with New Aesthetic artifacts (as scrolling observers or as 
post-digital artisans), rhetors are overtly presented with a human condition 
that has been (or is being) (re)mediated—with everything from one’s actions 
to one’s likeness being/becoming available to the masses of techno-culture.
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Sicart also argues that play is not only a way of engaging with (others in) 
the world (human and nonhuman alike) but is itself contextual, by which he 
means that it takes place “in a tangled world of people, things, spaces, and cul-
tures” (6). When one engages in play, then, one must take into consideration 
the environments of play, the technologies of play, and the potential com-
panions with whom one might play—the latter two categories, I argue, being 
increasingly one and the same (7).9 Now, while this orientation toward context 
is important for Sicart (and reflects the ecological tint of this work), he also 
sees play as appropriative, which means it readily “takes over the context in 
which it exists” (dominating the orientations to a given relational ecology) and 
yet “cannot be totally predetermined by such context” (11). This locates play in 
the interspaces and intersections of humans and nonhumans, while possess-
ing a capacity to be in excess of those contextual boundaries, which suggests 
that while the wider complexities of “context” may be key to understanding 
play (and perhaps rhetoric, as Lloyd Bitzer suggested many moons ago), the 
contextual elements are themselves “not sufficient for play [or rhetoric] to 
exist” (8). For play itself, as Sicart tells us, “is not tied to objects but brought 
by people to the complex interrelations with and between things that form 
daily life” (2; emphasis added). As such, play shares further affinities with New 
Aestheticism in that it is fundamentally tied to people, to humans, to human 
conditionalities (however technologically saturated or infused).
While the conceptual projections of play help add a richness to think-
ing about New Aestheticism, there are also more practical considerations of 
Sicart’s rhetoric of play, which include (a) play being creative, (b) the prac-
tice of developing tactics (ludic habits) for play activities, and (c) play being 
personal. As a creative act, for example, play is a way of “mak[ing] a world, 
through objects [and discourse], with others, for others, and for us” (17). 
This includes not only “creatively engaging” with “technologies, contexts, 
and objects,” in ways akin to Hernan’s work, but also grounding that engage-
ment in what Sicart calls “ludic interaction” (17)—a willingly playful exchange 
between human and nonhuman interrelations toward the experience (and 
possibly understanding) of the interaction itself (chiefly oriented toward audi-
ence; a matter I return to in the next chapter).
The second element here, tactics or ludic habits, refers to the strategies and 
“on-the-fly creative interpretation[s]” one develops in relation to specific play 
activities (17). And here one might see how something like play adds a dimen-
sion to the habits of mind and/or serial practice considerations raised by Boyle 
 9. There are echoes here with Thomas Rickert’s work on ambient rhetoric, where play, 
much like rhetoric, much like sound (and much like the human condition, as I have argued), 
takes on the tenor of the environment and things in the environments: for example, bellowing 
into a coffee cup and then into a bucket produces notably different sounds.
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earlier. For ludic habits form in serial engagements too, but also in relation 
to the particular contexts in which the play is occurring (gaming environ-
ments, material conditions, play partners [human and nonhuman alike], and 
so on), as well as in relation to previously established and emerging habits. 
Playful engagements lead, therefore, to the development and/or refinement of 
ludic habits of practice: the formation of strategies for overcoming a challenge 
or for creating particular kinds of representation or for relating to/engaging 
with particular kinds of technology. Further, as a player/rhetor moves across 
contexts/ecologies, she often builds from and builds upon these habits in both 
reflective and nonreflective ways—critically reflecting on her play practices to 
think through new solutions, while developing something like bodily mem-
ory (something related to, yet more than, “muscle memory”) for things like 
performance movements or maneuvers of particular actions (from quick-key 
functions to conceptual architectonic tendencies). Of course, it is not just the 
human element that develops these ludic habits of practice, as increasingly 
smart technologies adjust their own parameters and practices in relation to 
particular play partners. This can be seen in competitive game algorithms in 
something like the Mario Kart series, where the competition of the computer 
players adjusts to the performance of individual racers. But it also works in 
relation to more making- or production-oriented technologies; Adobe Pre-
miere, for example, adjusts its settings to individual collaborators by adopting 
a different interface configuration based on the “logged in” player/rhetor.
While the deployment of ludic habits of practice is perhaps easiest to 
grasp in games themselves—for example, transferring boss battle techniques 
across different gaming contexts—it is also excessively the case when work-
ing with new mediating technologies. For example, working creatives (novice 
and professional) develop ludic habits of practice for making visuals (still and 
moving alike), and these habits transfer, with varying degrees of success, to 
other visual technological settings. But while some redeployments work fairly 
well (e.g., cutting a video clip in iMovie versus cutting a video clip in Adobe 
Premiere), other habits require continual play with new contexts (and new 
collaborative partners) to successfully create new expressions. Take the filter 
manipulations in Snapchat as one example: these can help human participants 
develop a particularly playful mindset for remaking digital images (tap, toggle, 
select, save, and share), but those ludic habits of practice do not convey explic-
itly to working with visual media in something like Adobe Photoshop, which 
operates in terms of layers and not simply digital augmentations.
All of which is to suggest that working creatives develop ludic habits of 
practice in relation to the fuller complexities of the contexts in which they 
operate, which include environmental and technological considerations along 
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with sociopersonal exigencies and individual intentions. Moreover, as dem-
onstrated with Lasko, these ludic habits also develop, explicitly so, in relation 
to individuals themselves (to each person’s own embodied understandings of 
the world) as actants in and constituted by different play contexts and experi-
ences. Which means that each person’s ludic habits of practice develop (and/
or get remade) in relation to her own previous knowledges and habits, estab-
lished practices and purposes, and emerging (and unanticipated) capacities 
for action.
The last practical element for Sicart’s rhetoric of play—that play is per-
sonal—argues that “play is a singularly individual experience—shared, yes, 
but meaningful only in the way it scaffolds an individual experience of the 
world” (18). What this means is that while there may be a lingering desire for 
a general theory of New Aestheticism—one applicable across contexts and 
persons—what is needed, particularly for working creatives operating at vary-
ing levels of post-digital artisanship, is an approach to knowing, doing, and 
making that is grounded in rhetorical play. And it is here that I turn to Hol-
mevik’s work, which, in building upon Ulmer, offers an approach to digital 
rhetorical capacities tied directly to play and emergent from the technological 
apparatus itself.
Ulmer–Holmevik Line
Ulmer sets out to invent what he sees as the new apparatus for an electric 
and/or digital age, with the goal being not to adapt emerging technologies 
and digital practices to the scriptures of literacy (which he sees as happening 
as a matter of course anyway) but “to discover and create an institution and 
its practices capable of supporting the full potential of the new technology” 
(Internet Invention 29). In this regard, he and I begin from a shared posi-
tion—attuning to technologies and their related phenomena to see what they 
might offer on their own accord. Ulmer, however, is working on a much larger 
scale: in the ways that literacy functioned as a new instauration for oral cul-
tures, Ulmer claims electracy as the new instauration for literate cultures. This 
includes shifts in both practices and institutions: for example, oral cultures 
were rooted in the institution of religion (and practices of worship), whereas 
literate cultures are rooted in the institution of the academy (and practices 
of science), whereas the institution of electracy is the internet (and related 
practices of entertainment). What this sets up, then, is the ability for Ulmer 
to create parallels (see Table 1) between orality, literacy, and electracy—with 
electracy being situated by Ulmer as the third great epoch of human history.
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TABLE 1. Sample of Gregory L. Ulmer’s Apparatus Theory*
Apparatus Orality Literacy Electracy
Practice Religion Science Entertainment
Procedure Ritual Method Style
Behavior Worship Experiment Play
Philosophy Mythology Epistemology Aesthetics
Ground God Reason Body
Mode Totem Category Chora
*Ulmer’s apparatus table has appeared in many locations, from Ulmer’s own work (specifically his 
networked book website [www.ulmer.networkedbook.org]) to that of Arroyo, among others. But 
the table here is a specific modification of the one Holmevik provides in Inter/vention: Free Play 
in the Age of Electracy.
As one can see from the table, the procedure of the digital age for Ulmer is 
that of style—ushering in a new set of practices and considerations tied explic-
itly to the arts, and belonging to the domain of aesthetics—with style itself 
“marking the aesthetic quality of thinking” (Ulmer interview, in Weishaus 
n. pag.). This offers a certain resonance with the New Aesthetic, which also 
uses style markers, but does so as inventive relays to shifts in the human con-
dition. But Ulmer pushes the matter further, calling for a return to embodied 
ways of knowing, similar to Dewey’s recovery of the aesthetic. Here, Ulmer 
explicitly foregrounds the individual body (as sensorium) and the self (as an 
amalgamation of experiences) as filters by which one makes / makes sense of 
the world (an orientation echoed in Ceraso’s work). In so doing, Ulmer returns 
the technological conversation to the embodied conditionalities and individ-
ual attunements central to how one makes sense of the raw, unfiltered world 
(digital or otherwise). This works in contrast to those theories, frames, and 
perspectives that have continued to push away from the anthropocene—with 
Ulmer dramatically pushing back toward the embodied experiences of the 
individual. (He even invents strategies and genres for individuals to discover 
their own attunements, orientations, and choragraphical starting points—see 
Teletheory and Internet Invention.) Ulmer does not overlook, discount, or 
ignore the experiences and knowledges that a person brings to any discursive 
moment, especially those intertwined with mediating technologies, but rather, 
much like this work, he understands that the human shapes human–technol-
ogy symbiosis as much as any material affordances or algorithmic practice.
Now, what Holmevik does is extend Ulmer’s apparatus across a play 
dimension—turning to play because it (a) emerges from an “artistic/creative 
impulse” tied to style and the aesthetic (20) and (b) functions as a transversal: 
a line of intersection that moves in, across, and through media and cultural 
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systems. What Holmevik adds is the impulse to play (and play as an inter-
vention) to the embodied experiences of the individual centricity of Ulmer’s 
electrate writing/making practices.
But there is more to this dimension of play than just a name for what one 
does when working “electrately.” For the Ulmer–Holmevik position presents 
play as being tied to affect and experience. That is, Ulmer argues that oral cul-
tures took shape along an axis of right and wrong, and literate cultures on an 
axis of true and false, but electrate cultures operate on a Nietzschean axis of 
pleasure and pain—with the latter tied not to a moral condition, nor to a rea-
soned imposition, but rather to a life-aesthetic and experientiality. Holmevik 
argues that it is the very experiences of affect that electracy and the larger 
considerations of digital rhetoric attempt to augment (and/or invent with). 
This is why turning to play is essential for Holmevik, because play has long 
been grounded in affect.
This affectability (particularly in relation to the pleasure–pain axis) is per-
haps most identifiable in games with clear win-states: those in which players 
experience joy or sorrow with winning and losing, with overcoming or fail-
ing to overcome obstacles (and with failure not always resulting in negative 
affect10). But in more open play experiences (like Tegwar), the affect results 
not from predetermined win-states but rather is an emergent quality mani-
fested from the deep play of/through the ludic experience itself (Holmevik 13). 
To play, then, is to participate in, initiate, and even undergo an experience. In 
more open play activities, however, playing is an experience that both shapes 
one’s ludic habits of practice and is specific to individual humans (see Sicart’s 
“play is personal” position). For how one plays and what one plays with—
particularly in playing with mediating technologies as a way of being—are 
not universal conditions; rather, play is tied to individual humans (in specific 
cultures), individual choices, and individual attunements. While one can, in 
some capacity, account for general practices and potentialities of mediating 
technologies, one cannot fully account for the humanistic elements central to 
the productive acts of engagement with mediating technologies.
In an interesting sort of counterorientation, there seems an underlying 
drive (if not expectation)—particularly for those who teach things like writ-
ing with technologies—to develop in students and in faculty individual lev-
els of expertise in (if not mastery of) different mediating practices. Meaning, 
since at least Stuart Selber’s 2004 Multiliteracies for a Digital Age, scholars have 
correlated an increase in functional ability or technical acumen with a given 
 10. For example, in Reality Is Broken, Jane McGonigal details the concept of fun failure in 
games, where spectacular failures are experienced as positive values to the play experience and 
where failure is fundamentally a necessity to the playability (and overall value) of a game.
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mediating technology as having the potential to lead to greater capacities for 
action and expression. But there may be something inherently wrong, or at 
least worthy of hesitation, with this kind of tint toward “expertise.” First, the 
ever-changing mediascapes of post-digital culture prevent expertise in exact-
ing ways; and, in some cases, the advanced complexities of computational 
processes render expertise ineffectual (even when composed of the highest 
human–technology assemblage available in a given area) (see Golumbia 12611). 
Further, educators, particularly rhetoric and writing pedagogues, are seem-
ingly perpetually behind the curve—forever retrofitting the mediating prac-
tices of yesterday into/for today’s rhetorical situations. This is not meant as 
an indictment of the field but rather as descriptive—for mediating technolo-
gies (and computational operations) simply change and evolve faster than one 
can learn and teach them. Moreover, the rhetorical and medial conditions in 
which post-digital natives find themselves shift just as rapidly.
One condition of this technological shift is, as I suggested earlier, that 
computational mediation has, in effect, led to a kind of “outsourcing” of much 
of the labor of digital rhetoric: algorithms, processors, and rendering pro-
grams work together to mime the productive practices and representational 
techniques of previous media-writing devices and previous media-writing 
experts. And this offers a key distinction for screen-mediated, post-digital 
culture, as what is being made available to current rhetorical practices are 
both the acts of machinic (re)production (e.g., taking a photo) and, as argued 
throughout, the representational techniques of post-digital artisans, the avant-
garde of twenty-first-century aesthetics. The result is that digitization and 
algorithmization allow everyone—from expert to novice—to not only create 
with the processes of mechanical reproduction but to also do so with the aes-
thetic techniques of the master craftsmen and craftswomen. Pastiche, located in 
the click of a mouse. Glitch at the tap of a button. Pointillism, rendered digi-
tally anew through pixelism.
If what is at stake here is a practice of play that includes the materialities of 
post-digital culture as well as the current and emergent aesthetic practices of 
the post-digital artisans (commercial creatives included), then what is needed 
is not only a reorientation toward a willingness to play but also something of 
 11. David Golumbia has explored the implications of advanced computationality in a num-
ber of works. As one example, in “Judging Like a Machine,” he details how the micro trans-
actions that undergird most of digital culture, including those that compose the backbone of 
our financial institutions (e.g., stock exchange), can be illegally and unethically manipulated 
by other machines in ways that are invisible to us. For the machines that have been built to 
make these practices possible and to transmit their information interact with other machines 
and algorithms at rates and in ways that are not only not visible to us but are often not even 
comprehensible to the most expert of experts working with the highest technologies available.
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a new figure for the activities of knowing, doing, and making—a figure ame-
nable to the contours (and play possibilities) of the New Aesthetic. To this 
end, I conclude this chapter by presenting two viable figural considerations 
that, when considered together, represent something akin to the post-digital 
practitioner. One of the figures comes from Holmevik, whose hacker-brico-
leur functions in direct relation to his construction of play. The other, and the 
one I pick up with first, is Jenny Edbauer Rice’s mechanic.
Potential Figuration
Edbauer Rice, like Ulmer, begins overtly from the personal. Edbauer Rice’s 
father was a mechanic, and he did far more than just fix things: he imag-
ined solutions among materialities and did so through embodied practices. 
His understanding of the mechanical allowed him to enact new possibili-
ties and interact with the world in ways attentive to relationships among 
things. Edbauer Rice sees her father’s inventive and dynamic complexity as a 
mechanic as offering a richer vision for the connections between mechanics 
and digital rhetoric. For Edbauer Rice, “embracing the role of technology’s 
mechanics” is critical to those “who want to serve as rhetorical producers and 
teachers of production in the twenty-first century” (“Rhetoric’s” 368) because 
an understanding of digital mechanics allows one “to operate a wider range of 
tools” and, in turn, “to imagine and enact what was not possible (or ‘working’) 
before” (373). Therefore, mechanics (as figures) are not simply individuals who 
do repair work but rather are individuals who engage in manual (embodied) 
activities, who can improvise relationships and enact unexpected solutions, 
and who can “help others imagine what they need in order to create, repair, or 
refit almost anything that has parts” (372).
Edbauer Rice’s rhetorical mechanic, then, is one who engages in “material 
practice(s) of enactment,” and one who does so through inventive “deploy-
ments of meaning” (“Rhetoric’s” 372). With emerging media platforms and 
materialities offering all manner of new modes of deployment, the mechanic 
is one well suited to tinker with these platforms and materialities as a way 
to imagine new modes of representation, new forms of expression, and new 
enactments of experience. Further, Edbauer Rice argues that as “rhetori-
cal mechanics” become “digital rhetoric mechanics,” they develop “a greater 
potential set of tools for rhetorical production” (374). But the “tools” devel-
oped are not just external objects to and interfaces for the mechanic: rather, 
as indicated with Sicart and Holmevik and the formation of ludic habits of 
practice, they include internalized capacities of action and deployment (in 
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relation to new platforms and materialities). In talking about how new medi-
ating technologies expand the available means of production, the expansion 
of one’s rhetorical capacities includes, then, not just a consideration of the 
mediating technologies themselves but the particular ways in which the “digi-
tal rhetoric mechanic” internalizes and then redeploys those meaning-making 
dynamics in other (non)related situations. Or, to say this another way, the 
expansion of one’s capacities for action depend on the relationships of the 
mechanic (human) and technology. For to be a digital rhetoric mechanic in 
Edbauer Rice’s sense is not simply to possess the ability to use a particular 
technology (one kind of relationship) but rather to be able to imagine and 
enact new orientations and solutions within (and beyond) a given technol-
ogy’s deployment. And, for the purposes of this work, these new deployments 
include the possibility of subversion, of intervention, of working against the 
grain so as to expose the overt qualities of the mediation itself along with the 
computational underbelly of the digital/networked world.
But what interests me most in Edbauer Rice’s “digital rhetoric mechanic” is 
the recurrent focus she places on tinkering with available materialities, modes, 
and tools as an operative form of engaging and addressing an exigency. That 
is, the kind of “caring for” and “cultivation of self ” to which she gestures is 
rooted in a willingness to play with the available materialities, mediations, 
and mechanisms (379). And to do this, to help more traditional rhetoricians 
develop the mechanical-technological abilities to teach and do digital rheto-
ric, she advocates for the personal—for playing with different platforms in 
relation to personal projects. In fact, through her interest in personal projects 
and in tinkering as a mode of material and medial engagement, Edbauer Rice 
situates a kind of willingness to play as a “bridge [between] the tensions .  .  . 
[of] theory and practice that continue to pull [rhetorical studies] in different 
directions” (385). Play, in this regard, not only may be a key mode of rhetori-
cal engagement in a digital/post-digital culture but may itself better situate 
how one makes in relation to the contours of the New Aesthetic—doing so 
through personal projects, engagements, and investments that allow for fluid 
movement between the theoretical orientations and practical guides of the 
contours themselves. What Edbauer Rice’s “digital rhetoric mechanic” gestures 
toward, then, is not just a kind of repair person but rather a play-figure—a 
tinkerer extraordinaire—who develops capacities for action through personal 
projects and who improvises material and medial deployments that allow for 
new possibilities, whether in accord with representational expectations or as 
intervention in a driving order.
Given the ties to tinkering (and to play more generally), Edbauer Rice’s 
mechanic has interesting resonance with Holmevik’s hacker-bricoleur. Both 
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operate in relation to the ability to improvise and intervene, to repair and 
remake as a mode of offering different kinds of experiences, and, in many 
cases, both are rooted in the personal—from personal projects to the personal 
connections one finds with the available means of expression. But I get ahead 
of myself; before offering something of a synthesis of these figures, I need to 
first unpack Holmevik’s hacker-bricoleur a bit more systematically.
The hacker is, of course, something of a cult figure—coming to main-
stream culture through literature and cinema narratives over the past thirty 
to forty years that position her as a subversive, as one who can intervene in 
various technological systems to make them better suit particular needs and/
or represent a different vision. The hacker is often understood as anti-estab-
lishment, as dangerous, as loner and/or outcast, but in truth the hacker (as 
person and practice) has brought much in the way of modern technological 
developments—from cyber security to Facebook. Moreover, the hacker is one 
who possesses the ability to expose (and, in turn, make a post-digital public 
aware of) that which is routinely hidden by black-boxed computationality.
The bricoleur, as second component of Holmevik’s construction, comes 
from French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, who situates the bricoleur 
as a do-it-yourself (DIY) practitioner. Derived from the French word bri-
coler, which means to tinker, the bricoleur is an individual who improvises 
with the material and nonmaterial possibilities at hand. Unlike that of the 
craftsperson, who selects specific tools and materialities to best suit the pre-
cise needs of the job, task, or purpose, the bricoleur’s work is emergent and 
responsive to the material and nonmaterial conditions available to the pro-
ductive situation.
Bricolage, the practice of the bricoleur, was fairly popular in postmodern 
art—denoting a practice of improvisation that brings together varying objects 
and aesthetics. The tensions created by the juxtaposed elements, in turn, cre-
ate attentiveness to the surface (a hypermediacy) because the deployment 
of meaning in these works necessarily takes shape through intertextuality—
through the relational intensities among elements as they move across and/or 
offer touchstones among different registers (forming a rhetorical ecology). If 
moving one abstraction out from the specific material practices of art or the 
stylistic assemblages of bricoleur architecture, one might situate the bricoleur 
as an assembler—the figure who does assemblage. In this regard, bricolage is 
not only a product and mode of production but could be seen as the very tap-
estry created by works that stem from and reflect the principles and interests 
of multiple fields, multiple perspectives, and often-incongruent frameworks. 
In many ways, Bridle’s New Aesthetic is itself a bricolage, and this book is an 
attempt to put into words its intertextuality.
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Now, before moving more fully back into Holmevik’s hacker-bricoleur, 
there are a couple of additional elements to consider. First, if the bricoleur is 
tied to the tinkerer and to DIY culture, then this component of the figuration 
has never been more important, as there is (and continues to be) a growing 
DIY orientation as part of the current cultural mediascapes.12 Second, while 
the bricoleur of postmodern art has worked primarily with materialities and 
objects, today’s bricoleur (including Holmevik’s hacker-bricoleur) works with 
the algorithmized techniques of the master class. For example, one need not 
have available black-and-white imagery, as one can now render any visual in 
black and white. Moreover, one can add vignette effects with the click of a 
mouse, add decorative text with the tap of a button, and even reproduce the 
very objects desired with 3D printing. Put simply, the bricoleur is now limited 
not as much by materialities as by her abilities to imitate, simulate, replicate, 
and leverage aesthetics, objects, and artifacts in and through computational 
systems. If the bricoleur is one who must be adept at a wide array of making 
tasks and abilities, then these must include, in the current context, a variety 
of ludic habits of technological engagement.
To bring this back to Holmevik: the hacker-bricoleur is a highly capable 
individual who “works with what is available to create new and exciting pos-
sibilities” because this allows for offering new representations of the world 
and things in the world along with the possibility of intervening into other 
socio-culturo-political orders (44). Moreover, the hacker-bricoleur is limited 
no longer by the physical materialities at hand but, when engaged in screen-
mediated bricolage, by her ludic habits of practice that allow for accessing and 
deploying a wider array of digital and nondigital capacities for action. And, 
perhaps most fundamental, what drives this kind of hacker-bricoleur figure is 
that creating and recreating in this fashion is fun and entertaining (28)—this 
kind of making is enjoyable and, in many cases, empowering.
When the hacker-bricoleur is combined with Edbauer Rice’s mechanic, 
one might get something resembling the post-digital practitioner: an individual 
who plays with the material deployments of meaning and mediation to inter-
vene in various technological systems so as to cultivate a different sense of 
self and to imagine (if not improvise) new representations of the world. The 
potentialities of deployment, the intervention, the cultivation, and the like are 
not general conditions of engagement but instead specific to the individuals 
and individual technologies involved. For, to return to the three examples 
from this chapter, Winter’s, Lasko’s, and Hernan’s capacities for engagement 
 12. This DIY presence may be a kind of cultural response to an industrial/corporate com-
plex that now is built on a model of planned obsolescence.
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(and even the ways in which all three play with technology) are unique to 
them, owing to their experiences and expertise, and manifested in the unique 
and rhetorical artifacts they co-produce with technological collaborators.
That said, the contours emerging among the New Aesthetic may serve as 
a loose set of guides for post-digital practitioners—from novice to expert—
who embody the values of this hybrid figuration and who orient to knowing, 
doing, and making in ways more amenable to a post-digital posthumanism. 
While the contours are, by no means, a perfect solution, they can provide 
something of an operative orientation for those who play with new mediating 
technologies to imagine new worlds, improvise new possibilities, and enact 
unexpected solutions.
To support this kind of practice, in this chapter I introduced the third con-
tour of the New Aesthetic ecology and attempted to extrapolate its practical 
(and figural) implications for post-digital rhetoricians. In so doing, I focused 
primarily on the rhetor (and/or her partnership with technology). In the next 
(and final) chapter, however, I push a bit more outwards toward consider-
ations of audience—primarily taking into account the very expectations that 
rhetors and audiences bring to medial experiences. For shifts in medial expec-
tations necessitate corresponding shifts in the underlying practices of rhetoric.
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Hyperawareness of Mediation and 
the Shift to Medial Experience
IN CONTOUR 1,  this work picked up with the notion of eversion as a way of 
challenging the conceptual coupling of the digital/real divide—calling into 
question the very premise of the division so as to expand the rhetorical capac-
ities of rhetors and materialities alike. Then, with contour 2, it highlighted 
both how mimetic patterns central to screen and computational media take 
on multiple layers of cultural meaning and rhetorical value and how techno-
logical materialities transition into human aesthetic sensibilities and (re)color 
individual ways of seeing the world (and things in the world). Following that, 
contour 3 focused on how New Aestheticism orients rhetors to the actual 
practices of making in twenty-first-century mediascapes—giving saliency to 
the ways in which humans and technologies come together to develop ludic 
habits of practice for working with one another. What has been presented to 
this point, then, is a set of reorientations that move from (a) destabilizing a 
conceptual coupling to (b) exposing something of the post-digital human con-
dition to (c) realigning the practices of (and preferences of engagement with) 
techno-human assemblages, with each contour expanding, in its own way, the 
capacities and concerns of post-digital rhetoric, and doing so primarily from 
the perspective of the rhetor. With this final chapter, however, I want to push 
beyond a primary focus on the rhetor and better attune to audience-based 
considerations, as the fourth contour of the New Aesthetic is oriented around 
the experiencing of mediation as much as it is around any construction of 
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post-digital artifacts. To this end, this chapter picks up with a conditional 
hyperawareness central to the New Aesthetic—returning to Jay David Bolter 
and Richard Grusin’s remediation (specifically their concepts of immediacy 
and hypermediacy) as one framework for situating this hyperawareness and 
its related connections to a shift in medial expectations.
That said, what I have attempted to present in the arc of this work is that 
New Aestheticism (whether movement or not) operates as an awareness aes-
thetic—one as much rhetorically inclined as it is toward any specific aesthetic 
sensibility. However, while the previous chapters used the tenets and tenden-
cies of the New Aesthetic to raise awareness about digital/real ecologies, about 
pixels as human aesthetic values, and about the depths and degrees to which 
technologies might be understood as collaborative partners in digital mak-
ing practices, there are at least two other medial awareness considerations 
operative within New Aestheticism. First, New Aestheticism plays on, in, and 
across the fringes of the fourth wall—the illusionary divide between viewers/
users and media/mediated content. While it may not possess the traditional 
“fourth wall” mediated presence of the box theater, it nonetheless invites both 
an explicit and implicit sense of the “box” (screen-mediated, computational 
technologies) looking out, staring back, reading and reacting to human coun-
terparts, and creating a concatenation of awareness of a human-other who 
knows that the “box” knows that the human knows that the “box” is aware 
of her presence. Second, as implicated in chapter 1, the New Aesthetic is a 
kind of network aesthetic enacted in/on the network itself: it performs its 
own paradigm, folding back on itself as a way of offering critical insight and 
calling attention to its own assumptions and operations (as well as those of 
network technologies more generally). This kind of paradigmatic enactment 
(which uses the hyperawareness of fourth-wall disruptions) situates the New 
Aesthetic as being hyperrhetorical (a matter I more fully explore toward the 
end of this chapter). To better explicate these two additional awareness con-
siderations, the following sections pick up with each and situate how they can 
contribute to the practices of rhetoric.
FOURTH-WALL MEDIATIONS
Western culture has long been wed to the illusion of narrative immediacy 
(and to a preference for media that require a suspension of disbelief—plays, 
film, books, videogames, etc.). Therefore, when something (or someone) calls 
into question (if not shatters) the illusory division between subject and object, 
performance and audience, representation and viewer, an immediacy-oriented 
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culture experiences something of a destabilization. This disruption is com-
monly referred to as breaking the fourth wall.
The breaking of the fourth wall stems from the theatrical arts, particu-
larly from nineteenth-century theater and the advent of theatrical realism. 
The “fourth wall” itself refers to the four walls of boxed set theater, which is 
composed of three physical walls (stage left, stage right, and the backdrop) 
and one imaginary wall, the opening to the stage (the space between stage and 
audience). This imaginary fourth wall keeps the performance and the viewers 
in their respective planes—acting as both an opening and a divider. Of course, 
it is not surprising how easily this concept maps onto television and film (with 
the screen serving as the “opening to the stage”). But toward the latter half of 
the twentieth century, there was an increased amount of breaking the fourth 
wall in television and film, and this, I believe, was an early gesture toward 
shifts in cultural expectations of media—for breaking the fourth wall puts 
viewers/participants into a hypermediate, rather than immediate, relationship 
with particular media.1
One of the most well-known examples of breaking the fourth wall comes 
from filmmaker Woody Allen’s 1977 film Annie Hall. There is a scene in the 
film where Allen, waiting in a queue, is arguing with another man in line 
about Marshall McLuhan’s work. Growing frustrated, Allen goes off “stage left” 
(breaking the filmic illusion) and pulls McLuhan into the shot/conversation 
(McLuhan just “happened” to be standing there). Of course, given McLuhan’s 
impact on media studies and his “the medium is the message” mantra, the fact 
that it is McLuhan whom Allen pulls into the scene is itself significant, which 
only adds to the genius that is Woody Allen and the détournement of disrupt-
ing the filmic (and narrative) immediacy.
A decade after Annie Hall, John Hughes’s 1986 film Ferris Bueller’s Day 
Off built this fourth-wall play directly into the fabric of the film narrative, 
with Bueller (played by Matthew Broderick) regularly talking to the audience. 
Viewers were both separate from and yet part of Ferris’s “day off.” Move for-
ward another decade, and video games took this to another level. In Kona-
mi’s 1998 Metal Gear Solid for PlayStation, the character Psycho Mantis could 
cause a player’s controller to rumble, could read the memory card on game 
consoles in order to reference other games a player had been playing, and 
 1. Immediacy, as a quick reminder, “dictates that the medium itself should disappear” and 
leave an audience “in the presence of the thing represented” (Bolter and Grusin 6). Hyperme-
diacy, in contrast, “multiplies the signs [and streams] of mediation” (34). The former achieves 
its goal through fidelity of representation and an effacement of the techné and technological 
dimensions; the latter by foregrounding the mediation and, in many cases, using the mediation 
as central to the experience (and representation) itself.
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could even change the input signal on a player’s television (or so it seemed). 
In order to negate Mantis’s “mind reading” (a major strategy in the battle with 
Mantis), the player had to unplug her controller from port 1 in the gaming 
console and back into port 2—a physical, mechanical, and counterintuitive 
action that sat well outside the bounded walls of traditional gameplay. Then, 
in 2002, Silicon Knights’ Eternal Darkness: Sanity’s Requiem for Nintendo 
GameCube employed “sanity effects,” a game mechanic that turned down the 
volume on the game, produced (virtual) bugs crawling on the screen, and 
even sent out fake notifications that the game had deleted all of a player’s 
saved data for the other GameCube games she was playing. These examples 
not only breached the fourth wall but also overtly blurred the boundaries of 
the digital/real divide.
In another media ecology, television programs have increased their break-
ing of the fourth wall over the past two decades. From Nickelodeon’s Dora the 
Explorer to NBC’s The Voice, television shows regularly engage with, speak 
to, and ask for interaction from viewers. Dora the Explorer, which launched 
in 2000, has the animated character Dora routinely asking for help from her 
“friends” (viewers); from calling out the Map (a character in the show) to 
making decisions in the story, viewers get to “participate” in the show’s sto-
ryline. These viewer-aided “decisions” are often completed/enacted by a blue 
mouse cursor moving across the screen and “clicking” the selection/answer. 
In borrowing visual and narrative metaphors from the computer world (from 
hardware to video games), Dora puts viewers in a default position somewhere 
between operating a computer and watching a television show. In contrast 
to Dora, whose “interactive” blue cursor always moves in a predetermined 
fashion, NBC’s reality singing competition, The Voice, allows for real-time 
interactions from viewers to help determine particular (though limited) out-
comes. Not only does it crown a winner based on viewer votes (and/or song 
downloads) like many similar shows, but in the later stages of the competition 
viewers can tweet during the episode to save one of two or three contestants. 
This breaks the fourth wall through both a TV host talking directly to at-home 
viewers and in allowing those at-home viewers to become participants in the 
game (determining particular outcomes).
Further, shows like Dora not only entertain and educate (in limited ways) 
but also offer a kind of media indoctrination: the Dora the Explorer, Mickey 
Mouse Clubhouse, and Team Umizoomi toddlers of today will grow up to be 
the media-savvy (if not media-expectant) teenagers of tomorrow. If my gen-
eration grew up in a world firmly grounded in the suspension of disbelief and 
the upholding of the fourth wall that dominated popular, narrative media of 
the twentieth century, today’s generations are being grounded in something 
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different—and at least one element of that difference includes an affinity for 
medial awareness resulting from regular disregard (or manipulation) of the 
fourth wall.
Now, readers may be asking at this point, what does all this “fourth wall” 
talk have to do with the New Aesthetic? As Rahel Aima, co-editor of The State 
(Dubai), has argued in “Breaking the Fourth Wall: Duende and the New Aes-
thetic,” the New Aesthetic is tied explicitly to the breaking of the fourth wall 
because “machines and other unknown objects are . . . shattering the artifice, 
. . . turning to face us, and making pidgin efforts to communicate” (n. pag.). 
For Aima, the “machines” that constitute a significant portion of today’s world 
are becoming performers who routinely break the fourth wall by looking back 
at human interactants, and who, in so doing, also ask people to “reevaluate 
[their] tenuous relations” with screens and the screens’ “cast” of characters and 
performers (n. pag.). Much like my Sims character in Will Wright’s The Sims—
an avatar who frequently looks out to me when he is unhappy or frustrated 
(pleading with me to do something, anything)—many of the digital objects in 
everyday life have an awareness (or so it seems) of human roles in human–
technology relationships. To bring this back to one of the examples from ear-
lier (e.g., word processing), in the late 1990s to early 2000s, the Microsoft 
Office Assistant (the little animated paperclip2) seemed to stare at users, often 
impatiently, waiting for an opportunity to help. The paperclip’s presence was 
unsettling for some, both because it felt like an intrusion in the writing pro-
cess and because it seemed to have a significant awareness of one’s presence 
on the other end. In those formative stages of the new media era, one where 
Western culture was still grounded in a preference for immediacy, some users 
had a negative response to “Clippy’s” hypermediate presence. But what things 
like the paperclip assistant suggested, and things like Siri and Alexa are rein-
scribing in the post-digital mediascape, is that as medial objects and artifacts 
continue to turn to face their flesh-and-blood collaborators, individuals will 
have to confront (and reconsider) the assumptions guiding their relationships 
with particular media.
New Aesthetic artifacts, then, have the potential to create effects and/or 
experiences similar to those that break the fourth wall: they make viewers 
aware of specific mediations and illuminate particular human relationships 
(or nonrelationships) with those processes. The problem, as Aima suggests, 
is that Woody Allen (and Ferris Bueller) are persons with whom individuals 
can empathize, but the drones and chatbots (nonhuman machines) that seem 
 2. From 1997 to roughly 2004, Microsoft Office included an intelligent user interface that 
functioned as an “Office Assistant.” This assistant, named Clippit or Clippy, was an animated 
paperclip that interfaced with Office’s help content.
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significant to Bridle’s New Aesthetic are “performers” that “produce an uneasy 
discomfort in many” people (n. pag.). Unlike with Allen and Bueller, when the 
fourth wall is broken by objects and artifacts whose “inner lives are inacces-
sible” to humans—objects and artifacts that are “cold, alien, inhuman”—then 
not only do people have to deal with the mediating act and their own place 
within the meaning-making apparatus, they also face an incredibly present 
sense of irreconcilable agency (Aima n.  pag.). The irony is that despite the 
cold, distant, “never our friends” quality that Bruce Sterling wants to ascribe 
to technologies, people still feel increasingly bonded to them. Many individu-
als keep their primary technological devices close to them, next to them, in 
their pockets, on their persons, in their beds, in their bathrooms. In some 
cases, technologies are often more intimately connected to people than their 
human friends (often more responsive, too).
Now, the distrust and/or disdain of technology (and its potential Big 
Brother qualities) may simply be an orientation stemming from life in a pre-
digital moment. For in the current culture, one may be better served to view 
the possibility of sentient machines more like Number 5 from John Badham’s 
1986 film Short Circuit than Mr. Smith from the Wachowski brothers’ 1999 film 
The Matrix. The point is that while the machines may never be “our friends,” 
that does not mean they are inherently evildoers out to destroy or control 
humankind (with both of these positions already assuming a kind of machinic 
agency one can recognize). If, however, one continues to operate under this 
condition of uneasiness toward technologies rather than embrace the kind of 
with partnerships suggested in the previous chapter, then what will emerge 
through the very rhetoric employed to describe and delineate technological 
conditions is a worldview that only furthers a kind of techno-psychosis (built 
upon an underlying condition of techno-paranoia).
To be fair, techno-paranoia is not without grounds. For one, it is not just 
technologies looking at people; humans (as part of the human–technology 
assemblage) are looking as well (using the myriad forms of digital representa-
tion facilitated by technologies). In this sense, part of what the New Aesthetic 
is drawing attention to is the fact that everyone is, in many ways, “becoming 
the object of the gaze” (Aima n. pag.). That is, when technologies begin look-
ing back and when humans partner with those technologies for voyeuristic 
ends, people move, even if only in brief, as Aima has argued, into a “(con-
ventionally) feminised subjectivity” (n.  pag.). For people are increasingly 
surveilled, tracked, tagged, monitored, followed (by both technological and 
human actants), which creates a default condition in which individuals are 
always on display and, perhaps just as importantly for this chapter’s consid-
eration of hyperawareness, increasingly aware (or being made aware) of this 
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being “on display” conditionality. The challenge, however, is not to destroy the 
gazing of a hybrid techno-human agency (or its related post-digital cultures), 
nor to move “off grid,” but rather to adapt to this awareness and to how these 
technological systems (coupled with particular human actants/voyeurs) come 
to bear on everyday activities—and, in turn, to leverage those considerations 
for post-digital rhetorical practices.
In this frame, then, the New Aesthetic might be seen as both a validation 
and an invalidation of techno-psychosis. It validates the condition by mak-
ing visible the modes, methods, and mechanisms of surveillance technolo-
gies (thus, Bridle’s interest in drones, bots, and facial recognition programs). 
It invalidates the condition by better attuning individuals, as Carla Gannis 
argues, to the creation of and experiencing of “a hybrid world of novel expe-
rience” (n.  pag.), suggesting not simply a surveillance culture but an emer-
gent coming-to-be at the intersections of digital and nondigital processes and 
materialities. By drawing attention to hybrid and novel experiences, as well as 
to the practices, performances, and platitudes of mediated conditionalities, the 
New Aesthetic locates people in a world where the fourth wall does not exist—
or exists differently. Or, to pick up with the eversion from chapter 3, individu-
als are no longer separate from their media, from their narratives, from their 
representations, from their ordering mechanisms. They are of them, produced 
by them, and that which calls them forth—a Möbius strip of a relationship.
The “validation” dimension of the New Aesthetic and techno-psychosis are 
important for a whole host of conversations (and chock-full of political, ethi-
cal, and cultural considerations), but my interests lie in the latter, the invalida-
tion, which turns the conversation toward the experientiality of mediation and 
better lends itself to the making aspects of New Aestheticism. In this sense, 
the New Aesthetic is not only illuminating the digital layers saturating (and 
observing) the everyday world; it also reveals the necessity of a mediated being 
in a world that requires both human and computational ways of seeing, sens-
ing, sorting, and sharing. For example, people may not be able to identify 
with the human eye alone what a QR code points to, but many recognize 
that it points to something (or should, in theory). Nor can most “read” a bar-
code. Nor can they account for the number of steps they take in a given day 
(a more embodied quality). But in conjunction with a technological device 
like a QR code reader, barcode scanner, or Nike+ FuelBand (i.e., as part of 
an assemblage), people become increasingly aware of these other modes of 
mediation (and learn how to make sense of them) and can, in turn, deploy 
them (through their assemblages) to particular ends, for particular purposes, 
directed toward particular achievements/outcomes for an audience who also 
shares in (and/or who can make sense of) these hybrid perspectives. Which is 
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to suggest that with certain human–technology assemblages, one can leverage 
digital and material capacities for rhetorical desires and directives, capital-
ize on their experiential dimensions, and present them to an audience who 
participates in similar hybrid “ways of seeing” and/or adopts (and adapts to) 
analogous techno-human perspectives. Or, more pragmatically, working cre-
atives can now design a QR code that both links to a company webpage and 
has the company logo embedded inside the block-pattern—both a human 
and machinic kind of “reading.” Or, as another possibility, one might use a 
Nike+ FuelBand to engage in “draw running,” as artist Claire Wyckoff does—a 
process that traces one’s run path onto a map. In Wyckoff ’s case, she draw-
runs penises,3 but others tend to spell out names or to make hearts or other 
rudimentary shapes.
Artists routinely find a way to intervene in human–technology assem-
blages in order to create new kinds of expression—using the rhetorical pos-
sibilities of hypermediation not to reinscribe a political order but to invite 
awareness (of subject matter, of condition, of a set of relations, of the self, 
of culture, and the like). What these hypermediate works suggest, particu-
larly those featured in the New Aesthetic, is a kind of crossroads moment 
that necessitates a bit of a shift from the analytical to the inventive. Or, as 
Kyle Chayka puts it, the hypermediate mediascapes of contemporary culture 
invite people (rhetoricians included) “to go native,” to “stop gathering data 
points and start making things in the intrinsic language of the New Aesthetic” 
(n. pag.). The contours introduced so far include gestures toward these mak-
ing practices—from considerations of eversion and design to pixel aesthetics 
to human–technology collaborations—and hyperawareness of mediation is 
no different, as it leverages the ethereality of the fourth wall toward rhetorical 
ends (using an artifact’s own mediation as a rhetorical device) while ground-
ing New Aestheticism in matters of engagement and, as I explore in the next 
section, hyperrhetorical enactment.
ENACTING THE (HYPERRHETORICAL) PARADIGM
The hyperawareness under consideration in this section begins with the idea 
that New Aestheticism is, as Bridle has argued, “an attempt to ‘write’ criti-
cally about the network in the vernacular of the network itself ” (“New Aes-
thetic” n. pag.). That is, as a movement (or even pseudo-movement), the New 
 3. Wyckoff, of course, has made a number of nonpenis shapes as well, like an image of a 
dog or of the middle finger, but her penis maps still generate the most web traffic.
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Aesthetic is a phenomenon “undertaken [and recapitulated] within its own 
medium” (n. pag.). It is what Victor J. Vitanza would call a writing or enact-
ing of the paradigm, which might be better understood as an entity that per-
forms its thinking, value, contribution, or purpose within (and as reflective 
of) the very paradigm it espouses (“Writing”). Thus, what the fourth contour 
is drawing attention to is not merely that the New Aesthetic participates in 
the operative practices of the network but that the very acts (and vehicles) of 
mediation in New Aesthetic artifacts offer comment on themselves (and their 
own conditions of existence) in their process of becoming. It is not just that 
New Aesthetic artifacts point toward critical techno-human conditionalities 
but that their very mediations carry a dimensional awareness that invites one 
to consider the rhetorical and medial ecologies through which the artifacts 
take on particular kinds of meaning.
To demonstrate something of this condition, let me return briefly to a key 
example from chapter 4, the Telehouse West (Plate G) building. While the 
pixelated exterior of the building calls attention to the building itself, its met-
onymic qualities, as I argued earlier, call attention to it being a certain kind 
of building that houses certain kinds of things. Thus, as Bridle suggested, the 
building’s design makes it stand out from its surroundings as well as gives it 
a sense of belonging to “the digital” (“Waving” n. pag.). This kind of design 
or even methodological approach is what Gregory L. Ulmer has referred to as 
hyperrhetorical practice, where the impact and/or critical value of the design/
creation stems, at least in part, from its ability to leverage its own privileged 
logics, practices, ethics, aesthetics, and the like toward rhetorical ends that 
speak to the creation itself and its relation to the ecologies in which it par-
ticipates. Ulmer demonstrates this hyperrhetorical practice in his monograph 
Heuretics: The Logic of Invention, which is a project on method and rhetori-
cal invention where he employs the very method he is inventing while he is 
inventing it (17). As a result, Ulmer’s method, inventing, and artifact (e.g., 
print text) place readers into a critically aware relationality with the text, its 
contents, and its implications. In certain ways, the same is true of viewers of 
Telehouse West: by leveraging a pixel aesthetic, the building enfolds into its 
aesthetic its own implications within the technological, ideological, and onto-
logical ecologies it inhabits—creating, for some passersby, a hyperrhetorical 
condition.
Hyperrhetorical works do more, then, than just direct attention to the 
methodology and/or mediating act itself; they also, as a matter of course, 
make viewers/readers/interlocutors complicit in their enactment.4 That is, for 
 4. In many ways, this “complicitness” echoes the conditional orientations central to 
Bolter and Grusin’s remediation. In their formative introduction of remediation, they actually 
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there to be any sense of hyperrhetoricity in something like Telehouse West, 
not only does the artifact need to employ particular representational (and 
rhetorical) triggers but also there must be an audience who completes the 
feedback loop—individuals who bring (or have the capacity to possess) an 
awareness to the design/creation that includes a sensibility (if not sensitiv-
ity) to the logics, cultures, and practices associated with the design. Mean-
ing, for someone without a penchant for seeing pixels in nonpixel spaces, or 
without an understanding of what a server farm is or does, Telehouse West’s 
metonymic possibilities are seemingly irrelevant and the building sits there as 
just another building—albeit one with multicolored, square windows. How-
ever, for an audience with contextual and digital sensibilities, Telehouse West 
functions hyperrhetorically because it embodies something of its own logics 
and aesthetics: it calls to its viewers, making certain passersby aware of its 
own awareness of its role in the larger complexity that is post-digital culture.
Now, given the feedback loop required for hyperrhetorical entities to func-
tion as such, whether in the New Aesthetic or not, there is a necessary inter-
est in accounting for the qualities and capacities of audience. For the rhetor 
can use hyperawareness in a multitude of ways, but without a corresponding 
audience capable of attuning to the hyperconditionality or without an ability 
to play within and against certain audience expectations, the artifact is just 
another thing in the world, awash amidst the milieu. And it is here that the 
connective tissue between hyperrhetoricity and hypermediacy begins to take 
more concrete form. For one of the critical conditions underlying Bolter and 
begin with an act of negation, separating remediation from Hollywood’s practices of content 
repurposing (the borrowing of filmic content, literary/filmic narratives, and the like). While 
Hollywood-style repurposing does often necessitate a redefinition of content in ways similar 
to the tenets of remediation (adapting a book to film, for example, always includes certain 
recolorations), there is often “no conscious interplay between media” in those acts of repur-
posing (45). Or, if there is, that interplay occurs nearly exclusively at the level of the individual 
“who happens to know both versions and can compare them” (45). Meaning, the “interplay” 
or awareness associated with content repurposing is viewer-specific, not media-specific. The 
implied counterclaim, then, suggests that remediation (unlike Hollywood’s repurposing) must 
include an awareness of the redefinition or the interplay of media and that this “awareness” 
must be present (or made present) in the media itself. This is, in many ways, the specific defi-
nition of new media offered by Anne Wysocki, who argued that what made new media new 
was not the technologies themselves but a kind of critical awareness on the part of artists and 
produced artifacts with regard to the available materialities, the techniques of representation, 
and the mediation presented/assumed in the artifacts themselves. For Wysocki, the “newness” 
of new media, then, was not tied to computational underpinnings but rather was linked to 
this conditionality of a hyperrhetorical capacity, with the artifacts themselves carrying this 
potential hyperrhetoricity and with the experience of the mediation inviting an audience to 
multiple levels of awareness (some of which complete the hyperrhetorical feedback loops). The 
New Aesthetic seems to extend these considerations into a post-digital era, capitalizing on a 
sense of hyperawareness of mediation as aesthetic and rhetorical values.
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Grusin’s hypermediacy is that it (as well as its counterpart, immediacy) is cul-
turally and temporarily (and potentially individually) situated. Put another 
way, the two operative logics of remediation—immediacy and hypermedi-
acy—designate countering orientations by which people experience media, 
and mark, to a certain extent, the expectations of media that people carry 
with them into different medial registers. Thus, it is important to recognize 
that what may be a hypermediate medial experience for one person in one 
culture at one moment in time (inviting a certain kind of awareness, hyper-
rhetorical or otherwise) may very well be an immediate experience for oth-
ers in other cultures and times as well as immediate for that same individual 
in the near future. The reality is that one’s medial expectations change with 
medial experience. Which is to say, if practice becomes perception, as Casey 
Boyle suggested in his work on serial practice (and which I explored in chapter 
5), then one might extend that logic to suggest that experience becomes expec-
tation. Put simply, the more one experiences hypermediacy, the more one 
becomes accustomed to (and/or expectant of) hypermediate representational 
affordances. Hence, for an individual to experience Telehouse West as hyper-
mediate requires at least one sense of medial awareness (connected, in part, 
to a greater sense of medial expectation); further, to experience Telehouse 
West as hyperrhetorical requires another sense of medial awareness (one that 
involves a kind of a hypermediate awareness that can be situated or read in 
rhetorically meaningful ways). Of course, both “hyper” conditions are always 
already located within the representation itself (as part of the possibility space 
by which different ecologies and their human and nonhuman entities establish 
relational connections to the design), but they only take on these conditions 
if certain experiences and expectations are present in (or potentially available 
within) participant ecologies.
To better explain this dynamic, let me work backward a bit in order to 
move forward—drawing on new media (in Bolter and Grusin’s orientation) 
and its potential parallels (and distinctions) with the New Aesthetic. The point 
here, however, is not to impose an unnecessary division or to create a false 
coupling with new media and the New Aesthetic, but to use these two orienta-
tions to highlight something of a shift in cultural expectations of mediation. 
For example, part of what made new media “new” was the fact that compu-
tational modes of representation and expression introduced in the last half of 
the twentieth century offered a notably different orientation to the experience 
of media than that of print media or mainstream film and television artifacts 
of the time—with the far majority of those types of mediations championing 
immediacy as the driving orientation to the experience being offered. Thus, 
what mattered for medial practices leading up to at least Bolter and Grusin’s 
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“new media” moment was both the fidelity of the representation offered and 
the corresponding effacement of the techné and technological dimensions that 
might impugn the illusion of representational purity. But the new media era 
of the 1990s began something of a transition in cultural, medial preferences—
moving the techno-public of the Western world away from the centrality of 
immediacy toward a penchant for hypermediacy (or at least something ori-
ented toward a bit more balance). For the advent of computers and computa-
tional media created widespread opportunity, particularly in the US, for the 
hypermediate to be present; in so doing, there were increased opportunities 
for the hypermediate to become valued in representation, critical in the craft-
ing of meaning, and fundamental to the experience being offered—doing so in 
ways simply not possible before (or at least not to the same extent). Meaning, 
from the advent and uptake of video games and heads-up displays (HUDs) to 
multiwindowed desktops and interfaces to multimediated webtexts, computa-
tional, screen media have thrived in the very multiplication of “the signs [and 
streams] of mediation” central to hypermediacy (Bolter and Grusin 34). Thus, 
much of the turn-of-the-century scholarship on new media—from Bolter and 
Grusin to Lisa Gitelman, from Lev Manovich to Anne Wysocki—was about 
accounting for this shift and its impact on contemporary artists, cinematic 
practices, materialities and methodologies, student compositions, and the like. 
But while both new media studies and the New Aesthetic seem tied to hyper-
mediate conditionalities—and a corresponding preference for experiencing 
mediation itself—Bolter and Grusin’s petit récit was working in relation to an 
emerging sense of hypermediacy for a culture unquestionably grounded in 
immediacy. The New Aesthetic, in contrast, involves accounting for a condi-
tional hypermediacy in a culture that has already undergone this hyperme-
diate transition (or, again, an undergoing in which hypermediacy is at least 
equally viable as an experiential, medial orientation).
Whereas Bolter and Grusin’s new media was content with focusing on the 
hypermediacy of the screen itself, much in the post-digital present, includ-
ing elements of the New Aesthetic, has to generate the hypermediate condi-
tion (and corresponding hyperawareness) through different means. Because 
of this, there has been an increasing push by working creatives (and by some 
scholars) to move inside “the digital” (or to move computationality’s “insides” 
outward to the aesthetic dimension) as a mode of hypermediate expression—
directing attention and awareness in particular ways. Or, put another way, 
Western culture has become more accustomed to the hypermediate qualities 
of screen media, undergoing something of a naturalization of hypermedi-
ate medial experiences and turning the previous hypermediate elements into 
somewhat immediate sensibilities (see chapter 4 and the pixel orientation). 
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Consequently, general mediated publics now expect multiple media streams 
(and competing representations and sensory inputs/outputs) in most (if not 
all) of their mediating devices. Therefore, to make something hypermediate 
and/or to use that hypermediacy in hyperrhetorical ways, post-digital artisans 
(including post-digital rhetoricians) have begun to draw attention to what it 
is like to be in, of, or even among computationality. This is, to a certain extent, 
what is occurring in Telehouse West, as its design attempts to locate passersby 
within the pixel aesthetic at the root of computational, screen-based repre-
sentation—not fully inside the box, but definitely closer in proximity than 
what the seamlessness of techno-progression narratives might suggest. How-
ever, this sense of evolving computational hypermediacy may be more readily 
grasped in the artworks of Dutch designer Bart Hess, whose Digital Artifacts 
installation attempts to express what glitch feels like on the skin. Hess is try-
ing not to represent glitch as such but to ask what it is like to be part of the 
computational process/mishap that results in glitch and then to find a way to 
express that disruption in embodied (if not rhetorical) forms through simu-
lation or representation that call attention to the condition itself. Of course, 
Hess’s work eventually gets rendered as a digital-visual artifact that can be 
distributed across various networked streams—participating in a multitude 
of circulating rhetorical ecologies—but as an artistic act and object it raises 
different questions from those pursued by the new media–era avant-garde. In 
fact, the distinction between the new media avant-garde and New Aesthetic 
tendencies provides a revealing dimension to hypermediate/hyperrhetorical 
orientations.
For example, as Bolter and Diane Gromala explored in their Windows 
and Mirrors: Interaction Design, Digital Art, and the Myth of Transparency—
where they looked at the representational, rhetorical, and aesthetic implica-
tions of digital art featured in the SIGGRAPH 2000 Art Gallery—new media 
artists, particularly those playing with digital technologies in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, began to approach digital art as “experiments in interac-
tion design” (24). By manipulating the expectations of mediation as part of 
their very design, emergent digital artifacts were able to offer something of an 
authentic medial experience that took shape in the very interaction between 
the designed elements and the (hypermediated) engagements of the partici-
pant (25). One can see these considerations in the widely popular Text Rain, 
created by Romy Achituv and Camille Utterback in 1999, where participants 
used their bodies to interact with virtual letters raining down on a screen.5 
This installation, which was dependent on the play between digital artifacts 
 5. For a deeper look at the project, visit http://camilleutterback.com/projects/text-rain/.
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and real, human participants, foregrounded the experience of the media-
tion. What a work like Text Rain accomplished was to remind participants to 
“appreciate the ways in which .  .  . [a particular artifact] shapes .  .  . [human] 
experience” by framing screens as both mirrors and windows—things not 
only that people look through but that reflect something of their own con-
ditionality in their very mediation (Bolter and Gromala 27). New Aestheti-
cism, while turning toward ecologies rather than couplings, has retained 
gestures of the windows-and-mirrors dynamic (particularly with regard to 
hypermediation). However, New Aestheticism has also pushed further, not 
just foregrounding the mediated interaction but attempting to represent and/
or let individuals experience both the computationality at the root of various 
mediations as well as the underlying human registers through which those 
mediations have meaning—folding layers upon layers of awareness into the 
mix (and thus inviting a sense of hypermediacy along with the potential of 
a hyperrhetoricity). In other words, Text Rain in a New Aesthetic moment 
would simply work differently: it might expose the operative mechanics of 
the installation to participants or sync the letter fall and letter placement with 
heart monitors on participant smartphones, smartwatches, or smartbands. Or 
it might push beyond the embodied interaction with falling digital letters and 
employ real-time sensors with humans functioning as data source (influenc-
ing the letter choice, letter flow, and the like), where the screen mediations 
call to human participants in particular ways (offering facial recognition map-
ping and pulling up corresponding Google images that share those pixel-map 
features). Or, as a third example, a New Aesthetic Text Rain might expand 
the interaction space of the installation and allow participants to manipu-
late the coding or algorithms operative at the core of the interaction (with 
those manipulations live-streamed in addition to their corresponding shifts 
in screen representation/experience). Or, as yet another possibility, a New 
Aesthetic Text Rain might introduce glitch into the process altogether, with 
images, letters, sounds, and all manner of visual disruptions taking place on 
the screen—all superimposed on the mirrored screen-projections of the real-
time human participants. All of which is to say, a New Aesthetic Text Rain 
would be notably different (a) because of changes in technological affordances 
and aesthetic preferences and (b) because the cultural expectations of media-
tion (from immediate to hypermediate) and of human-to-media influence 
have shifted as well—a transition that includes not only ubiquitous computing 
and a naturalization of certain screen-media-to-human interactions but also 
an undergoing of a computational orientation that renders humans-as-data 
and, in turn, seeks to leverage human data streams toward critical and creative 
(and sometimes controlling) ends.
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This, of course, introduces yet another rhetorical consideration in this 
conversation, which is the degree to which hypermediate, computationally 
oriented, mediated experiences increasingly invite techno-human assemblages 
into a humans-as-data worldview. And this is important because how one 
enacts one’s rhetorical capacities is notably different if people are understood 
less as mediated beings (capable of experiencing mediations in particular ways 
and serving as mediators of change in a mediated world) and more as aggre-
gates of data streams, responsive and reactive to changes in data-generating 
activities. The focus in dealing with the former remains a matter of shifting an 
audience’s identities or identifications—a matter rich in the rhetorical tradi-
tion—while the latter pushes the conversation necessarily toward the depths 
and degrees to which one can introduce mediations that manipulate the out-
put values (and intensities) of data streams.
Thus, while new media artists and theorists asked audiences to consider 
the expressive potential of new forms of representation and their interactions 
with those elements, highlighting mediation through competing representa-
tional practices and other forms of hypermediacy, New Aesthetic working cre-
atives invite hypermediacy-oriented audiences to play with the hypermediacy 
itself (as expectant value and as interactive possibility) and, in many cases, to 
experience the computationality connected to the mediation—encouraging 
an attentiveness to how the experiential artifact participates in computational 
mediation as well as to how the artifact and its experience invite audiences to 
adopt particular medial orientations (i.e., to bring together technological and 
biological desires for understanding the world).
To further situate this orientation, I turn to Random International’s 2012 
work Rain Room6—offered here as a comparative, of sorts, to Text Rain. Rain 
Room is an installation that allows participants to walk through an environ-
ment of falling water droplets and yet remain completely dry. This process 
involves an incredibly complex set of interactions between 3D tracking cam-
eras, water, solenoid valves, pressure regulators, molded tiles, a grated floor, 
steel beams, and a water management system (fully dependent on compu-
tational procedures). As a participant enters the rain room, the sound of 
water and the suggestion of moisture remain, but the water stops flowing in 
the space the participant occupies. Her body (rendered as interpretable data 
stream for specific computational processes) becomes a negative space in the 
water flow as the downpour ceases and resumes in response to her move-
 6. For a more detailed look at Rain Room, visit the Museum of Modern Arts webpage 
on the installation (https://www.moma.org/calendar/exhibitions/1352) or view any number of 
videos available about the project online—specifically the Guardian’s video at https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=EkvazIZx-F0.
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ment and presence. What is interesting is not how the installation speaks to 
the control that humans may exert over natural forces and phenomena, but 
the ways in which the water (more precisely its negation) gives a thickness to 
what is otherwise an invisible computational space—the water, or its absence 
thereof, makes one hyperaware of the thickness of computational space, and, 
if extended far enough, of one’s body as data stream occupying (or negating) 
a corresponding set of computational values. Further, as Jonathan Openshaw 
has suggested, when participants experience Rain Room, its complexity is so 
seamless and yet so pervasive that they cannot help but contemplate its com-
putationality. For in the current epoch of a hypermediate and/or hyperaware 
culture, one’s “first instinct upon seeing a complex form [like Rain Room] is to 
look for signs of the digital technology that made it” (Openshaw 228). While 
this instinctual move may both contribute to and reflect David M. Berry’s 
condition of digital pareidolia (referenced earlier in this work), it nonetheless 
foregrounds the very experience of something like Rain Room, which offers 
an embodied experience of space while also inviting participants to ask after, 
experience, look for, and even expect the computationality of the project.
Thus, while there may be something of an operative continuum of hyper-
mediate considerations, as Western culture transitions from an era of new 
media (a becoming hypermediate) to one of the post-digital (leveraging 
hypermediacy for a hypermediate culture), there is also a necessary overlap: 
new media hypermediacy foregrounded the experience of screen mediation 
as a way of talking about hypermediacy, whereas the New Aesthetic leverages 
the hypermediate qualities (and expectations) of screen mediation in/of/for 
a post-digital culture to help expose rhetorical and medial ecologies (par-
ticular computational considerations, medial conditions, human–technology 
relations, and the like). One might see the New Aesthetic as the very thing 
being occasioned by the larger orientations of post-digital culture (see Kwastek 
78–79). Additionally, by operationalizing hypermediacy for an increasingly 
hypermediate-oriented audience, the New Aesthetic is able to call attention to 
a set of sensibilities (and implications) that vibrate between the rhetorical and 
aesthetic preferences of biological and technological desires. And this refers 
not only to those moments where artifacts and objects draw incredibly rich 
parallels between things like biological cells and technological pixels—as in 
the works of Japanese artist Kōhei Nawa, whose PIXCELL sculptures actively 
“question the line between living being[s] and digital technology” (Openshaw 
180)—but also to the fact that mediated beings increasingly see the world 
in (technologically) mediated ways, while technological improvements (in 
software, hardware, and techniques) simultaneously render “the everyday” as 
“increasingly machine readable” (Kwastek 73). Consequently, any hyperaware-
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ness that takes form does so in relation to counterpointing forces: a mediated 
condition that perpetually invites mediated ways of seeing/sensing the world 
(as well as a preference for particular types of medial experience) and a tech-
nological orientation that increasingly reduces the world to interpretable data 
values (whether as pixels, GPS locations, electric impulses, or the like).
Although these are each critical considerations for contemporary rhe-
torical practice, it is harder and harder for rhetoricians to intervene directly 
in the “data streams” themselves, as much of those generative outputs reside 
beyond the physical and conceptual grasp of the human bodies that produce 
them (whether via technical complexity, black-boxing practices, or yet other 
constraints). But one can attune to the medial orientations and experiences 
themselves, as rhetors and audiences often have (greater) access to those 
mediations and their potential interventions. Therefore, one can work with 
different mediating practices (and aesthetic representations) to find ways to 
extend or counter particular mediated perspectives by producing artifacts and 
expressions that work within the expectations that an audience brings to par-
ticular medial experiences. This, of course, is not only a way to foster rhetori-
cal awareness of mediation (and to use that awareness for rhetorical ends) but, 
in many ways, often the only recourse one has to exposing, with any impact, 
the more critical (and often unquestioned) values of the “humans-as-data” 
worldview. For example, telling people that Facebook collects their data, lis-
tens to their conversations, tracks their movements, and the like in order to 
better feed and facilitate their role as Facebook-data-streams invites a certain 
kind of awareness. But creating an app or web-browser extension that hijacks 
the Facebook interface in order to capture and represent, in hypermediate 
fashion, the data streams themselves invites another. Think, for example, how 
one’s experience and expectations of Facebook might change if every time a 
person made a post on Facebook she could see the digital residue left behind 
and how that residue gets taken up by the program’s algorithms to make pre-
dictions, market content, or select user feeds to display. This is precisely what 
Data Selfie does. Created by Data X, a group co-founded by Hang Do Thi Duc 
and Regina Flores Mir, Data Selfie is an extension for the Google Chrome 
and Firefox browsers that tracks users’ data traces and reveals what gets left 
behind and what the various learning algorithms can predict about their per-
sonalities based on the data.7 The project was designed to help people explore 
their relationships to the data residue they leave as a matter of course when 
engaged in social networks and online media consumption. But what it does, 
 7. Data Selfie continues to operate in its data-gathering capacity, but its algorithmic pre-
diction function was shut down on July 1, 2018.
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in addition to capturing one’s data stream (and highlighting humans-as-data 
orientations), is invite a certain kind of attentiveness to one’s participation 
on Facebook and/or Facebook’s “lurkerism” in relation to one’s mediated life. 
Thus, Data Selfie points toward a hyperawareness (with a conditional poten-
tial for hyperrhetoricity) of the very worldview that underlines something 
like Facebook—which, while operating as a social media network for people, 
inherently reduces the human condition to a series of more and less valuable 
data streams (and thus an ethically suspect line of more and less valuable 
humans). But what this kind of New Aesthetic–esque browser extension also 
has the potential to do is to use hyperrhetorical mediations to foster an aware-
ness of the depths to which Facebook is looking back out at its participants, 
listening to their lives, following along in their actions and activities, and the 
like—inviting the hyperawareness associated with the previous fourth-wall 
section.
The point, here, in all of this, but particularly in this contour, is to better 
understand the considerations and contributions of New Aestheticism. Col-
lectively, then, one might see that under the auspices of the fourth contour the 
New Aesthetic (1) has a penchant for enactment in its own medium (e.g., an 
emerging aesthetic of the network taking place on/in/through the network), 
(2) privileges artifacts that turn to face their human viewers/participants (e.g., 
artifacts that call attention to their mediation and to human relationships with 
them, disrupting illusions of immediacy), and (3) routinely identifies with 
artifacts that possess a hyperrhetoricity (e.g., works that take shape in rela-
tion to their own privileged conditionalities and do so by calling attention to 
their own [and others’] guiding assumptions). Any one of these (or two or 
three together) can serve as inventive guides for making artifacts that partici-
pate in the logics and values of New Aestheticism, which means that the New 
Aesthetic may be, as this work has implicitly argued, far more widely at play 
than just in the visual/digital artifacts curated on Bridle’s tumblr. For the New 
Aesthetic is about awareness (of mediation, of underlying systems that govern 
particular technological and/or sociocultural practices and preferences), about 
relationships (human–technology assemblages as well as technology-to-tech-
nology dynamics), and about representational practices (dissolving boundaries 
between the digital and the nondigital as well as between technological and 
biological materialities), calling attention to themselves as acts of mediation, 
and then staring back at humans as partners and co-participants in a hybrid 
world.
The question that emerges, of course, is how (and to what extent) does one 
use this kind of hyperawareness, hyperrhetoricity, and/or condition of hyper-
mediacy in relation to the practices of rhetoric? To this end, I want to con-
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clude this chapter (and this work) with something of a larger implication of 
the necessary shift that these kinds of considerations invite, which, at its core, 
is a reorienting of rhetorical practices away from the long-standing tradition 
of ekphrasis toward matters more intimately linked to medial experience (and 
experience design).
AUTHENTIC MEDIATED EXPERIENCES
As I introduced in chapter 1, ekphrasis comes out of the rhetorical tradition as 
part of the progymnasmata (a series of exercises designed to prepare students 
for the production and performance of oral declamations). In this regard, the 
ekphrastic act involved bringing (via description) something visual, material, 
or experiential clearly before the eyes or minds of an audience. In public dec-
lamations this was the job of the rhetor: to present, via description, the scene 
or image or act or object of importance/under question to an audience (and 
to position it accordingly). And ekphrasis has, for the most part, remained at 
the heart of rhetoric over several millennia—with the very act of producing 
discourse involving, at a fundamental level, describing in words one’s think-
ing, one’s position, or one’s preferred course of action (among other consider-
ations). Further, as the practice of ekphrasis is, at its core, an act of translating 
something of the phenomenological world from one mediation to another, the 
bulk of the arts might be seen to operate in relation to the condition (and con-
straints) of ekphrasis—with artists and practitioners of all varieties employing 
various techné to translate (and/or transmediate) experience, imagination, 
feeling, and the like.
But when one shifts from ekphrasis to matters of experience (and experi-
ence design) as a point of emphasis, there is an accompanying rise in the value 
(and place) of pathos. And here I mean pathos not simply as it has been (mis)
represented in the Aristotelian order—as a category for emotional appeals 
(On Rhetoric 1.2.2–4)8—but the more root meanings of the term, which are 
linked directly to experience, to that which one undergoes or that which one 
suffers/endures (Heidegger, On the Way 57; see also Handler Spitz 546–47).9 
In this sense, pathos more readily aligns with Dewey’s embodied experience of 
 8. This reduction stems in part from Aristotle’s treatment of specific emotions, which he 
construes in topoi-fashion: Orge/Praotes, Philia/Ekhthra, Phobos/Tharsos, Aiskyne/Anaiskhyn-
tia, Kharis/Akharistia, Eleos/Nemesan, Phthonos/Zelos (see On Rhetoric, Book II).
 9. Handler Spitz locates this original meaning of “experience” in works like Aeschylus’s 
Agamemnon (line 177), Sophocles’ Ajax (line 313), and Plato’s Theatetus (193c) and Republic 
(612a) (547).
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aestheticism—a recovery not of descriptions of stylistic judgments by a master 
class, but an undergoing of an affective experience rooted in everyday occur-
rences (and intrinsically linked to aesthetics).
But what drives this turn from ekphrasis to experience (design) is more 
than just a need to recover the aesthetic and embodied affectivities of every-
day life. Rather, it is equally occasioned by the cultural shift in expectations 
of media suggested above—that is, that post-digital culture operates, by and 
large, with a hypermediate rather than immediate orientation to medial expe-
rience. Couple this overt attentiveness to mediation itself with a slew of mul-
timedia practices that champion affect and felt sensibilities over categorical 
reason (see Ulmer’s genres for electracy, as one set of examples), and one 
might start to grasp how a description of an idea, theory, or even an experi-
ence (the practice of ekphrasis) is increasingly insufficient for a post-digital 
audience. Rather, immersive mediations (from virtual reality platforms to 
material environments that get blanketed by layers of digital mediation) now 
allow (if not necessitate) working creatives to craft not just a description of X 
but an authentic mediated experience of X—in other words, to (re)produce an 
experience that, when undergone, leaves participants with an embodied sense 
of understanding. One example of this can be seen in rhetoric and media 
scholar Jason Helms’s “Vorhandenheit” project, which invites participants to 
maneuver through an explication of philosopher Martin Heidegger’s concepts 
of zuhanden (ready-at-hand) and vorhanden (present-at-hand), but in doing 
so the participants actually undergo the experience of the concepts them-
selves. Of course, Helms’s work still includes elements of ekphrasis (as the 
shift under consideration here is by no means intended as an erasure of ekph-
rasis), but those descriptive elements are eventually subsumed by the experi-
ence itself, which offers an embodied mediated undergoing of zuhanden and 
vorhanden. In many ways, Helms’s project is an enacting of the paradigm ges-
tured to in the previous section, but one whose experience leads to a deeper 
(if not different) understanding.
But beyond individual projects like Helms’s, technical communication 
scholar Liza Potts has gone so far as to advocate for the inclusion of a user-
experience design expert on all digital humanities projects. While Potts is 
concerned in most cases with making sure that those projects operate with an 
attentiveness to the experience of the interface—as she sees this as critical to 
the kinds of knowledge building that digital humanities projects may accom-
plish—her argument is far more poignant, as computational, networked, 
screen-based delivery systems have necessitated a reframing and reformat-
ting of cultural and scholarly ways of knowing and representing that knowing. 
For example, at this point in human history all digital-visual representations 
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(academic and non) are, at their root, manipulated (and remediable) mediated 
creations. Their very coming-to-be (whether as representation, simulation, 
or other) is fundamentally dependent upon mediation—with each artifact 
subject to all sorts of influences, agendas, interpretations, and the like. What 
matters, then, is no longer the authenticity of a moment, which has become 
perpetually suspect in post-digital culture where everything is infinitely medi-
ated and infinitely available for further mediation. Rather, what matters is the 
experience that an artifact offers or of which it is suggestive (again, see Helms 
and Rain Room as two such examples). Therefore, post-digital practitioners 
must be mindful not just of the descriptions they provide but of the experi-
ences they produce—which include not only the authors’ own sensorium that 
takes stock of and helps manipulate new mediating technologies toward par-
ticular ends but also that of their audiences (particularly human audiences), 
whose sense perception is augmented/altered by that very mediation.
In other words, every rhetorical artifact, particularly of the digitally 
mediated variety, offers a particular kind of mediated experience, but how 
one makes sense of that experience through the human sensorium is itself 
“enhanced” by the very medial conditions that have contributed to the cre-
ation of the artifact itself and the experience it offers. At work here, then, 
is a practice that produces its own conditionality. What emerges for post-
digital rhetoricians as a result is a need for an orientation that includes less 
an attentiveness to the fidelity of representation (via the act of alphabetic and 
verbal description) and instead a focus on the experience that an artifact or 
creation can provide (and the ways in which that artifact can produce experi-
ential homologies or invite accretions of value in relation to other rhetorical 
ecologies).
Further, this orientation should also include an understanding (as the 
New Aesthetic suggests) of the very potentialities of that experience being 
interdependent with the seeping of computational values and practices into 
the human condition, which contributes both to its production and to any 
attempts to make sense of the creation. Meaning, the crafting of an experience 
(as a rhetorical practice, homological or otherwise) must also play within the 
mediated expectations (and ways of experiencing that mediation) brought to 
the encounter by a post-digital audience.
CRAFTING EXPERIENCE
One way to help attune rhetoricians to these considerations, then, is by 
turning to craft—to the crafting of particular mediated experiences. Craft 
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knowledge, of course, has been primarily associated with “‘lower forms’ of 
knowledge”—with having “little theoretical knowledge of its own” (Johnson 
674). But as writing scholar Kristin Prins has argued, craft actually allows for 
an attentiveness to the relationships among human and nonhuman materi-
alities (152) because it implies a kind of embodied creationism—it involves a 
human laboring act. Craft, as rhetoric and compositionist Robert Johnson has 
argued, is both a type of knowing and a formation of knowledge, and, just as 
important, is of and in the human domain (677).
When this human laboring act comes into contact with computational 
platforms and algorithmic procedures, what occurs, as designer Wes McGee 
suggests, is the opening of a “wide range of new workflows” that introduce 
new habits of practice (in Openshaw 272)—including new ludic habits of prac-
tice—and, as I suggested in chapter 5, a fundamental shift in labor. That is, 
part of what computational mediations have done is to take on some of the 
labor burden of making/doing. In many cases these labor shifts are subtle—
from autofill to autocorrect—but in some cases they are quite extensive: for 
example, think about how much labor is offloaded into digital photography 
apps, which routinely render sepia images in the blink of an eye (an oth-
erwise labor-intensive process). On the one hand, as suggested earlier, this 
shift in labor allows digital rhetors to focus their energies elsewhere: to spend 
more time tinkering with ideas, playing with technology, creating multiple 
versions, and being increasingly attentive to the crafted experience. On the 
other hand, the shift in labor and accompanying workflows alters the very 
conditions of craft knowledge itself. For if craft is understood as a capacity 
for action that brings together embodied habits of practice and special (if 
not specialized) ways of knowing—“know[ing] the materials of the trade,” 
“understand[ing] the forms of various genres and media[tions],” and being 
aware of the dual orientations of (1) process and product, and (2) the making 
of selves (subjectivities) and the making of cultures (Johnson 685; 684)—then 
new computational practices that take on human labors and establish new 
human–technology workflows also augment the materials of the trade, the 
forms and experiences of mediation, and the cultures and subjectivities that 
might take shape. A craft orientation can help facilitate, then, the making of 
artifacts as offering uniquely mediated experiences because craft requires an 
understanding of the materialities and mediations involved, as well as how 
shifts in those elements introduce new craft products and new craft processes. 
And this (hyper)awareness of process—of altered workflows that include tech-
nological co-laborers—actually makes it easier for craftspersons to use an 
exposure of process for hypermediate purposes (for the making of hyperme-
diate experiences).
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Now, while craft allows for an embodied orientation to materialities and 
mediations, perhaps an equally valuable approach to the making of medi-
ated experiences would be, as I suggested earlier in relation to Potts, through 
something like experience design, which operates more explicitly with an 
attentiveness to architecture and aesthetics. For example, in interaction 
design, usability studies, and the like, there is a highly complex, delicate, and 
dynamic interconnectedness that exists between the grammars, procedures, 
logics, frames, techniques, and so forth (architecture as structure) and mat-
ters of representation, tone, mood, visual metaphors, and so on (aesthetics as 
style). The default inclination, since at least Aristotle’s Metaphysics, has been 
to treat these constituents separately—the lingering effect of the dominant 
Western form/matter model. But as media theorist Matthew Fuller has argued 
in Media Ecologies: Materialist Energies in Art and Technoculture and “Com-
monality, Pixel Property, Seduction: As If,” the two cannot be, nor should 
they be, separated, particularly when trying to create meaningful represen-
tations—or, in the case of this chapter, meaningful (and rhetorical) medi-
ated experiences. To counter this division, specifically in Media Ecologies, 
Fuller uses philosopher Gilbert Simondon’s notion of individuation to suggest 
that the materials of any given situation—which include working creatives 
(humans), technologies, institutional and political contexts, cultural aesthet-
ics, and so on—“produce their own capacities of formation,” and do so “in 
relation to the morphogenetic affordances around them” (18). In terms of the 
New Aesthetic, the morphogenetic affordances include human–technology 
assemblages and the ways in which humans have “naturalized” computational 
values and practices—creating not only techno-infused epistemologies but 
also particular aesthetic expectations for mediated engagement. There are, 
of course, any number of treatises on experience design that offer basic prin-
ciples or guidance, and this work is by no means discouraging readers from 
picking up with those considerations in more detail (particularly the works of 
Donald Norman and Nathan Shedroff). But this work is not about experience 
design itself; rather, in this context, what matters is how the phenomenon 
of the New Aesthetic introduces additional considerations to an experience 
design orientation.
For example, one key element introduced here is that post-digital rhetori-
cians are no longer designing artifacts for the primary experience of immedi-
acy. Take any number of digital textbooks or accompanying “learning suites,” 
which regularly offer “pop-up” video explanations (of the talking-head vari-
ety), interactive explanatory animations, hypertextuality as matter of user con-
venience, and so on. The experience of media, even relatively traditional media 
like textbooks that have been remediated for electronic delivery, now include a 
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notable level of hypermediate possibilities—from additional layers of informa-
tion sitting “on top” a particular content to meaning itself occurring through 
/ in relation to the metaphors offered by visual cues and buttons. While this 
perpetual disruption of the through orientation would have been destabilizing 
(if not devastating) to popular culture in Richard Lanham’s moment of “digi-
tal rhetoric” coinage, today’s post-digital natives situate medial awareness as 
(increasingly) “natural” to screen-based mediations: news broadcasts include 
layers of related and nonrelated information situated on top of and below the 
main camera feed; YouTube videos are littered with onscreen and interrup-
tive advertisements, overlays, texts, and the like; corporate websites regularly 
include redirects and pop-out windows that explain information, offer related 
services, or provide additional context; and even static print-culture media, 
through programs like LAYAR and Aurasma, now include the possibilities of 
playable media as hypermediate elements. Thus, from smartphones to com-
puter games, television shows to digital textbooks, people are perpetually 
engaged in hypermediate relations with their media—through both internal 
(onscreen) and external (social media) mediations. What matters is no longer 
a mediated artifact’s ties to realism, nor its ability to efface the interface—
matters aligned with immediacy—but rather an attunement to how different 
technologies and humans are individuated in radically different ways from 
moment to moment, with each of those moments being increasingly medi-
ated and yet experienced as authentic rather than artifice. Take the application 
Snapchat as an example; part of what makes it so engaging is not simply that 
it offers real-time image sharing (as one can do that in any number of other 
applications) but that it allows for new ways of experiencing and augment-
ing image/text exchanges. While the viewing time limits are unique in their 
own way, it is actually the quick filters (the mapping and masking dynamic) 
of Snapchat that make the application itself an experience. This is perhaps 
most evident when playing with the app in real time with a friend or fam-
ily member, as the two-person augmentations (whether captured and shared 
via the network or not) offer an authentic mediated experience. Moreover, 
once one has undergone a Snapchat engagement, it becomes increasingly dif-
ficult to separate that experience from the expectations one brings to other 
digital-image-based mediated exchanges. This is not to say that users expect 
Facebook, for example, to offer the same experience as Snapchat, but that the 
affordances and capacities for expression (and, perhaps, for playing with the 
application as itself an authentic experience) seep into the milieu of image-
oriented human–technology expectations.
However, while experience design has risen in prominence in the past 
decade for everything from the making of textiles to web design, what the 
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New Aesthetic provides is (1) a set of considerations that work deliberately 
across digital and nondigital materialities, (2) an attunement to a culture 
rooted in hypermediacy (not immediacy), and (3) operative contours that may 
help working creatives employ hypermediacy rhetorically (as part of mediated 
experiences). For the hyperawareness of the mediating act is not only part of 
the expectations that audiences bring to digital artifacts and digitally mediated 
engagements; it is itself a way of adding context, clarity, and condensation to 
the commentary or critical engagement offered by the artifact itself (i.e., part 
of its hyperrhetorical capacities). What all this suggests, then, is a change in 
how rhetors understand audiences’ expectations of mediated artifacts.
To account for this shift, what the New Aesthetic contours offer is some-
thing of a post-digital remake of the clarity, brevity, and sincerity (C-B-S) 
system central to the ekphrastic practice of the last three-hundred-plus years 
of alphabetic literacy and print-culture rhetorics. In other words, when alpha-
betic writing is given primacy for rhetorical practices, the C-B-S system func-
tions as one idealized set of operative values. Of course, as Lanham argued, 
these elements were never fully present/achieved in any particular production 
(Analyzing Prose 217), but they nonetheless operated in harmony and helped 
guide rhetors toward the production of a particular kind of text-based experi-
ence (C-B-S as a decorum for writing-as-immediacy). But post-digital rheto-
ricians need something grounded more fully in the human sensorium, as the 
experience of digital artifacts is not only different from that of text but also 
not beholden to the scriptures of ekphrasis.
Per the indications of the New Aesthetic, this “something else” includes 
a greater attentiveness to the embodied experiences of particular mediated 
artifacts and to the hyperawareness of mediation itself (manifest in relation 
to both material and nonmaterial conditions of production)—and here is 
where the New Aesthetic contours begin to take on a more systemic intent 
or purpose. But whereas the C-B-S elements operated in harmony—present-
ing product values for which to strive—the contours of the New Aesthetic 
orient making activities through a fluid mix of complementary connections 
and competing tensions, with various combinations of the contours (and even 
singularities) guiding post-digital rhetoricians toward making effective and 
affective mediated experiences in/of/for a hypermediate culture. Given this 
dynamic, what is perhaps most stable across the contours is the way in which 
each helps in the pursuit of mediated experiences that invite (if not insist on) 
an awareness of mediation, of materiality, of manifested implications, and the 
like. Which means that post-digital practitioners who allow the contours to 
influence their practices of making mediated (and remediable) experiences 
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should not try to hide their rhetorical or representational maneuvers but 
rather should foreground the mediation itself as (critical to) the experience. 
To put this in McLuhan’s terms: the experience of the medium is (becoming) 
the message. Thus, what the New Aesthetic offers is one set of operative guides 
for the doing of post-digital rhetoric.
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